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Abstract
The safety culture of so-called high-reliability organizations (HROs) encompasses values,
routines, and work processes that allow an organization to prevent mistakes and quickly
bounce back if unexpected events occur. It is said to provide a model for improving
organizational resilience in the offshore oil and gas industry, where small errors can grow
into accidents with devastating environmental, social, and economic impacts. To date, such
a transfer of successful practices is impeded by a lack of system perspective that would
allow researchers and practitioners to fully understand the safety dynamics in HROs, adjust
them to the unique setting of offshore oil and gas, plan safety interventions, and anticipate
the direct and indirect effects of these interventions.
In this dissertation, I have developed and rigorously tested a model of how safety
interventions impact the interdependent aspects of the HROs’ characteristics, based on
peer-reviewed research, an industry workshop, and a survey of offshore oil and gas
practitioners. This approach combines the qualitative research methods of Thematic
Analysis (TA) and Thematic Network (TN) with Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) modeling
and simulation, and Exploratory Modelling and Analysis (EMA). Furthermore, I developed
a thematic proximity measure to determine the weights of the edges in the FCMs based on
research texts, thus reducing the need for including subject matter experts in modeling
studies.
This work makes several contributions: on a theoretical level, it shows the inherent
dynamics of HROs and points to several limitations in existing High Reliability
Organizations Theory (HROT) as well as uncertainties regarding the efficacy of some
i

safety interventions. On a practical level, it provides a tested and verified planning tool for
the safety decision-makers that can also serve as the foundation of future safety culture
training.
Finally, it makes several contributions to the FCM methodology, namely a model
architecture that combines knowledge from the literature with that of human experts, the
introduction of thematic proximity coefficient, and the adaptation of model testing
strategies from the literature on Systems Dynamics.
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1. Introduction
Large-scale accidents in socio-technical systems can have devastating consequences,
including loss of lives, poor health outcomes, damaged ecosystems, reduced economic
opportunities, disruption of local communities, and negative impacts on government
budgets. A case in point is the 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion and oil spill, which
resulted in 11 fatalities, 17 severe injuries (BSEE, 2014), massive environmental damage
(National Commission, 2011), and reduction in BP’s bottom line and taxable income by
almost 65 1 billion US dollars. These consequences should be a compelling incentive for
organizations to prevent such events. However, the rate of accidents in the offshore oil and
gas remain consistently and stubbornly high (BSEE, 2015; 2016; 2017; National
Academies, 2016), which results in the need to move beyond the study and analysis of
accidents causations and aftermaths: besides, effective strategies and reliable procedures
for prevention and mitigation of accidents must be developed and implemented, such as
error anticipation, detection, reporting, and timely correction.
High-profile accidents (also known as organizational accidents) are rare events that happen
to systems or subsystems due to multiple organizational factors that can be identified in
almost every organizational disaster (Reason, 1998; Pidgeon, 2010) and that are critical to
preventing them (Leveson et al., 2009; Reason, 2000). These factors include but not limited

1

BP Deepwater Horizon costs balloon to $65 billion: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bpdeepwaterhorizon/bp-deepwater-horizon-costs-balloon-to-65-billion-idUSKBN1F50NL
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to system complexity 2 and elements coupling 3 (Perrow, 1984), sophisticated types of
machinery (Priest, 2008), conflicting goals, performance pressure (Weick et al., 1999),
deadlines, intensifying commitment, a decline of resource slack (Vaughan, 1996; Reason,
1998), and reward systems that promote productivity and undermine safety (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2015).
Within the literature on organizational accidents, a significant research stream recommends
adopting the practices of so-called High Reliability Organizations (HROs) to overcome
these factors and prevent and control errors that lead to such accidents (Amalberti, 2013;
Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). HROs practice is the outcome of High Reliability Organizations
Theory (HROT): A philosophy of system-resilience to manage risks in complex sociotechnical systems (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989; Roberts, 1990), which leads organizations
that operate reliably. This theory was developed by researching so-called HROs, which are
defined as “a subset of hazardous organizations that have enjoyed a record of high safety
over long periods of time” (Sutcliffe, 2011, p. 134), such as nuclear power plants, air traffic
control (Vogus et al., 2010; Weick et al., 1999), and naval aircraft carriers (Roberts, 1990a).
HROs practice results in a company culture that strongly endorses learning and fosters
work environments where errors, awareness, and concerns can be openly discussed without
fear of blame or accusation (Rochlin, 1996; Weick et al., 1999). It builds and continuously
updates repertoires for organizational knowledge to support developing a resilient system

2

System complexity denotes the extent whereby the interactions among the system elements (e.g., people,
hardware, processes, etc.) are unpredictable and invisible.

3

Coupling refers to the degree of interdependence among the system elements.
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that enables people to anticipate, contain, and cope with unexpected events and learn from
these events and quickly return to normal conditions (Sutcliffe, 2011; Weick & Sutcliffe,
2015). This approach consists of five principles: Preoccupation with failure, reluctance to
simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience, and deference to expertise.
An extensive discussion on HROT, HROs, and the five principles will be provided in
Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
Although the literature on HROs builds on more than thirty years of academic research and
provides an extensive discussion and description of the five principles, it fails to identify
or provide methods for implementing HROs practices in different organizational contexts
(Hales & Chakravorty, 2016; Roberts & Martelli, 2016). Moreover, the literature lacks a
clear explanation of how these five principles are correlated and how they can result in a
capability for both discovering and managing unexpected events (Hopkins, 2007a; Lekka,
2011). As a result, there is an essential need to identify and model all factors that boost as
well as factors that impede the development of organization reliability. Such a model
ensures that organizations can be assessed not only for their aspiration to become HROs,
but also for their actual capacity, efforts, and the level of their success in the process.
To solve the presented problems, the overall objective of this dissertation is to develop a
novel approach by using Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) to build a theory-driven model of
HROs that is grounded in the literature on HROT. FCMs are created with a system thinking
technique that explores the dynamic behavior of causal maps through fuzzy set theory and
neural networks (Kosko, 1986; 1988). In this work, I combine FCM modeling with
Exploratory Modeling and Analysis (EMA), which is a simulation technique that deals
3

with uncertainties in complex modeling (Kwakkel & Pruyt, 2013). EMA copes with
modeling so-called “deep” uncertainties about system states and system structures by
considering not only a single model but multiple models with different structures. Each of
the models is simulated for various inputs resulting in a range of different outcomes;
therefore, the decision-makers can thoroughly explore the uncertainty of their decisions.
The approach of this dissertation and the resulting model of HROT are intended to be
generalizable for all HROs. To evaluate the model’s feasibility, usability, and
effectiveness, I applied it in the context of the offshore oil and gas industry, which has
inherently hazardous operations, generally high accident rates, and a historical record of
high-profile disasters.
The objective of developing and evaluating a theory-driven HROT model through the
integration of FCM and EMA required answering the following research questions:
1. How can research publications on HROT be analyzed to identify and represent relevant
concepts and causal relationships?
2. How can the weight of causal relationships be inferred from qualitative data in research
publications?
3. How can information about concepts, causal relationships, and relationships’ weights
be used to develop a general FCM model of HROT?
4. How can uncertainty about the appropriate model structure be managed in the modeling
process?
5. How can the general FCM model of HROT practices be contextualized to the specific
settings of offshore oil and gas operations?
4

6. How can the contextualized FCM model of HROT practices be used to support safety
decision-makers in the offshore oil and gas industry?
In addition to several theoretical, methodological, and practical contributions, answering
the above six questions resulted in an innovative approach that, for the first time, assigned
weights for the edges of the FCM model by using the same qualitative context used to build
it. The model is expected to leverage the existing capabilities of the selected research
context in fostering and sustaining a culture of safety that empowers people to cope with
unexpected events and mitigate their often-devastating consequences. Moreover, it informs
safety decision-makers and guides their prioritization of safety-relevant procedures, and
helps them understand how to best achieve a high safety level.
Chapter 2 of this dissertation provides extensive discussions on the-state-of-the-art of high
reliability organization theory HROT, as well as an overview of why practicing HROs can
lead to achieving safer operations when other available approaches fall short. This chapter
also presents the research framework and extensively reviews the offshore oil and gas
industry as the selected context of this research. At the end of this chapter, I highlight the
identified research gaps.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the methodological foundation for this research, including Fuzzy
Cognitive Maps (FCMs), Thematic Analysis (TA), Thematic Network (TN), Thematic
Proximity (TP), Exploratory Modelling and Analysis (EMA), methods for model testing
for verification, and model simulation and scenario planning. Chapter 4 discusses the
process of developing the modeling approach and the actual procedure of building the core
FCM model, which I conducted across two research phases.
5

In the first phase, I extracted the knowledge about the causes and effects of HROs practices
from the literature, using a qualitative approach that combined the method of thematic
analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) and the technique of thematic networks (Attride-Stirling,
2001). This phase resulted in the research’s cognitive map. In the second phase, I used the
thematic proximity method (Armborst, 2017) to quantify the causal relationships between
each two causally related concepts in the research’s cognitive map, thus converting it to an
FCM model.
Chapter 5 covers the process of conducting the third phase of this dissertation, which
includes testing the developed FCM model using several verification tests, and then
preparing it for the pilot study, which I have undertaken through an industry workshop.
This pilot study has evaluated the feasibility and usefulness of the overall research
approach based on the opinions of experts from the offshore oil and gas.
Chapter 6 of this dissertation includes the fourth research phase, through which I first
subjected the FCM model to another series of model verification tests; then, I expanded
the research through an online industry survey. In this phase, I combined EMA with FCM
to cope with uncertainties resulting from the complex nature and limited research on HROs
in the offshore oil and gas as well as the variations in the opinions of the survey’s
participants. This chapter also covers the interpretation and analysis of the model
simulation results.
Chapter 7 provides a summary and discussion of my research results, while Chapter 8
covers in detail the research limitations and contributions.

6

2. High Reliability Organizations Theory (HROT)
This dissertation builds on High Reliability Organizations Theory HROT, which explains
the safety and reliability of complex technical operations from social and technological
perspectives of systems. In particular, the theory emphasizes the importance of
organizational practices and mindfulness, which results in a unique organizational culture
that leads to improved safety. Accordingly, the following sections will discuss system
perspectives on safety, define HROs, introduce the concepts of organizational culture,
safety culture, and safety management systems and discuss the unique cultural aspects that
allow HROs to maintain high levels of safety and reliability under challenging conditions.
The chapter concludes with a framework that explains how the five HROT principles lead
to developing a joint capability for organizational reliability and how this research
addresses the gaps and plans to close them.
The chapter also includes detailed discussions on the current safety performance and
culture of the offshore oil and gas industry as a research context. By the end of this chapter,
a summary of the state-of-the-art of HROT, the research gaps, the research objectives, and
the research questions are presented.
2.1

Safety as a System: High Reliability and Normal Accident Theory

Approaches to improving safety have varied significantly over history (Antonsen, 2009)
but were primarily focused on the notion that accidents are either unavoidable events of
fate or caused by a single cause, such as a person’s ill will or flaws. A more systemic
perspective on accidents only emerged relatively recently (Amalberti, 2013) and
emphasizes that accidents and disasters are the results of complex factors that contribute to
7

things going wrong and complex mechanisms that determine the effects of whatever goes
wrong (Hollnage, 2014; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Among others, Barry Turner’s 1978
book Man-Made Disasters shifted the focus from disaster management to disaster
prevention (Turner, 1978), and several disciplines began to analyze the factors that lead up
to disasters (Hale & Hovden, 1998). In the 1980s, the growing understanding of humangenerated disasters created a broad debate between two principal schools of thought
(Sagan, 1995): System-vulnerability based on Normal Accident Theory (NAT) and
system-resilience based on High Reliability Organizations Theory (HROT).
NAT is based on the work of Charles Perrow (1984), who studied the Three Mile Island
disaster (i.e., a partial meltdown of a nuclear reactor, which occurred in Pennsylvania in
1979) from a system design and organizational perspective. Perrow (1984) stresses that
accidents are inevitable in systems that are characterized by high-complexities and tightcoupling because their design makes large parts of the system invisible to operators and
managers so that no individual can fully comprehend latent issues that can lead to accidents
when they begin to evolve (Perrow, 1984). As a result, organizational learning is inherently
hampered, making systems vulnerable to accidents in their normal course of operations
(Perrow, 1984). This problem is getting worse as systems are becoming more complex.
Shrivastava (1987), for example, points out that half of the 28 industrial disasters during
1900-1986 have occurred since 1977, and three of them occurred in 1984. NAT explains
this as a result of how technical systems are designed and increasingly connected to other
systems and states that high-profile disasters will continue to happen. Approaches to
reducing risks, such as creating redundancy in complex systems, are considered ineffective
8

in preventing accidents and may add additional complexity that causes even higher risk
(Perrow, 1984). The NAT thus takes a decisively pessimistic view.
In contrast, HROT theorists (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001) urge that system complexity does
not necessarily lead to accidents and disasters but can be comprehensible and manageable.
This is possible when people pay attention to sustaining performance instead of solely
focusing on increasing efficiency and engage in organizational practices that facilitate
system comprehension rather than impede it (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). According to
Weick (1987), accidents can be reduced in a complex system, even in trying environments,
if the system’s technical complexity is matched with sufficient levels of human complexity
(i.e., diversity of perspective), which he characterizes as “requisite variety.” This
dissertation takes the same optimistic view and focuses on organizational practices in
HROs for improving safety outcomes.
The theory at the center of this investigation, HROT, is in many ways a direct response to
the growing number of high-profile disasters that occurred, as NAT had anticipated: society
became unsatisfied with just studying and investigating the causation and aftermath of
extremely costly accidents (Roberts and Rousseau, 1989) that were, in hindsight, often
recognized to be triggered by poor management strategies (Roberts, 1990) and unsafe
cultural rigidities (Turner, 1978). This resulted in increasing pressure to devote more
attention to operating organizations safely (Roberts, 1990b) by learning from organizations
with a positive track record, rather than learning from accidents.
Several high-hazard organizations served as examples, namely the Federal Aviation Air
Traffic Control System, the United States Navy, and the Pacific Gas & Electric Company.
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They had operated nearly error-free for long periods of time (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989;
Roberts, 1990; Rochlin, 1993). Their high operational reliability provided a research
opportunity for understanding what leads to safety, rather than accidents.
Starting in 1984, Todd R. LaPorte, Karlene Roberts, and Gene I. Rochlin from the
University of California, Berkeley set out to examine the organizational patterns and
behaviors associated with these organizations’ exceptional performance. The researchers
used a multi-method approach, including direct observations, workshops, interviews, and
surveys. In 1988, they reported the first project on what they called “High Reliability
Organizations” (HROs). The report highlighted the structural patterns, approaches to
managing interdependence, decision dynamics, and organizational culture that led these
organizations to perform reliably despite the sophisticated technologies they operate and
the trying conditions they had been coping with regularly (LaPorte et al., 1988). Together
with subsequent research, it provided the theory on high reliability organizations.
2.2

Definition of HROs

High Reliability Organizations (HROs) are high-hazard organizations that operate with
nearly-accidents-free operations and include nuclear power plants, air traffic control
operations (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007a; Weick et al., 1999), and naval aircraft carriers
(Roberts, 1990). In HROs, operations take place in environments that are socially and
politically challenging (Weick et al., 1999), technologically sophisticated (Weick et al.,
1999; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007a), interdependent and timely pressured (Vogus & Sutcliffe,
2007a), uncertain, and hazardous (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989). Still, they perform with a
constant high safety level nearly error-free (Roberts, 1990).
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The early research on HROs defines them based on their ability to achieve and sustain
exceptional performance over a long period of time (Roberts, 1990; Roberts & Rousseau,
1989). However, the more widely used definition in research on the topic goes beyond
these performance characteristics. It includes the objectives or strategic mindset of HROs,
including their readiness, commitment, and capacity to perform reliability. It defines HROs
as “..organizations that exhibit a strong sense of mission and operational goals stressing
not only the objectives of providing ready capacity for production and service but an equal
commitment to reliability in operations, and a readiness to assure investment in reliability
enhancing technology, processes and personnel resources” (La Porte, 1996, p. 63).
HROs are known for their ability to maintain reliability, as the name and the definition
above highlights. In the context of HROs, reliability refers to the performance of the whole
system and reflects a culture that embodies doing the right thing at the right time using the
proper means even in the face of unexpected events, particularly when no one is watching
(Roberts et al., 1994). 4 A reliable organization remains consistent in its ability to fulfill its
purpose, even when a part of its system fails. Reliability5 thus is the most critical
4

The term “reliability” in the context of HROs sometimes leads to confusion. Reliability is commonly known
as a statistical measure that determines how efficiently and consistently a product, service, or system
component(s) functions over a given period. The lower the probability of failure, the higher the reliability.
According to LaPorte et al. (1988), reliability is often concerned with production rather than the whole system
because the classical understanding of reliability stems from an engineering perspective that reflects
“repeatability” or “reproducibility” of actions or patterns of activity (Weick et al., 1999). Over time, the
concept became a reflection of work routine, and thus, failed to deal with fluctuating and unexpected working
conditions (Weick, et al., 1999). In the context of HROs, reliability refers to the ability of the entire system
to deliver, even in the face of unexpected and difficult to control events.

5

LaPorte et al. (1988) conclude four types of reliability that aspiring organizations must achieve to be HROs.
Each has distinguished operating, and managerial implications (LaPorte et al., 1988, p. 7):
 Reliability of aggregate supply: Assures an unbroken flow of production input (materials).
 Reliability of physical infrastructure: Searches for perfection in operation integrity.
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competency to defend the organization, its people, and the society against any catastrophic
threats and possible damages. It is defined as; “a condition in which the organization
demonstrates continuously the capacity to provide expected levels and quantity of services,
without off-setting failures of critical processes” (LaPorte et al., 1988, p. 6). As widely
acknowledged, the phrase “high reliability” in HROs reflects the idea that high risk and
high effectiveness can coexist (Weick et al., 1999).
2.3

HROs as Organizational Safety Culture

HROs are characterized by a unique “safety culture,” which is commonly understood to
encompass the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that members of an organization
share concerning safety (Cox & Cox, 1991). However, understanding the construct of
safety culture requires having a working understanding of the concept of organizational
culture (Guldenmund, 2000; Glendon & Stanton, 2000; Götvall, 2014). Accordingly, this
section first describes the organizational culture in general, followed by a discussion of the
concept of safety culture and the unique features of the culture in HROs. Because many
companies aim to track their progress towards improving safety culture through the socalled safety management system, the section will discuss these systems.
Organizational Culture
Organizational culture is the set of values, anticipations, practices, and shared vision that
guide and inform all the organization members’ behaviors. One of the commonly




Reliability of signals: Searches for perfect accuracy and timeliness of communication signals.
Reliability of human response (operational reliability): Seeks to perfect performance of human operators.
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referenced conceptualizations of organizational culture is provided by Schein (2010), who
developed a layered model of organizational culture. It consists of a core layer (underlying
assumptions, e.g., human nature), a middle layer (espoused beliefs and values, e.g.,
strategies, goals, philosophies), and an outer layer (artifacts, e.g., greeting rituals, dress).
The visible outer layer points to the invisible other layers but requires considerable
interpretation. It is relatively easy to change, but this change can occur without affecting
the “deeper” inner layers of culture.
Other pioneering authors agreed with the notion of organizational culture as “layered,” yet
they disagreed concerning the layers’ constructs, sequences, and interpretations
(Guldenmund, 2010). Table 1 below lists different but frequently cited and used models of
culture.
Table 1: Layers of Culture Based on Different Perspectives: Adopted from Guldenmund (2010)
Central Core

Layer 1

Layer 2

Layer 3

Basic
Assumptions

Espoused values

Artifacts

Non

Values

Rituals

Heroes

Symbols

Values

Heroes

Rites and Rituals

Communication
Network

Basic
Assumptions

Beliefs,
Attitudes

And Values

and Conventions

Systems and
Institutions

Artifacts and
Products; Rituals

Author(s)
(Schein, 2004; 2010)
(Hofstede, 1986)
(Deal & Kennedy, 1982)

(Spencer-Oatey, 2000)

and behavior

Cultures exist on all levels of an organization, and there are differences between the
cultures of organizational units (e.g., “engineering” culture vs. “marketing” culture, “team
culture”). However, when members of an organization share history, occupational
backgrounds, and technology requirements, some aspects of culture can be found across
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all organizational levels (“company culture”), and even across different organizations in
the industry (IAEA, 2002). For example, the offshore oil and gas industry culture is often
described as; “male-oriented, macho, rough and tough, and can do” (National Academies,
2016, p. 20).
Safety Culture
Within the broad concept of organizational culture, many authors focus on safety culture.
The term is defined as “a specific set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and
technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees,
managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or
injurious” (Turner et al., 1989, p. 4). The first use of the term “safety culture” is usually
attributed to the summary investigation report of the International Nuclear Safety Advisory
Group (INSAG) concerning the Chernobyl disaster in 1986 (INSAG, 1991). This report
examined the factors behind this catastrophic event as an indication of a weak or lacking
safety culture; “The accident can be said to have flowed from deficient safety culture”
(Edwards et al., 2013, p. 23). Since then, the term has been progressively used in research
that aims to define and identify factors that strengthen safety (Vu & De Cieri, 2014),
especially in the nuclear industry (INSAG, 1991).
The relationship between organizational culture and safety culture is a matter of
considerable debate. Several scholars, such as Parker et al. (2006); Clarke (1999);
Aboagye-Nimo et al. (2013); Götvall, (2014), and others consider safety culture as a subset
of organizational culture (i.e., the meaning of the beliefs, values, and behaviors as they
relate to health and safety). Other authors, such as Antonsen (2009), point out that
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understanding safety culture as a subordinate to organizational culture creates confusion
because it would require an understanding of which part of the organizational culture
influence safety or not and because it reduces culture to a rigid property with stable
characteristics (Antonsen, 2009). In contrast, Reason (1997), Hopkins (2006), and Cooper
(1998) emphasize that safety culture must be treated independently to achieve focus on and
dedication to safety. Specifically for the field of engineering and management, Silbey
(2009) urges that safety culture encompasses the commonly shared and constant set of
practices by which all members of the organization learn the lessons from mistakes to
minimize risk and maximize safety while achieving production goals.
This dissertation is based on HROT, and according to theorists such as Weick (1987), Klein
et al. (1995), and Weick & Sutcliffe (2001), safety culture is inseparable from
organizational culture. The similarities in definition and perception between the two
concepts are rooted in the notion that safety culture is, in fact, an organizational culture
that underlines safety. Weick (1987) suggests that organizational culture is the source of
reliability in all HROs, while scholars such as Klein et al. (1995) have empirically shown
that HROs share cultural characteristics related to the risk and dangers of their technologies
and, as a result, likely also share organizational culture.
Safety Culture and Safety Management Systems (SMSs)
A Safety Management System (SMS) is defined as “a systematic approach to managing
safety, including the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and
procedures” (ICAO, 2013, p. xii). SMSs began to emerge in the 1990s, when the realization
that significant accidents are organizational, systemic problems, rather than single events,
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shifted the perspective of safety research. Researchers and practitioners began to apply
general management principles such as setting targets and tracking progress towards
targets, to the specific field of safety (Antonsen, 2009) and created integrated systems for
managing safety (Richter, 2003).
Early applications of SMSs created a debate regarding their effectiveness in reducing risks
in complex systems. On the one hand, SMSs improved safety performance measured by
traditional safety indicators 6 (i.e., FAR, LTIF, and TRCF) 7 (National Academies, 2016).
However, after these initial improvements, the indicators reached a plateau (Hudson, 2007;
Götvall, 2014; Fleming, 2001; Carnino, 2000), and none reached zero (Hudson, 2007). This
meant that there was evidence that safety management interventions had positive impacts
on employees’ health and safety but could not produce consistently high levels of safety or
“zero accidents.” Thus, results were inconclusive, and safety researchers were unsure if
they should recommend or discourage SMSs (Robson et al., 2007).
The investigation of SMSs in the context of specific accidents that had occurred despite
the implementation of SMSs, could not resolve the debate, either (Hopkins, 2007b;
National Academies, 2016). For example, Hopkins (2007b) concluded after studying the
1996 Gretley Coal Mine disaster that SMSs could not ensure safety in complex systems.
However, other authors countered that perhaps the complex paper-based management

6

Safety indicators are defined AS “a data-based safety parameter used for monitoring and assessing safety
performance” (ICAO, 2013, p. xii).

7

FAR: fatal accident rate, LTIF: lost time injury frequency, and TRCF: total recorded case frequency.
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system that SMSs were built on, not the safety management approach per se, caused the
failure (Borys et al., 2009).
Academic scholars, governments, and practitioners began to increasingly point to “safety
culture” as the missing ingredient in SMSs, stating that an effective SMS can never be
achieved with the absence of strong safety culture (Piers et al., 2009; National Academies,
2016). Today, there is a broad consensus that SMSs by themselves do not create safety and
that cultural approaches are needed that go beyond the enactment of stricter rules,
regulations, and unfeasible supervision (Cooper, 2013; National Academies, 2016).
Because culture influences people’s perceptions (i.e., what people see, feel, think, hear,
say, etc.), it affects people’s decisions and behaviors in an organization, which eventually
drives the outcomes and the performance of safety (National Energy Board, 2014).
Similarly, Weick & Sutcliffe (2015) observe that if the espoused values (i.e., what is
essential, right, useful, and desirable) are treated as core beliefs, those beliefs serve as work
rules. Still, they do so with more flexibility than traditional practices, regulations, and
process descriptions. This permits cultural approaches to eventually reach all the
subdivisions of the organization (Parker et al., 2006). Accordingly, this dissertation focuses
on cultural approaches to safety, not SMSs. These cultural approaches can exist in parallel
to SMSs and be fostered by well-designed SMSs.
2.4

HROs Compared to Other Approaches

The research on HROT emerged when academia, governments, and the public became
increasingly interested in the systemic nature of safety and the importance of culture. The
research, therefore, shares several characteristics with other frameworks and approaches
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for safety, which were created with the intention to break down the multifaceted concept
of safety into several and distinct dimensions (also labeled as attributes, characteristics,
elements, or traits) to understand, enact, and assess safety culture. Table 2 lists seven
selected approaches, including HROs practice, for the purpose of comparison.
Although all these approaches were developed based on technical, social, and
organizational perspectives (National Academies, 2016), their attributes vary in the
number, labels, and descriptions. Compared to HROs, some of the other six approaches in
Table 2 consist of more dimensions, which might be mistaken to cover broader conceptions
of positive safety culture. In particular, the HROs approach does not provide dimensions
for leadership and communication. However, it does not ignore its role but acknowledges
the influence of leadership and communications patterns in every practice. As the previous
discussion shows, HROT provides a broad and in-depth discussion and interpretation of
strong foundations’ safety culture attributes. The principles of HROT were theorized based
on empirical and observational studies in the specific context of high-hazard and high
reliability organizations in different industries (National Academies, 2016; Amalberti,
2013; Grabowski & Roberts, 2016).
In contrast, some of the other frameworks are more industry-focused. For example, the
safety culture policy statement of the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(BSEE, 2013) consists of nine cultural dimensions. Yet, these dimensions are not
commonly recognized in the industry (i.e., offshore oil and gas) that they were developed
for (National Academies, 2016). The dimensions also lack the discussions on developing
individuals’ competencies, which other frameworks emphasize, particularly HROs
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(National Academies, 2016). Moreover, the BSEE and other policy statements, such as the
safety culture policy statement by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, do not provide
explanations on how to interpret, interrelate, and implement framework dimensions within
specific contexts and how to adapt them to other contexts and industrial environments,
which reduces their practice relevant. Even practice-focused guidance, such as BSEE’s
requirement to provide scales for assessing workers’ safety performance, does not,
according to Paranhos et al. (2017), provide the information needed to achieve the
characteristics of a highly reliable organization that is resilient in the face of unexpected
events.
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Table 2: Approaches to Safety Culture Compared to HROs: Adopted from (National Academies, 2016)
Approach

Dimensions

(BSEE, 2013)
Bureau of
Safety and
Environmental
Enforcement

(U.S.NRC,
2011)

(Christian et al.,
2009)

(Cox & Cheyne,
2000)

U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory
Commission

(The Health
Foundation,
2011)

(Reason, 1997)

Research on
HROs
(Weick et al.,
1999; Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2015)

Leadership

Leadership is
committed to
safety values
and actions.

Leadership is
committed to
safety; safety
has priority over
other demands.

Management
commitment to
safety

Leadership is
committed to
safety; safety is
a priority.

Leadership
committed to the
safety

Work
Environment

Respectful
work
environment.

Trust permeates
the organization

Teamwork

Frontline
involvement in
safety

Teamwork

Just culture

Deference to the
expertise with
the specific
safety issues

Raising Concern

Environment
for raising
concerns.

Internal group
processes, such
as peer support
for safety

A supportive
environment for
speaking up
about safety

Speaking up

Reporting
culture

Reluctance to
simplify
interpretations

Communication

Significant
environmental
and safety
communication

Communication

Communication
and feedback

Informed culture
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Accountability

Attitude

Risk Management

Operations

Continuous
Improvement

Everyone
involved in
safety

Personal
accountability.

Everyone
personally
responsible for
the safety

Inquiring
attitude

Questioning
attitude
cultivated

Hazard
identification
and risk
management

Technology
recognized as
complex and
challenging to
manage

Perceived job
risk; safety
attributes and
behaviors

Risk
appreciation

Risk perception

Work processes

Safety
undergoes
constant
examination

Safety systems
limit work
pressures to
trade off safety
for productivity

Safety rules are
followed and not
sacrificed for
productivity

Safety systems
limit job
demands to
trade off safety
for productivity

Continuous
improvement

Organizational
learning is
embraced

Flexible culture

Deference to
expertise with
the specific
safety issues.

Reporting and
informed culture

Preoccupation
with failure
(seeking
potential threats
to the system)

Informed culture

Preoccupation
with failure
(seeking
potential threats
to safety
system)
Sensitivity to
operations

Learning culture

Commitment to
resilience
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2.5

Research Framework: A System Approach to Achieving HROs

This research aims to explain and achieve safety by improving Organizational Reliability
(OR) or, as some authors characterize it, “Collective Mindfulness.” To achieve this goal,
it focuses on the practices and principles identified by HROT, which builds on Weick et
al. (1999), Weick & Sutcliffe (2001; 2015), and Sutcliffe (2011) and others. I first
summarize the cultural and organizational characteristics of HROs (Sections 2.5.1). Then
I discuss the earlier and the present interpretations and organize them in the theoretical
framework for this dissertation, which is graphically illustrated in Figure 1 and described
in Section 2.5.2. I subsequently present and critically discuss the elements of the
framework in greater detail.
Earlier Interpretations of HROs’ Characteristics
Since its beginning, research on HROs, such as Rochlin et al. (1987), has been concerned
with organizations’ cultural characteristics that operate with high levels of safety and
reliability (Sutcliffe, 2011). Several broad themes emerge.
Approaches to Knowledge and Learning: According to Weick & Sutcliffe (2001; 2015),
HROs’ culture is characterized as “generative” concerning the other types of organizational
culture based on Westrum’s typology (Westrum, 1993; 2004). This typology is developed
according to how each cultural type treats the stream of safety-related information (see
Table 3 below). As part of their culture, HROs actively seek information and encourage
people to think, say, urge, negotiate, report, etc. While responsibilities are shared, failures
are inquired about, and new ideas are welcomed and rewarded (Westrum, 1993; 2004).
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Table 3: Typology of Organizational Culture That Deals with Safety-Related Information
Generative

Attributes

Pathological

Bureaucratic

Information Flow

Do not want to know

May not find out,
“ignored.”

Actively seek information

Messengers

Whistle-blowers are
“shot.”

Listened to if they
arrive

Trained and rewarded

Responsibility

Evaded

Compartmentalized

Shared

Bridging

Discouraged

Allowed but neglected

Rewarded

Failure

Punished or concealed

Leads to local repairs

Leads to far-reaching reforms

New Ideas

Actively crushed

Present problems

Welcomed

HROs Cultural Attributes

The culture of HROs provides the cognitive infrastructure for concurrent adaptive learning
(Weick et al., 1999), resulting in continuously building and updating knowledge
repertoires. This occurs through (1) particular types of training such as face to face,
simulation, and video training (Roberts, 1990b), (2) reporting, investigating, and analyzing
all types of failures (LaPorte et al., 1988), and (3) sharing information with other
organizations (Turner, 1995; Reason, 1998). 8
Being Proactive: The theorists of HROT further argue that accidents in complex systems
are preventable through proactive processes that enable significant anticipation and
containment of catastrophic errors (Rochlin, 1996; La Porte, 1996). HROT, therefore, takes
the optimistic view that accidents do not only happen but occur through the accumulations

8

Notably, perspectives on learning, namely learning by trial-and-error, have changed over time. Initially,
HRO research emphasized a total elimination of failures and the absence of learning by trial-and-error
(Weick, 1987), while later characterizations tolerate the inevitability of errors and acknowledge the need for
limited trial-and-error learning (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991).
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of latent errors and early signals (Weick et al., 1999) that are fundamentally discoverable.
HROs implement this approach by integrating doubt as a mindset so that people stay
preoccupied with anomalies and latent errors and are reluctant to simplify interpretations
(Weick et al., 1999). This mindset mitigates the tendency to become complacent and,
instead, causes people to remain alert and sensitive to operations. Because errors can occur
and evolve into something larger, they require continuous detection and immediate
correction. Consequently, HROs encourage all people to raise their voices and concerns
without fear of blame and accusations (Rochlin, 1993). In fact, HROs have reward systems
for people who participate in reporting any issues or concerns (Roberts, 2003; Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2015).
Structural Flexibility: Structural flexibility allows the response to unexpected events by
migrating the decision-making process to those with unique expertise regardless of their
rank and authorization. This characteristic is also known as safety on the front lines (Vogus
et al., 2010). It is enabled by workers who understand the technology and procedures and
develop specific actions and practices to cope with emergencies (Leveson et al., 2009).
Redundancy: In contrast to NAT, which considers redundancy in complex systems
ineffective or even risky (Perrow, 1984), HROT promotes redundancy as an integral
approach to achieving resiliency, safety, and performance (La Porte, 1996; Roberts, 1990;
Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Redundancy is defined as: “the ability to
provide for the execution of a task if the primary unit fails or falters-is a necessity for highreliability organizations managing activities sufficiently dangerous to cause serious
consequences in the case of operational failures” (Rochlin et al., 1987, p. 84). HROs use
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technical redundancies such as backup computers when those that are in use fail, human
redundancies such as backup personnel to perform a given safety task when those in front
lines lose control (Roberts, 1990b), as well as organizational redundancies to support the
decision-making process in particularly trying conditions (Weick et al., 1999). These
mindsets, learning strategies, and organizational design choices result in a unique safety
culture that reduces the rate of unexpected events, such as accidents, increases the
organization’s ability to bounce back from disturbances, and increases productivity
(Roberts, 1990).
In HROs, these characteristics (organizational learning, flexible structures, a proactive
mindset, and redundancies) are implemented through unique principles, which sometimes
also labeled as pillars, elements, strategies, practices, or cognitive processes (Weick et al.,
1999; Rochlin, 1996; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Many of these characteristics were already
highlighted in the concluding remarks of the first project on HROs, which reflected on the
observed organizational patterns of the three studied organizations (LaPorte et al., 1988).
Later, additional studies by the original theorists and others (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989;
Roberts, 1990; Roberts & Libuser, 1993; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; La Porte & Consolini,
1998) described similar (though not identical) principles. These early principles of HROT
included the following:
Management by Exception: Managers are focused on long-term strategic decisions. While
they monitor operations, they only get involved in the operational decisions as needed.
Deference to Expertise During Emergencies: During emergencies, the decision-making
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process migrates to those with a high level of knowledge, regardless of their rank or
authority, to ensure quick action taking without the need to seek higher rank approvals.
Continuous Training: Training provides knowledge and personal skills to the operators
and managers to enable them to deal with the system’s complexities and build trust and
credibility among the workforces. As a result, people share the senses that everyone
involved is competent enough to take responsibility and do their job correctly.
Communication of Safety-Critical Information: Operators are fully and promptly
informed, especially in times of emergencies. To achieve this, HROs design multiple
channels for sharing safety-critical information.
Redundancies: As described before in the general characteristics section, redundancy is a
backup that provides a system of checks-and-balances for identifying risks before they
occur or before they become out of control.
The Specific Characteristics of HROs: A Present-Day Framework
Beginning in 1999, the early characterizations of HROs described above became less
pertinent because Weick et al. (1999) and Weick & Sutcliffe (2001) defined five new
fundamental principles more descriptive of the essence of their finding and more
generalizable across multiple studies. These new principles cover both earlier and later
characterizations of the HROs and include preoccupation with failure (e.g., by being
proactive), reluctant to simplify (e.g., by designing redundancies), sensitivity to operations
(e.g., by communicating safety critical-information), commitment to resilience (e.g., by
continuous training), and difference to expertise (e.g., by designing flexible structures).
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Each of these principles will be defined and discussed in more significant detail in the next
Section 2.5.3.
These five principles form two reciprocally interacting groups based on the nature and the
objectives of practicing each principle. The first group consists of preoccupation with
failure, reluctance to simplify, and sensitivity to operations, which are continuously
interacting with each other to develop an organizational capability to discover unexpected
events as a system of multiple barriers to defend the organization and its people from any
potential threats. This group supports unique practices that include but are not limited to
continuous searching for, discovering, controlling, and solving even small issues within
time and before they accumulate and augment into broader issues. This developed
capability is also known as mindful anticipation, which will also be defined and discussed
in more detail in Section 2.5.4.
The second group comprises commitment to resilience and deference to expertise, which
are also continuously interacting with each other to create an organizational capability to
manage unexpected events. This capability enables people to cope with unforeseen threats,
solve broader issues when they become out of control, minimize their effects if they lead
to safety-critical events, and quickly return to operations’ normal conditions. This
organizational capability is also known as mindful containment and will be defined and
discussed in Section 2.5.4.
The outcome of these two interrelated and interdependent groups of principles is
organizational reliability or, according to some authors, collective mindfulness. It is an
ultimate objective that results in a strong safety culture and a high operational performance
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level. Figure 1 is a graphical illustration of the research framework that consists of the
briefly discussed above activities. The following sections define and discuss each element
of the framework in greater detail.

Figure 1: Research Framework

The Five Principles of HROT
The following subsections include definitions and extensive discussions around the five
HROT principles, including how each principle is characterized in the earlier and later
characterizations discussed in the previous sections.
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Preoccupation with Failure (PWF)
Preoccupation with failure is a chronic precaution that motivates a proactive and
preventative inspection of potential weaknesses in the organization and treats any type of
failure or near-miss as an indicator of potentially large-scale issues (Sutcliffe, 2011). This
principle is central for the HROs: it leads to a precautionary approach to constantly
maintain readiness on an operational level. It also results in a mindset that suspects
anything may go wrong at any time, which mitigates the tendency of becoming complacent
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; 2015). The focused attention on possible failure (Weick et al.,
1999), even though failures in HROs are rare, is chosen because simple errors could be
indicators that there is something wrong within the system that could lead to more severe
events (Aven & Krohn, 2014; Lekka, 2011). As a result, the members of HROs are
concerned when things go smoothly because this may mean that they have not caught
everything (Sutcliffe, 2011).
This mindset results in three actions, each of which requires rigorous attention: (1)
Detecting small and emerging failures, (2) anticipating and specifying significant mistakes,
and (3) acknowledging that people have incomplete knowledge of the situation, the
environment, and their group (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). It is also closely linked to
organizational learning because it requires that the members of the organization must have
the necessary knowledge of (1) the system details to construct logical thinking within the
expectations domain of the processes they operate and (2) failure knowledge so that people
understand how failure can evolve and can cause the system or subsystems to collapse.
Therefore, HROs develop and sustain repositories of failure, such as experts and people
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with domain-specific knowledge and written failure, incidents, and accidents reports as
sources for information inquiry.
However, preoccupation with failure can negatively affect the member’s confidence in
their competencies and knowledge (Lekka, 2011). It can exhaust the organization’s
financial resources on training and continuous learning (Leveson et al., 2009). Moreover,
since this practice requires ongoing reporting of errors and safety-critical events,
organizations that do not endorse a culture of reporting issues and raising concerns will
result in members that fear such actions to avoid punishment and accusations (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2001).
Reluctance to Simplify (RTS)
Reluctance to simplify is the tendency to question assumptions, think critically, and create
a detailed picture of the operations (Sutcliffe, 2011). Simplification might be required for
order and clarity (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015), but simplifying things too much or too quickly
may ignore and obscure significant information needed for problem-solving (Weick et al.,
1999). Simplification weakens people’s defenses and the capacity of undesired
consequences they predict (Sutcliffe, 2011) since it increases the likelihood of the
unexpected (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). HROs limit simplifications by widening the base
of the precautions they implement.
HROs emphasize constant doubt regarding all aspects of the operations (Lekka, 2011) and
systematically considers a unique context of the problem based on unique solutions by
discouraging routine prevalent “best practice” solutions to problems (Hales &
Chakravorty, 2016). The necessary exercise to reduce simplification is to distinguish things
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based on the specific context that they are falling into and the details that they are
providing.
To accumulate and process accurate information, HROs organize for action-based inquiry,
which is a pattern for generating and gathering information from actions, particularly from
people who have already been confronted with unexpected events (Roberts et al., 1994).
The information generated through this mechanism requires recursive interactions between
interpreting and the continued updating of the information (Weick et al., 1999). Reluctance
to simplify is also embedded in the structural and organizational design. HROs organize
for variety, wherein a complex system, complexity is the only way to cope with the
complex environment and sustain healthy conditions.
It has been acknowledged that diverse groups have a more comprehensive range of
information than those in homogeneous groups. Moreover, when organizational variety is
coupled with redundancies (i.e., technical, human, and organizational duplications and
backups in the system), a sense of discrediting is developed in the organization, causing
significant information to be interpreted with fewer simplifications, generalizations, or
normalizations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). However, designing a redundant system can
breed complacency, which may reduce the principle of preoccupation with failure (PWF)
(Weick et al., 1999). Complacency can also cause decision-makers to overestimate their
systems’ reliability (Pettersen & Schulman, 2016; Schöbel, 2009), which may cause them
to allocate insufficient financial resources for safety improvements (Weick et al., 1999). It
can also affect the level of sensitivity to operation (STO) because it reduces the frontline’s
concentration on ongoing operations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015).
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Moreover, redundancy in how information flows can confuse which source of information
the organization members should use and cause them to disregard communication channels
that were deliberately designed to ensure that information flows to where it is needed. This
negative effect of redundancy is not commonly discussed in the literature, which worth
investigating and future research.
Sensitivity to Operations (STO)
Sensitivity to operations refers to the collaboration and constant sharing of information that
enables the organization members to develop a system view of the operations. This permits
them to interrupt and adjust operations to prevent errors from accumulating and evolving
into unmanageable issues (Sutcliffe, 2011). STO emphasizes situation awareness or what
it is called in the navy as “having the bubble” (Weick et al., 1999), which refers to the
attention of the ship’s overall conditions at the moment (Hales & Chakravorty, 2016).
While unfolding, vigilance and focus on the situation are crucial; even small gaps in the
operations require individual attention (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). STO furthermore
prevent anomalies from becoming the norm over time (Sutcliffe, 2011). The accumulation
of unmanageable anomalies, notably when they do not cause critical issues in the short run,
can become the standard over time following what is known as normalizing deviance (Goff
et al., 2015). Therefore, anomalies must be caught and treated while still manageable before
they evolve into a catastrophic accident (B&W Pantex, 2008).
Operations can fail when operators’ attention and mental concentration on operations
deviated due to various factors such as ignorance, casualness, and general distractions
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). To remain sensitive to the operations, operators must sustain
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dynamic situational awareness about their surroundings by picturing the operations as an
integrated map. This requires that they construct and maintain a mental representation of
operations that integrates diverse inputs, information sensors, and remote observation with
the system’s real-time status and performance (LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; 1998).
However, this can exhaust operators when they continue to concentrate on the same task
for a long time because human cognition is limited.
One of the most adverse factors to sensitivity to operations is when organizations pay more
attention to efficiency than performance. Focusing on efficiency often leads to increases in
time and production pressure, which negatively affects people’s cognition to stay focused;
thus, they lose attention since they are busy accomplishing top management strategies and
production plans. Pressured operators tend to ignore (Rerup, 2009), generalize, and
simplify important and complex signals (Weick et al., 1999). Working in constantly
pressured operations and continuous action without reassessing the overall situation causes
people not to notice cues for abnormalities. It leads to so-called dysfunctional momentum,
which eventually leads to a drift of performance from reliability to flawed norms. This
phenomenon is known as the normalization of deviance (Vaughan, 1996).
To maintain STO, HROs intentionally plan interruptions and force adjustments to
operations so that operators are returned to a sensitive mode in which they are aware of the
operations (Sutcliffe, 2011). Another critical element of this principle is the development
of heedful interrelationships among the organization’s members. Such relationships are
characterized by a collective mindset that thinks of individual actions as part of a larger
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pattern of shared activity and allows the organization members to understand how it fits
into that larger pattern.
Commitment to Resilience (CTR)
Commitment to resilience refers to developing and fostering competencies that enable the
organization to vigilantly notice, contain, and learn from errors that have already occurred
and swiftly resume normal operations (Sutcliffe, 2011). It is also known as the
organizational capability to recover a dynamically stable state for ongoing operations after
a significant shock or stress (Weick et al., 1999; Pettersen & Schulman, 2016). This means
that HROs can be stretched without breaking as its design is elastic, and the organization
can recover its shape quickly (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015).
Resilience is a result of organizational learning, as well as organizational design.
According to Pettersen & Schulman (2016), there are three types of resilience: (1)
precursor (i.e., monitoring the operations), (2) restoration (i.e., rapid actions to resume
operations), (3) and recovery (i.e., putting damaged systems back together). Performing
these resilience types requires a very well trained, uniquely skilled, confident, and
persistent workforce that can actively manage events (Sutcliffe, 2011), learn thoroughly
from their actions (Vogus & Hilligoss, 2016), negative feedback, and others through ad
hoc networks (Weick et al., 1999). Accordingly, “sensemaking” is central. It describes the
process that enables people to interpret a situation and come up with explanations and
expectations that can also be communicated to other organization members. It thus is a
social construction that creates enough certainty and order in a trying situation that
decisions can be made. In dynamic conditions, sensemaking is an ongoing process: people
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need to continually assess and understand what is happening to prepare themselves for
what will happen next. This process of continuous assessments and calibrations is
characterized as “rebuilding the evolving present” (Weick, 1987).
CTR uses and produces knowledge: it provides the foundational knowledge that enables
people to improvise and cope with emergencies. It creates a new experience as people
witness sensitive and trying situations and come to a closure. As organizations authorize
skilled people to improvise when needed, CTR provides them with the means to deal with
and learn from failure, which builds coherent responses and action repertoires that consists
of different levels of information richness, collaborative practice, and pro-active focuses.
Deference to Expertise (DTE)
Deference to expertise (DTE) refers to the organizational strategy of shifting the decisionmaking process to people with unique and specialized knowledge. Such as people on the
frontline of an emergency whenever the situation requires (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001; 2015).
This means that frontline people can take action without waiting for the hierarchy’s
approval (Lekka, 2011; Sutcliffe et al., 2016). This means that the structure of an HRO
change during emergencies and is configured according to the problem at hand, which
often enables HROs to develop unanticipated solutions (Roberts et al., 1994). However,
deferring to expertise does not always lead to decision making, but sometimes it generates
sensemaking, advice, and interpretations only.
In practice, DTE is an organizational principle that demands of managers not to answer
questions that are outside of the scope of their expertise but to rely on experts who have
the necessary knowledge in providing the proper solution (Aven & Krohn, 2014),
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sometimes characterized as “respectful yielding.” These experts are typically individuals
who have earned expertise and their peers’ respect (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe,
2015). HROs trust and highly value their true expertise, which depends on how many years
they spend in a specific field, but on how many times they have been involved in and the
degree of their involvement in emergencies and trying conditions (i.e., their “compressed
experience”) (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015).
To implement the principles of DTE, organizations need to have a culture of trusting in,
having respect for, and yielding to expertise. Moreover, members of the organization need
to be mindful of their knowledge and limitations and aware of other people’s competence
(Schöbel, 2009). However, the extent to which DTE is (and should be) practiced is contextdependent. For example, in some industries, such as health care, the decision-making
process is based on education level, not just based on field experience.
Organizational Reliability (Collective Mindfulness)
According to Weick et al. (1999) and others such as Vogus & Sutcliffe (2012), the three
studied HROs have successfully achieved and sustained a high level of organizational
reliability (OR) by effective implementations and equal attention to the five interrelated
HROT key principles that I defined and discussed above. They suggest that bringing the
five HROT principles together would develop a joint capability of organizational
reliability or “collective mindfulness,” as a conceptual construct that combines
expectations, sensemaking, organizing, and managing. Collective mindfulness is defined
as: “a means to increase organizational reliability and mitigate the adverse potential of
unexpected, so-called black swan events (Taleb 2007) and is characterized by five mindful
36

behaviors, including continuous learning from failures and the willingness to consider
alternative perspectives” (Carlo et al., 2012, pp. 1081-1082).
Collective mindfulness points to the many ways that the five cognitive processes
(principles) interact to create and sustain organizational knowledge and learning. It reflects
an organization’s capabilities to manage its recourses and detect, identify, and quickly
respond to any potential threats (Weick et al., 1999). However, organizational reliability or
collective mindfulness doesn’t lead to the desired level of reliability by following
checklists or adhering to controlling techniques to guarantee steadiness, but rather, when
the only certainty is uncertainty, readiness and swift adaptability for emergencies are most
essential fundamentals for reliable performances (Gebauer, 2013).
According to Sutcliffe (2011), two competing capabilities are reciprocal interrelationship
to achieve organizational reliability: Prevention or mindful anticipation and resilience or
mindful containment. On the one hand, anticipation refers to building a capacity to predict
and prevent potential threats or unwanted events in their incubation period 9 (Turner, 1978)
before they evolve and become unmanageable or turn into a disaster (Roberts, 2003).
Mindful anticipation is achieved when organizations equally practice each of PWF, RTS,
and STO. These three principles are interrelated and interdependent through various shared
cultural characteristics and practices (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015).

9

Incubation period is defined as “a chain of concealed errors and other partially understood events buildsup in a way that is at odds with the existing beliefs and norms about hazards” (Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000, p.
16).
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On the other hand, containment refers to building a capability that copes with the effects
of unexpected events after they occur and quickly return to normal operations (Sutcliffe,
2011). Mindful containment is attained when organizations equally practice each of CTR
and DTE, which are also interrelated and interdependent, through which several
characteristics are shared (Weick et al., 1999; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). Furthermore, a
system of collective mindfulness consists of components that are connected similarly to a
neural network as Weick & Roberts have urged in the following statement (Weick &
Roberts, 1993, p. 359):
“What connectionism contributes to organizational theory is the insight that complex
patterns can be encoded by patterns of activation and inhibition among simple units, if
those units are richly connected. This means that relatively simple actors may be able to
apprehend complex inputs if they are organized in ways that resemble neural networks.
Connectionists also raise the possibility that mind is "located" in connections and the
weights put on them rather than in entities. Thus, to understand mind is to be attentive to
process, relating, and method, as well as to structures and content”.
Weick & Roberts (1993) urges that the concept of collective mindfulness stems from the
ideas of artificial intelligence to describe organizations as (1) Mental entities that are
capable of thought, and (2) as distributed information processing systems and their
association with the theories of connectionism" that are embodied in the so-called “neural
networks,” and their applications in organizational theory.
Inspired by the above descriptions, each principle consists of various numbers of causally
related (connected) components that form its construct and represent its attributes. These
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components are also in causal relationships with the components of the other principles
within the same group (i.e., the group of mindful anticipation or mindful containment)
and the components of the other group’s principles. In other words, HROT five principles
form a network of causally related components that build the construct of organizational
reliability or the collective mindfulness.
Collective mindfulness assesses the extent to which leadership endorses practices and rules
that enable heedful ways of acting, thinking, and organizing (Ray et al., 2011). Therefore,
it is a “top-down” process similar to any culture (Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2012).
Interim Conclusion
The theory of High Reliability Organizations (HROT) provides five cognitive processes
(i.e., the five fundamental principles) that allow organizations, particularly those with high
hazard operations, to develop organizational capabilities to discover and manage
unexpected events. If consistently implemented and maintained, these capabilities result in
organizational reliability or - what a newly emerged research stream - labels collective or
organizational mindfulness. In a dynamically changing world characterized by surprise
events, this is an ultimate objective for many organizations’ safety programs in different
industrial fields.
Collective mindfulness is achieved by interplaying two groups of organizational principles
(i.e., mindful anticipation and mindful containment). It empowers organizations to
strengthen and sustain a safety culture while maintaining a high level of operational
performance. The resulting high level of organizational reliability does not just result in
low failures or accidents rate. It also creates an organizational competence and readiness
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to cope with unexpected events and mitigate their often damaging effects. Therefore,
increased organizational reliability is understood to be a function of improved performance
of the five HROT principles, which are dynamically interrelated.
While HROT principles and their systemic nature have been discussed in the literature for
over thirty years, there is a lack of a nuanced discussion of what these principles comprise
and how they are interrelated to form a network of system components. For the most part,
the HROT principles have been discussed as processes that should be implemented
concurrently and to the most significant degree possible. This will result in positive
outcomes. However, given the current descriptions of these principles and based on
attempts to implement them in different industrial fields, it appears that there may be
tradeoffs and that implementing some principles may be counterproductive to achieving
others. This means that the implementation process and the appropriate degree to which
these principles are implemented are most likely dependent on multiple factors that occur
internally (e.g., business strategies, policies, etc.) and externally (e.g., government
regulations, production demand, etc.). However, there is no comprehensive system model
to provide a holistic understanding of these dynamics to date.
Moreover, some of the contributing factors are explicitly discussed in the literature; other
factors were merely mentioned or implicitly deliberated. Therefore, developing a system
model based on these principles requires a thorough investigation to identify the factors
that foster the implementation processes and those impeding them.
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2.6

Applying HROs in Real-World Systems

While HROT is a well-rounded and accepted theory, it nevertheless poses the question if
the theory of five principles can help improve safety culture in practice. There are two
broad categories of concern: (1) Are the five HROT broadly applicable in organizations
with different characteristics than the organizations included in the original research? For
example, initial research was done on nuclear power plants and aircraft carriers - do
findings also apply to hospitals? And (2) To what extent do HROT principles improve
safety culture and outcomes and how considerable are the improvements? The following
sections review empirical research to answer these questions.
Applicability of HROs in Different Systems and Industries
Early HROT research was mainly focused on safety-critical organizations (Harvey et al.,
2016 ) with unique characteristics, which were identified by Roberts & Rousseau (1989)
as Hypercomplexity, tight coupling, system designs that allow only one way to reach the
goal, extreme hierarchical differentiation, large numbers of decisions, a remarkable degree
of accountability, high frequency of immediate feedback regarding decisions, compressed
time frame, and more than one simultaneous critical outcome. These characteristics shaped
the practices that HROT describes and explains. Accordingly, it was initially unclear if the
same practices can be implemented in other organizations and if implementing them is
beneficial for safety in their specific context (Leveson et al., 2009; Hopkins, 2007). For
example, petroleum refineries, railroads, and many other industries have continuous
processing facilities and time flexibility (Perrow, 1984), technologies with a high degree
of predictability (Roberts & Rousseau, 1989), the interactions among system elements are
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comprehensible (Lekka, 2011), the technology is well known, straightforward, and stable
(LaPorte & Consolini, 1991; Pettersen & Schulman, 2016), and the public considers its
hazards to be self-limiting (Rochlin, 1993). This means that risk can easily be identified
and managed proactively, making them quite different from HROs who need to manage
unexpected events.
Moreover, HROs seek nearly full knowledge of their technical aspects and relatively stable
technical processes to foster system comprehension. This may make it infeasible to
implement HROT principles in profit-making organizations (Leveson et al., 2009) because
such organizations are continuously seeking technological advancement to create and
sustain competitive advantages that cope with market uncertainties and pressures and may
never have full knowledge of technical details (Marais et al., 2004; Lekka, 2011). For
economic and regulatory reasons, naval aircraft carriers, aviation systems, and nuclear
power plants replace technology at a much slower pace. However, HROs are known for
their endorsement of technological advancement and system updates (Roberts & Rousseau,
1989). More recently, these questions about the applicability of HROT principles to
different organizations have given way to a more inclusive view: HROT research witnessed
a shift in focus, terminology, and adaptability (Hopkins, 2007) as Weick & Sutcliffe (2015)
acknowledged the similarities between HROs and other organizations “all organizations
develop precautions against these hazards that are set out in norms, regulations,
procedures, rules, guidelines, job descriptions, and training materials. And all
organizations accumulate unnoticed events that are at odds with accepted beliefs about
hazards” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015, p. 19). They also view the commonalities among all
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types of organizations as an excellent opportunity to inspire the non-HROs to intensively
learn from HROs regarding how to achieve a successful and desirable business.
Consequently, there have been many attempts since 2001 to adopt and practice HROT
principles in various industries, but most notably in healthcare (Vogus et al., 2010; Vogus
& Sutcliffe, 2007a; Madsen et al., 2006; Frankel et al., 2006). Implementations in
healthcare faced considerable difficulties due to this industry’s nature (Roberts & Martelli,
2016), particularly in the decision-making structure. For example, it became apparent that
designing redundancies in healthcare had adverse safety outcomes (Madsen et al., 2006)
because people relied too heavily on somebody else in the system to catch mistakes. This
indicates that implementing the principles of HROT is a context-dependent process, or in
other words, dependent on each industry’s specific characteristics, circumstances, and
particular ways for adapting to this approach.
In addition to healthcare and related fields, such as drug rehabilitation (Cooren, 2004),
HROT principles were also investigated in firefighting teams and fire management
(Berardi, 2010; Black & McBride, 2013), oil refineries (Lekka & Sugden, 2011) offshore
oil and gas (Aven & Krohn, 2014), onshore natural gas (Paranhos et al., 2017), and the
construction industry (Harvey et al., 2016 ). With a focus on reliability, more so than safety,
the applications of the HROT five principals were also attempted in industries that are not
particularly hazardous such as architectural design (Carlo et al., 2012), reliability seeking
virtual organizations (RSVOs) (Grabowski & Roberts, 2016), software industry (Vogus &
Welbourne, 2003), and commercial banks (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015). A key challenge in
many of the reported implementations is a lack of knowledge about how HROT principles
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were implemented in the field. Some industries claimed that they were successful in
practicing HROs, such as the U. S. nuclear industry (B&W Pantex, 2008), U.S. Navy
submarine and carrier aviation services, commercial aviation worldwide (Roberts &
Martelli, 2016), and NASA (Boin & Schulman, 2008). Yet, it is unclear how they
interpreted and implemented the principles and how successful they were at shifting culture
towards improved safety and resilience (Roberts & Martelli, 2016). Recent events, such as
accidents in the US Navy and several high-profile plane crashes, also shed doubt on HROT
principles’ ability to maintain a safety culture.
Assessing HROs in Practice
The literature on high reliability organizations provides a rich foundation for the theoretical
background, fundamental processes (key principles), and various qualitative and
quantitative empirical studies that have examined, measured, and attempted to validate the
concept of organizational reliability. Table 22 in Appendix A: Empirical Studies on HROs
includes multiple empirical studies and applications of HROT principles in different
research contexts. As presented in the table, most studies are qualitative. They have used
various research designs and methods such as action research, case studies, interview-based
research, observational studies, and the use of government documents (Sutcliffe et al.,
2016). Qualitative studies thus provide a rich foundation for quantitative techniques,
notably survey measures, such as unidimensional or multi-factor tests (Vogus & Sutcliffe,
2012). These studies’ commonalities mostly rely on the conceptualization of high
reliability as a “mindful infrastructure,” which was developed initially by Weick et al.
(1999). This means that researchers ground their work on HROT and model collective
44

mindfulness (or organizational reliability (OR) as an outcome that can only occur if all five
fundamental principles are achieved, prompting Weick & Sutcliffe (2001; 2015) to
describe them as a “package.”
However, most studies are less interested in assessing the level of “HRO-ness” or achieved
organizational reliability but aim to assess specific factors to the context and understand
how they impact the HRO principles and collective mindfulness. Studies, for example,
investigate the role of managing and avoiding conflict in healthcare institutions (Valentine
et al., 2010), the impact of mindfulness practices (Hales & Chakravorty, 2016), and the
effects of huddle meetings (Goldenhar et al., 2013). This means that previous studies did
not result in robust methods or measures that would help organizations to holistically assess
how ready they are to become an HRO or to what extent they are an HRO already, making
it difficult to track progress towards the goals of HROs. Moreover, these and other studies
provide evidence that, as a result of contextual factors, HROT principles need to be
implemented differently in different organizations and industries and may vary in the
degree to which they promote organizational reliability. As a result, organizations require
contextualized approaches for tracking their progress towards organizational reliability.
An additional complication is that industry and organizational contexts are not static but
change over time, changing how the HROT principles affect reliability and render formerly
successful HRO interventions less effective. For example, in the study performed by Ray
et al. (2011), the authors operationalize and measure mindfulness among different
leadership levels of US business schools and discuss that this can be used to gain insights
into their organization’s ability to weather crises - a more mindful leadership should be
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better prepared to manage detrimental events, such as reduced enrollment and resources.
However, in practice, it appears highly unlikely that leadership would still have the same
level of mindfulness in an environment with strongly declining resources when people
leave, leadership changes, work pressures go up, and practicing mindfulness might fall
victim to cost-cutting. This, and other existing measures, cannot currently predict and
analyze the system’s future state in response to external changes (e.g., enrollment decline)
and internal action (e.g., program cancellation, cost-cutting). Accordingly, present
measures do not provide clarity about what an organization must do to remain reliable.
Interim Conclusion
HROs is a viable approach in any organization that seeks to become mindful in managing
unexpected events regardless of the type and level of the operational hazard, including nontechnical organizations. Organizational reliability is often referred to as organizational
mindfulness. However, the procedures of practicing HROs and the difficulties and
challenges associated with the resulting outcomes differ from one organization to another,
even within the same industry, and depend on the organizational and operational settings.
This means that following the same procedures that other organizations have followed in
practicing HROs would not lead to or yield similar outcomes. Therefore, management
actions to practice HROs by designing and implementing managerial interventions, safety
policies, strategies, and programs must be contextualized to the specific organizational and
operational settings of each organization or industry.
Furthermore, available measures have been designed to assess the static state of
organizations that aspire to become HROs; however, these measures lack the capabilities
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to evaluate and understand how far along organizations are on their path to being HROs
and what should be done to get there. Because the operational environment, especially in
safety-critical organizations, is dynamic and highly influenced by internal and external
changes, current measures cannot predict systems’ future state or assess particular
situations based on various scenarios. That is why a system model based on HROT
principles is needed to strengthen and sustain a safety culture.
2.7

Research Context: The Offshore Oil and Gas Industry

This research uses the offshore oil and gas industry to test, verify, contextualize, and assess
the would-be developed theory-driven model. I selected this industry as a research context
due to the constant and high rate of accidents and incidents and their often-devastating
consequences, making this industry a significant safety concern for many years.
Considering the interdependent and complex challenges in this industry, this research joins
the stage of academic research to develop a practical tool that can become a means of
decision support for this industry to manage and promote a safer work environment.
Industry Overview
For decades, the Gulf of Mexico has been one of the most lively and appealing exploration
frontiers worldwide (Priest, 2008), which made offshore oil and gas one of the most
developed industries in the world (National Academies, 2016). The factors that positively
position this industry in this vital place are the age of and the continuously growing scale
of the explorations. According to Morton (2016), the first large platform was built offshore
in 1938 by both Pure Oil (now Chevron) and its partner Superior Oil (now ExxonMobil).
However, as of November 2015, there are (33) mobile offshore drilling units operating in
47

deep water (up to 10,000 feet), and more than (2,500) platforms operating in shallow water
(National Academies, 2016). This continuously growing scale to meet the increasing
demand for oil and gas (National Academies, 2016) has established a long history in
employing new and innovative technologies for commercial opportunities (Max et al.,
2009). Based on the annual summary of production for the Gulf of Mexico, oil and gas
production has reached 634,497,418 BBLS of oil and 983,313,149 MCF of gas in 2018
(BSEE, 2019). However, for economic reasons, this industry has a proven history of
prioritizing production over safety (National Academies, 2016), which has been a critical
factor behind many large-scale accidents and incidents that have caused severe
consequences (Zimmerman, 2012). The following sections discuss safety performance and
culture in this industry.
Safety Performance and Safety Culture
The literature on the offshore oil and gas industry, including government reports and
official data, shapes the conclusion that this industry is relatively unsafe. This conclusion
is based on the following two major factors:
First: The offshore explorations based on the number and severity of accidents that have
occurred on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) demonstrate that this industry is inherently
hazardous (National Energy Board, 2014; Priest, 2008). In deep water, the operations occur
in distant and usually unfavorable marine circumstances (Beatrice, 2011), where the
chances of organizational and human errors are high due to the increasingly sophisticated
technologies (National Academies, 2016). As a result, the offshore industry is listed among
the most hazardous occupations in the world.
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Second: Despite all the improvements that have been made since the late of 1960s to ensure
safer operations through improving work procedures and practices, technologies, and
government regulations (National Academies, 2016), official reports show that the accident
rate, while fluctuating year-by-year, is still stubbornly high (National Academies, 2016;
BSEE, 2015; 2016; 2017). Figure 2 presents the offshore incidents statistics 10 between
2007 and 2018, as provided by the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
(BSEE, 2018).

Figure 2: Offshore Incident Statistics 2007-2018

10

Information provided in Figure 2 above is taken from the BSEE’s page on incident statistics
(https://www.bsee.gov/stats-facts/offshore-incident-statistics). However, this data might be underreported
since it does not match the data provided by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The latter
shows some differences, particularly concerning the number of fatalities, as presented on this website:
(https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6420a4.htm).
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It is too early to tell if the reduction in the number of accidents in 2015, 2016, 2017, and
2018 signals a persistent trend or simple fluctuation. Given the industry’s nature, a single
gap in the safety and risk management systems can lead to disastrous events that result in
years with a high number of fatalities and catastrophic consequences such as the 2010
Deepwater Horizon.
There are various and interrelated factors that have led and continue to lead to accidents
and disasters but, overall, the industry is recognized to have ineffective risk and safety
management systems (National Energy Board, 2014; Hudson, 2007). Improving the
situation requires a very careful examination of safety culture (National Academies, 2016),
as several studies illustrate how it lacks in the industry. Fleming & Scott (2012) studied the
findings presented in the official investigation reports of fifteen major offshore accidents
during 1980-2010. They found that a lack of safety culture was identified as the root cause
that turned an accident into a disaster in twelve of these accidents. While five of these
accidents were directly linked to safety culture: Piper Alpha (1988), Usumacinta (2007),
Montara (2009), Sikorsky S-92A (2009), and Deepwater Horizon (2010), seven of them
did not have direct cultural causes based on the study classification dimensions; however,
poor safety culture was considered as a causal factor in these events as well (Fleming &
Scott, 2012).
The offshore industry’s safety culture is derived from an organizational culture described
as “male-oriented, macho, rough and tough, and can do” (National Academies, 2016, p.
20). There is a broad consensus among safety practitioners, scholars, and government that
to foster and sustain a safe work environment, the offshore oil and gas industry requires
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compliance with the regulations and a fundamental transformation of safety culture,
whereby organizations can move beyond compliance to operate safely.
Challenges to a Strong Safety Culture
Generally, any business or occupation can expect accidents and sometimes fatalities if it
puts people to work in taxing and changing environments, operates sophisticated
machinery, and increasingly relies on virtual work activities that often span across multiple
companies and landscapes. However, Wright (1986) notes that accidents with fatalities are
the norm of the routinely unsafe work practices in the offshore oil and gas industry. This
is partly due to the constant time pressures on projects where the projects’ profitability
depends on quick and timely production (Priest, 2008). Furthermore, many companies rely
on a temporary/contracted workforce for operations and disaster responses, which do not
share the same training, experiences, and sometimes even language.
These challenges make ground observations even more difficult and create uncertainty
about the state of the systems. According to Priest (2008), advancing such industry
concerning safety is typically achieved by trial-and-error methods, which often leads to
harmful consequences to the environment and can be fatal to workers. After interviewing
former off-shore oil and gas employees, Priest (2008) came to the following conclusion
(Priest, 2008, p. 144):
“Operators, and especially contractors, like the owners of mobile drilling vessels, did not
overly concern themselves with safety. At times, they even cut corners. Safe processes and
designs either did not exist or remained untested ideas in the minds of researchers.
Facilities engineering on production platforms was a novel concept. Platforms were often
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stick-built with equipment squeezed or slapped together on the deck with little concern or
foresight for worker safety.”
The following are the significant challenges to fostering and sustaining safety culture in
the offshore oil and gas (Priest, 2008; National Academies, 2016).
Work Environment and Shifts Schedule: Work environments in the oil and gas industry
are stressful. The prevailing circumstances are unfavorable such as Darkness, excessive
heat, cold, loud, and excessive noise. The shift schedule is long and stressful, with an
average shift length of seven days on, seven days off. This leaves the workers tired and
unfocused, which ultimately makes them susceptible to make errors that can lead to
accidents and their potential consequences.
Labor Market: The turnover rate in the offshore labor market is increasing, and the use of
contract employees is on the rise, which means that the industry frequently recruits
inexperienced workers with a limited skillset who need more and adequate training.
Unfortunately, even adequate training does not guarantee longevity in the workforce. Many
industry segments have different and multicultural workforces that consist of employees
with differing safety practices and varying educational backgrounds.
Operators, Contractors, and Subcontractors: During 1986 and 1994, the industry reported
that 66% of the sector consisted of emerging smaller and independent operators. This took
into consideration that those operators did not necessarily have an organizational structure
for managing safety, or they may not have equally treated safety on the same level of
importance. The relationships among operators, contractors, and subcontractors can
confuse safety responsibilities, so deploying consistent practices becomes difficult. The
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varied perceptions towards each of those different parties’ safety and economic interests
create an operation that speaks in other voices regarding safety.
Leadership Commitment to Safety: Senior leaders and owners of organizations differ in
their knowledge of, the obligation to, and engagement with the need to improve and
maintain a strong safety culture. Leaders sometimes send wrong messages explicitly or
implicitly, giving priority to production over safety, which makes it evident that their
beliefs are oriented towards how the organization makes money whereby efficiency comes
before performance.
Industry Nature: The nature of an industry is described as fragmented and diverse among
companies and employees, making it challenging to design consistent and universal goals
and implement them through industry-wide agreements. The operations occur in many
different organizations (a mix of small and large companies) that vary as to their internal
core values and safety assumptions.
Level of Safety Culture: Safety culture in this industry is still developing; however, a
blaming culture and the lack of systems thinking even exists., This focuses on instant
causes of failure (e.g., human errors) instead of the system causes, including the
organizational culture.
Safety Regulations: Inspections for compliance will not guarantee safe offshore
operations. Accountable organizations and progressive officials recognize the need to go
beyond regulatory compliance by holistically supporting safety. One challenge for all
regulators is to change inspectors’ mindset from inspecting for compliance to advocating
safety culture.
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Interim Conclusion
Various challenges impede the offshore oil and gas industry from developing and
sustaining a strong safety culture. While some of these challenges are intrinsic in the
technologies and environmental conditions surrounding the operations, others have been
identified as cultural and organizational. To strengthen and sustain the safety culture in this
industry, safety practices must be adapted to the context and go beyond compliance with
rules and regulations. There is a need to implement and contextualize a comprehensive
system approach for safety. This dissertation develops based on HROT five principles,
especially since there is no specifically contextualized HROT principles model for this
industry.
The contextualization procedure is essential in this work since practicing the five HROT
principles is a context-dependent approach. Specific organizational, operational, and even
environmental aspects of the operations are considered so that the expected outcomes from
this entire process can reveal the industry’s real-world capabilities and drawbacks. This
helps industry decision-makers identify and understand the specific shortcomings that
inhibit a high level of reliability.
Furthermore, since comprehensive HROT practical planning approaches for this industry
are not available, the decision-makers continue to face difficulties in selecting adequate
managerial interventions. When appropriately implemented, organizational reliability can
be achieved, and confrontation with other interventions, initiatives, or safety programs are
avoided.
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2.8

Conclusion, Research Gaps, Objectives, and Questions

High reliability organizations theory HROT provides a promising approach for developing
and sustaining a positive safety culture in reliability-seeking organizations with the goal to
reduce errors and avoid catastrophic events. Despite decades of research and extensive
descriptions of HROT and its five fundamental principles, this approach remains elusive
and difficult to achieve in many industries, particularly in the offshore oil and gas industry.
Reliability is often misunderstood as an endpoint that reliability-seeking organizations can
fully accomplish. Yet, reliability is not a state, but rather, a moving goal that organizations
continuously aspire to reach. It is simple to lose sight of this goal because reliability is
recognized by the absence of errors, and extended periods of achieving safe operations can
lead organizations to overestimate their systems’ reliability. As a result, they can reverse
the focus from safety performance to efficiency and fail to pay attention to HROT
principles as a dynamic set of interrelated and interdependent characteristics, activities, and
responses that form a dynamic system.
To a large extent, the literature on HROT falls short in addressing the dynamic nature of
HROT principles as systems. It insufficiently explains how these principles and their
components are interrelated. Moreover, there are insufficient ways for measuring progress
towards the goal of becoming an HRO. Instead, organizations use a checklist that assesses
their static state rather than their dynamic readiness to cope with a wide range of
unexpected events. The discussion above has furthermore shown that context matters and
that the implementation of HROT principle in an industry such as the offshore oil and gas
industry, which suffers from a deficient safety culture and poor safety performance
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measured by the accident rates, likely has to differ from the implementation in other
industrial settings. Given the-state-of-the-art of high reliability organizations theory and
challenges in the offshore oil and gas industry as a research context, the following gaps
were found in the literature. This dissertation is designed to close.
Lack of System Perspectives
Despite the rich literature on how HROT theory is developed, progressed, and practiced in
various industries, the literature falls short in providing methods or techniques for
developing system models based on its five principles to assess the outcomes of the
practitioners’ decision-making process on safety-related practices. On the one hand, neither
the contributing factors to the five principles are well understood. Their interdependencies
are sufficiently investigated and weighted, nor is it clear how these principles are correlated
to influence organizational reliability in real-world practice positively. On the other hand,
there is limited knowledge regarding how the relationship between management actions
and the five principles is established to guide the efforts towards a high organizational
reliability level. Moreover, such relationships often encounter uncertainties regarding the
appropriate model structure due to the variations in practitioners’ opinions, which need to
be managed during the modeling processes.
Lacking Contextualization for Offshore Oil and Gas
Previous studies on practicing the HROT principles conclude that plans and actual
procedures, including requirements, challenges, and obstacles, and the anticipated
outcomes differ from a context to another, depending on various organizational and
operational factors. These factors include decision-making, communication patterns,
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failure and error reporting, training, operating shifts, work schedules, and many others. As
a result, implementing HROT principles requires contextualizing the processes based on
the context’s real-world conditions under study. To date, there are no contextualized
system models of HROT based on the offshore oil and gas organizational and operational
settings. The lack of contextualization could result in wasted efforts to practice HROs,
which may lead to a misunderstanding that the five HROT principles cannot be practiced
in the offshore oil and gas industry.
Lack of Practical Planning Approaches
Implementing and contextualizing the principles of HROT require rigorous management
actions and practical planning. Such planning includes the selection and implementation of
proper managerial interventions that fit the general circumstances of the industry (i.e., how
the operations are managed such as the number of work shifts) on the one hand and HROs
practicing requirements (i.e., HRO-related practices such the continuous reporting of nearmisses and incidents) on the other hand. However, practical planning approaches to
implement and contextualize HROT principles in the offshore oil and gas currently are not
available. This limits the decision-makers’ ability to select suitable interventions that work
as a bridge to successfully achieve organizational reliability and reduce counterproductive
effects that can results when confronted with other interventions and continue to achieve
positive outcomes even when internal and external changes occur.
Summary of Research Gaps, Objectives, and Questions
Table 4 summarizes the research gaps, objectives, and research questions.
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Table 4: Research Gaps, Research Objectives, and Research Questions
Research Gaps
Lack of System Perspectives
There is no comprehensive system model that represents
the relationships between management actions,
“interventions,” the five HROT principles, and
organizational reliability. This limits our understanding of
how organizational reliability can be achieved.

Lacking Contextualization for Offshore Oil and Gas
Industry and organizational contexts influence how HROT
principles are implemented and how they impact OR, yet,
to date, no contextualization of HROT for offshore oil and
gas has occurred. This limits the ability to improve industry
safety performance through HROs practices.
Lack of Practical Planning Approaches
There is no comprehensive approach to supporting HROs
planning. Decision-makers lack support in selecting
interventions that (1) can be expected to improve
organizational reliability, (2) are synergistic with other
planned interventions to improve reliability, and (3) are
robust under changing conditions.

Research Objectives

Research Questions

 To develop a novel, mixedmethods approach to modeling
the principles of HROT as a
Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM)
based on the published, peerreviewed research.
 To develop a comprehensive
FCM system model of HROT,
using the novel approach.

1. How can research publications on HROT be analyzed
to identify and represent relevant concepts and causal
relationships?
2. How can the weight of causal relationships be
inferred from qualitative data in research
publications?
3. How can information about concepts, causal
relationships, and relationship weights be used to
develop a general FCM model of HROT?
4. How can uncertainty about the appropriate model
structure be managed in the modeling process?

 To contextualize the FCM
model with the help of industry
experts so that it reflects the
unique context of the offshore
oil and gas industry.

5. How can the general FCM model of HROT practices
be contextualized to the specific settings of offshore
oil and gas operations?

 To evaluate the FCM model as a
tool for planning HROT
practices.

6. How can the contextualized FCM model of HROT
practices be used to support safety decision-makers in
the offshore oil and gas industry?
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3. Methodological Foundation
This work uses various methods over multiple phases to close the identified research gaps
and answer the research questions. In this chapter, I first provide an overview of the
methodological selection, then I review the research methods, including Fuzzy cognitive
maps (FCMs), Thematic Analysis (TA), Thematic Networking (TN), Thematic Proximity
(TP), and Exploratory Modeling and Analysis (EMA). The chapter also presents techniques
for model testing for verification and strategies for model simulation and scenario planning.
Figure 3 is a graphical illustration of how these methods will be presented and integrated
to create, test, and simulate the research model.

Phase 2

Calculating the Weights of The Concepts’ Relationships in the Networks

Model Verification Tests
Examining Model Structure for discrepancies and Anomalous Behaviors

FCM Traditional and Exploratory Modeling and Analysis (EMA)
Model Contextualization

Phase 3,4

Thematic Proximity (TP)

Phase 4

Thematic Network (TN)
Developing Networks Based on Arranging the Generated Concepts

FCM Model Building

Generating Model Concepts (Themes) From Published Research

Phase 1

Thematic Analysis (TA)

FCM Model Simulation

Quantitative Process

Qual-Quan

Qualitative Process

Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM)

Figure 3: Methodological Foundation
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3.1

Methodological Selection

The overall objective of this research is to build a practicable theory-driven system model
of organizational reliability based on FCM that can be used to simulate the effects of safetyrelevant activities on organizational reliability. The model will support organizations in the
offshore oil and gas industry in their decision-making processes regarding safety-related
practices, policies, strategies, and interventions. Creating the model requires extracting
insights from published research, which is mostly qualitative, converting these insights into
cognitive maps that show concepts and causal connections, and translating the cognitive
maps into quantitative FCM models.
A variety of content-based methodologies exist to support the first step, namely the
translation of insights from text documents (e.g., interviews or published research) into
cognitive map structures in ways that capture concepts, meaning, and causal relationships
between them. For example, Carley (1997) proposed an automated approach of a two-steps
process to build a cognitive map using survey instruments, observation, and archival means
to extract and represent mental models. The first step is to filter the text based on a
predefined list of concepts, while the second step is to set a text size window to
automatically generate maps from the filtered text. Although this is a fast approach to
extract and represent mental models, it can create relationships among contiguous concepts
that are not necessarily related. Moreover, this approach does not provide a means to
measure the strength of the causal links in the developed maps.
Nadkarni & Shenoy (2004) proposed a systematic procedure for creating structures for
Bayesian Belief Networks, which share some similarities with FCM. This procedure
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consists of a four-step process: (1) data elicitation by conducting open-ended interviews,
(2) derivation of a causal map 11, (3) modifying the original map, and (4) assessing the
parameters. This approach is quite different from the one proposed by Carley because it
was conducted manually using both exploratory and confirmatory methods. It is entirely
dependent on subject matter experts, who are charged with determining the causal map and
assessing its parameters, based on their knowledge. Thus, the expert provides a (weak) link
between published literature and the resulting map structures.
Alizadeh & Jetter (2017) proposed a content-based approach to extract the FCM model
from published research instead of conducting interviews. The process consists of five
steps: (1) drawing the raw FCM based on the original text, (2) consolidating identical
concepts, (3) adopting consistent terminologies for conceptually similar concepts, (4)
tuning the granularity for concepts and sub-concepts, and (5) identifying and closing the
gaps in the map, where the modeler hypothesizes connections to the concepts in the model
that are left isolated to complete the collective FCM. However, this process does not
provide a technique that resolves the issue of assigning weights to the causal relationships
in the developed FCMs. In fact, in a follow-up study, Alizadeh (2018) experimented with
the difficulties with an online survey that assigns weights to the FCM edges generated by
the discussed process. Although participants were researchers in the field, the study became
problematic for the recipients because they found the questions difficult, out of their area
of expertise, or too time-consuming to answer.

11

This step also consists of a four steps process: (a) Identifying causal statements, (b) developing causal
phrases, causal connectors, and causal effects, (c) designing a coding scheme, and (d) creating the final coded
causal maps.
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In conclusion, several approaches have been used to extract knowledge and build causal
model structures. The dependence on subject experts in assigning weights for the causal
relationships in such models is highly problematic. Accordingly, this research develops
and uses a different methodological approach, through which it (1) extracts knowledge
from published research texts, using a semi-manual procedure to ensure that knowledge is
rigorously and thoroughly captured, the concepts and their meanings are uniquely defined,
and the causal relationships are established, and (2) facilitates a quantitative estimation of
the causal relationships weights between concepts based on the same analyzed texts. It thus
provides an alternative method to survey subject-matter experts to assign the weights. This
approach consists of thematic analysis, thematic networks, and a newly developed
approach that uses thematic proximity for assigning causal weights. The outcome is the
FCM model based on published research on HROT five principles. The following sections
discuss each method and the rationale behind selecting each method to conduct this
research.
3.2

Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs)

Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) is a system thinking technique to model complex matters
with cause and effect relationships and dynamic behaviors (Jetter, 2006; Jetter & Kok,
2014). FCM was invented in the artificial intelligence field by Kosko (1986; 1988) to
employ cognitive maps with dynamic behavior through the applications of fuzzy sets
theory and artificial neural networks.
The FCM technique builds models in a form that can be easily understood (Papageorgiou
& Salmeron, 2013), learned and used by technical and nontechnical-experts alike
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(Alizadeh, 2018; Papageorgiou & Salmeron, 2014). The flexibility of FCM in building,
parameterizing, and modifying models that can perform within a relatively short period has
increased its popularity during the past decade (van Vliet et al., 2010). It became an
acceptable and widely used means for designing knowledge-based systems in various
scientific areas (Nápoles et al., 2016; Jetter & Kok, 2014). FCM has been used to support
the decision-making process in complex planning (Jetter, 2006), such as planning
information systems and product planning (Jetter & Sperry, 2013 ). According to
(Papageorgiou & Salmeron, 2014), FCM is used in solving problems in various research
fields such as medicine, control, business, robotics, environment, ecology, and safety
research (Bevilacqua et al., 2013; Pourreza et al., 2018). The knowledge of complex
matters can be captured in a standardized format and participatory technique involving
academic experts or key industry actors and decision-makers such as managers, operators,
etc. (Gray et al., 2012; Gray et al., 2014). However, more recently, the knowledge has been
captured from secondary data sources, such as published research. For example, see
(Alizadeh & Jetter, 2017) and (Hajek et al., 2017).
The main goal of building FCMs around the problems of complex systems, mainly when
the system’s elements are in constant dynamic interactions, is that FCM can convert
qualitative knowledge into quantitative and computable systems. Therefore, simulation
based scenarios can be applied to predict and analyze the system’s current and future state.
Because FCM allows a wide range of scenarios to predict the behaviors and future state of
the system it represents, and since it is a non-linear modeling technique and a proper means
to model dynamic and complex matters in the data-poor environment, it is, therefore, an
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appropriate and promising methodology to model the phenomenon of organizational
reliability. To understand how the FCM technique was invented and used, an overview of
its theoretical background, cognitive maps, fuzzy set theory, and the artificial neural
network will be discussed as follows.
Theoretical Foundations
FCM is a modeling methodology that originated in fuzzy logic and cognitive mapping to
represent complex systems’ knowledge under uncertainty based on neural network theory
principles. An FCM is a signed directed graph that consists of nodes (concepts) that denote
the system elements and links (edges) that connect the concepts with one another. The
edges are directed to demonstrate the influence of the causally related concepts, marked
with positive or negative signs to state the nature of the effect (i.e., increasing or
decreasing), and weighted to specify the corresponding influence’s strength. However,
unlike neurons in an artificial neural network, where they are either ON (the activation
level is 1) or OFF (the activation level is 0 or -1), FCM employs varying degrees of
membership; that is why it is fuzzy. Because of this combined nature of the FCM,
quantitative simulation can predict the system behaviors and state.
Cognitive Maps
A Cognitive Map (CM) is a graphical representation of qualitative knowledge that
describes how a system works (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). It is a digraph that has its root in
graph theory and was first used by Robert Axelrod in 1976 to visualize social knowledge.
Axelrod (1976) used cognitive mapping to represent the cause and effect relationships of
political elites, captured in a participatory fashion by crowd people instead of researchers.
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Creating a cognitive map is the first step in building FCMs (Jetter & Sperry, 2013 ). The
modeler identifies the most significant variables (concepts) in the system and then draws
signed arrows to connect the causally related concepts based on the provided reasoning.
The required causal knowledge to build a cognitive map can be captured using various
techniques such as interviews, focus groups, workshops, mapping exercises, and
qualitative analysis of textual data.
Figure 4 below depicts a simple causal cognitive map that consists of four concepts and
five causal links. In this map, concept A increases concept B, C, and D, yet increasing the
value of concept A may or may not increase concept D in the system’s steady state. That
is because concept D is a driven variable that depends not only on the positive impacts of
concepts A and C but also on the negative influence of concept B. Therefore, the final value
of concept D is contingent on the strength of all the positive and negative causal links.
However, cognitive maps in the earlier introduction and applications were binary. In other
words, the strength of the causal relationships was either (+1) for all the positive links or
(-1) for all the negative connections.

Figure 4: Simple Causal Cognitive Map and the Corresponding Adjacency Matrix

As a digraph, a cognitive map can be turned into a square (n x n) adjacency matrix, where
n is the number of the concepts in the map. This matrix indicates whether pairs of concepts
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are adjacent or not in the graph, and it demonstrates the causal relationships among the
adjacent pairs in a mathematical format. Each element of the matrix (mij) is a value function
of the adjacent pair of concepts (i.e., mij= f (Ci, Cj)). If Ci causally increases Cj, mij to (+1),
and if decreases Cj, mij to (-1), then when there is no link, mij is (0). The corresponding
adjacency matrix is shown in Figure 4 above. Since all the concepts in this example have
no feedback or influence on themselves, their values (m11, m22, m33, m44) in the matrix were
set to zero.
Fuzzy Set Theory
Modeling complex systems to represent real situations often encounter uncertain and vague
information resulting from human subjectivity and imprecision. Uncertain information can
be partially precise, which is usually handled using probability theory and statistics, or
imprecise, which can be handled using fuzzy set theory to provide measurable precisions
for verbal statements (Kangari & Boyer, 1989). Real situations often are not crisp (i.e.,
fuzzy), and therefore, they cannot be described precisely (Zimmerman, 2001).
Zadeh (1965) proposed the fuzzy set theory based on the axiomatic logic considering
human subjectivity and imprecision (Kangari & Boyer, 1989). It is an extension of the
classic theory of sets (Jetter, 2006) and a means to describe ambiguous situations by using
a more precise numerical context (Zimmerman, 2001). The difference between the classic
theory of set and fuzzy set theory is that the former considers an object in a binary
association with a set (i.e., the object either belongs to the set or not). For example, a 29years-old man is not a middle-aged group member if the group boundaries are between 30
and 50 years old. These crisp boundaries do not match human precision because people
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define age boundaries differently. However, the latter (fuzzy set theory) considers an object
as a member of a set with a varying degree of membership (i.e., partial belongingness),
which is usually represented in the interval [0;1]. A fuzzy set can expand the boundaries of
the above example from crisp values to a range that includes the 29-years-old man as a
partial member of this group with a specific degree of belongingness. Based on this
conception, Kosko (1986) integrated fuzzy logic into cognitive mapping and introduced
fuzzy cognitive maps. In FCMs, concepts’ values are not only 0, +1, and -1, but also values
within the intervals [0;1] and [-1; +1]. Also, the strengths of causal links are not in a binary
fashion (i.e., +1 or -1) as with cognitive maps, but use values in the range of [-1; 1]. Figure
5 below is an FCM with weighted edges based on fuzzy logic and the map’s corresponding
adjacency matrix.

Figure 5: Simple FCM and the Corresponding Adjacency Matrix

The value of each concept in the map is calculated based on the values of all the
influencing concepts multiplied by the strengths of the causal links using equation (1)
(Alizadeh, 2018):
(𝑘𝑘)

𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖

(𝑘𝑘−1)

= 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖

(𝑘𝑘−1)

+ � 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴≠𝑖𝑖

𝑊𝑊𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗

(1)

Where Wji is the strength of the causal link between concepts Ci and Cj at iteration k.
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To examine how a particular scenario can change the value of the concepts in an FCM, a
state vector (1 x n), where n is the number of the map’s concepts, is multiplied by the
corresponding adjacency matrix, by which a new state vector would result. This process is
repeated until the system reaches a study state or new iterations lead to the same outcomes.
For instance, activating concept A in Figure 5 above (i.e., increasing its value from 0 to 1),
while other concepts are turned off (i.e., set their values to 0), the initial state vector
(Iteration 1) is as follows:
𝑆𝑆1𝑇𝑇 = [1

0

0

0]

0

0 0.5 0.4 0.1
0 0
0 −0.9
�=[0
0 ] X�
0 0
0
0.3
0 0
0
0

This first state vector is multiplied by the adjacency matrix (Iteration 2):

[1

0

The new state vector; 𝑆𝑆2𝑇𝑇 = [0

0.5

0.4

0.5 0.4 0.1]

0.1]

The second state vector is multiplied by the adjacency matrix (Iteration 3):
0
[0 0.5 0.4 0.1 ] X �0
0
0

0.5 0.4 0.1
0
0 −0.9
�=[0 0
0
0
0.3
0
0
0

0 −0.33]

The new state vector; 𝑆𝑆3𝑇𝑇 = [0 0 0 − 0.33]

The third state vector is multiplied by the adjacency matrix (Iteration 4):

[0 0

0 0.5 0.4 0.1
0 0
0 −0.9
�=[0 0 0
0 − 0.33 ] X �
0 0
0
0.3
0 0
0
0

0]
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Integrating Artificial Neural Network Theory in FCMs
Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is a modeling technique that has been developed based
on the mathematical representations of the biological nervous systems (Abraham, 2005).
This technique emerged after the introduction of basic neurons by McCulloch and Pitts in
1943 (Alizadeh, 2018). In ANN, neurons receive stimuli (input signals with different
strengths), process, and transmit them to the adjacent neurons. When the received signals
are strong enough, they can be transmitted to all the network neurons (Jetter, 2006). The
connection strengths weigh the effects of the transmitted signals and transform them
through a transferring function that displays the neurons’ nonlinear characteristics
(Abraham, 2005). Figure 6 below illustrates this process graphically, and the output signal
O of the neuron can be calculated using equation (2):
𝑛𝑛

𝑂𝑂 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) = 𝑓𝑓 �� 𝑤𝑤𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 �

(2)

𝑗𝑗=1

Where wj is the weight vector, and f(net) is the transfer function, while the variable net is
a product of the weight and input vectors:
𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 = 𝑤𝑤 𝑇𝑇 𝑥𝑥 = 𝑤𝑤1 𝑥𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝑤𝑤𝑛𝑛 𝑥𝑥𝑛𝑛

(3)

Where T is the transpose of the matrix.

The output value O is computed as follows:
𝑂𝑂 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛) = �

Where θ is the threshold level.

1
0

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑤𝑤 𝑇𝑇 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 𝜃𝜃
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒

(4)
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Figure 6: Signal Processing in an Artificial Network

Several types of inference (activation) functions can be used in FCM modeling techniques
such as binary, linear, sigmoid, and hyperbolic tangent. Modelers usually choose what fits
their modeling objectives and results presentations (Alibage et al., 2018).

Binary function:

Linear function:

−1 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 < 0
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 = 0
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = � 0
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 > 0
−1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 ≤ −1
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = �𝑥𝑥 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 − 1 < 𝑥𝑥 < 1
1
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑥𝑥 ≥ 1

(5)

(6)

The sigmoid function produces outputs between [0, 1] for any input variable.

𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) =

1

1+𝑒𝑒 −𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆

(7)

The hyperbolic tangent function produces outputs between [1, -1] for any input variable.
𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡ℎ 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆W

(8)
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Where λ is a parameter used to determine the transfer function’s appropriate shape,
whereby modelers specify the function slope or the degree of fuzzification.
Kosko (1988; 1991) integrated the principles of ANN theory in the FCMs, which turned
them into recursive artificial neural networks. ANN application has enabled the FCM
technique to conduct various scenarios regarding complex systems’ dynamic behaviors and
predict system states. Applying ANN to FCMs has solved the problem of misidentifying
which system’s elements can stay active in the short term when activating a particular
concept(s) and which ones last under the activation effects for a more extended period
(Jetter, 2006). The use of sigmoid and the hyperbolic tangent functions to examine the
performance of the FCM shown in Figure 5 above yielded the results shown in Table 5 and
Table 6 and presented in Figure 7 and Figure 8, respectively.
Table 5: Results of Using Sigmoid Function
Iteration

A

B

C

D

1

1

0

0

0

2

0.5

0.6225

0.5987

0.525

3

0.5

0.5622

0.5498

0.4181

4

0.5

0.5622

0.5498

0.4278

Figure 7: Effects of Sigmoid Function
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Table 6: Results of Using Hyperbolic Tangent Function
Iteration

A

B

C

D

1

1

0

0

0

2

0

0.4621

0.3799

0.0997

3

0

0

0

-0.2931

4

0

0

0

0

Figure 8: Effects of Hyperbolic Tangent Function

3.3

Thematic Analysis (TA)

Thematic Analysis (TA) is a qualitative research method that identifies and interprets latent
or hidden patterns of meaning across qualitative data under study (Clarke & Braun, 2014).
Although this method has been known within the literature on qualitative research since
1979 (Braun & Clarke, 2006; 2014), its guidelines were first put into place in the late of
1990s by Boyatzis (1998) to describe the development of the codes and themes, where the
method sought independence from grounded theory. Nonetheless, TA is still considered a
grounded theory but within a theoretical framework (Clarke, 2017), and because there is
no clear distinction between qualitative content analysis and thematic analysis
(Sandelowski & Leeman, 2012), the two methods are often used interchangeably (Braun
& Clarke, 2006; Clarke, 2017).
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TA became popular over the last decade and has been widely used in qualitative research
(Clarke, 2017; Gross, 2013; Guest et al., 2014), particularly within social and health
sciences, following a widely cited research paper by Braun & Clarke (2006). TA can be
used to analyze most qualitative data types, including interviews, focus groups, qualitative
surveys, story completion tasks, diaries, vignettes, and a wide range of secondary sources,
including printed materials, online and electronic materials, and broadcast media and films.
This method moves beyond explicit words or phrases and focuses on identifying and
describing both implicit and explicit ideas within the data, or in other words, “themes”
(Guest et al., 2014).
The purpose of using TA is to facilitate the categorization process of the data and the
construction of the explicit and implicit various meanings and descriptions of all the
relevant concepts that emerge from the literature, including the concepts that support as
well as those that preclude the creation of a complex phenomenon, which in the case of
this research is organizational reliability. This method provides a beneficial qualitative
approach, particularly for conducting applied research such as health, policy, or practice
fields (Braun & Clarke, 2014), education, early childhood, and health and safety research
(Salleh et al., 2017; Lekka & Sugden, 2011).
Theme Definition and Development
A theme is defined as “an extended phrase or sentence that identifies what a unit of data
is about and/or what it means” (Saldaňa, 2016, p. 199), and generally known to
meaningfully capture the most significant data or information regarding the research
objectives, and to characterize some level of patterned meanings (Braun & Clarke, 2006).
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In other words, a theme identifies an area of data that tells the readers something about it
(Sandelowski & Leeman, 2012).
Themes are developed as a researcher assigns qualitative codes 12 to the text and tries to
organize and categorize the codes into larger patterns. Themes can emerge from conceptual
codes and sub-codes and relationship codes, which label data that link concepts to each
other (Bradley et al., 2007).
Moreover, categorizing the coded text into categories and sub-categories is, in fact,
comparing them based on their “particular-reality” while theming is converting them into
a “general-abstract” meaning (Saldana, 2016) as illustrated in Figure 9. For example,
theming two or more categories of technical staff that have been categorized based on their
specific technical disciplines (i.e., their “particular-reality,” such as mechanics,
electricians, etc.) as “technicians” is converting their specialties into a “general-abstract”
description. This process reduces complexities in the text and provides the readers with
bigger pictures of the hidden patterns for clarity and understanding; however, nuanced
details remain in the themes’ definitions.
Figure 9 demonstrates three paths to develop themes from textual data over streamlined
codes. In path 1, a theme or sub-theme is developed by grouping two or more categories
of codes if the categories are: (1) Sharing similar or general concepts such as theming
various categories of smokers into a theme or sub-theme of “people with high-risk cancer,”

12

A code in qualitative research refers to “the most basic segment, or element, of the raw data or information
that can be assessed in a meaningful way regarding the phenomenon” (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 63). More
discussions on qualitative codes provided in the next chapter (Chapter 4).
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or (2) leading to (causing) the same or a similar outcome such as theming various categories
of errors into a theme or a sub-theme of “operational failure.” In path 2, a theme is
developed by converting a unique category of codes into a theme or a sub-theme, such as
theming specific kinds of drugs under the theme or sub-theme of “specific treatment.” In
path 3, the code is unique and conveys a distinctive meaning that cannot be grouped with
other codes into one category or sub-theme; thus, it is converted into a theme or a subtheme, such as in the case of coding a medicine student in a piece of text that mainly
focused on STEM students.

Figure 9: Various Paths to Develop Themes from Textual Data
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According to Clarke (2017), there are two types of themes: Bucket themes and storybook
themes. A bucket theme (also referred to as a domain summary) is a combination of
different meanings, such as risk and benefits, which means that there is no sense of an
integrated or a shared meaning other than a summary of everything said concerning a
specific topic in such a theme. However, a storybook theme is conceptualized as a pattern
in the data supported by a central concept that organizes the analytic observations.
Phases of Thematic Analysis
TA is a structured method and follows a detailed and lengthy process that consists of the
following principles, as suggested by Braun & Clarke (2006). Extensive discussions
around these principles are provided in Chapter 4.
Phase 1: Understanding the Data: During this phase, the researcher develops a broad
understanding of and familiarizes himself/herself with the data set. This is especially true
when the data were not collected by the same researcher, such as analyzing the literature
around a phenomenon.
Phase 2: Generating Initial Codes: This phase involves developing a preliminary set of
codes from the data as depicted and explained in Figure 9. These codes categorize a feature
of the data (semantic content or latent) that appears significant to the analysis. The coding
process, including the coding strategy, procedure, and coding reliability, are discussed
extensively in Chapter 4.
Phase 3: Searching for Themes: During this phase, the analysis’s focus takes a broader
level of themes based on the developed set of codes. It involves categorizing the codes into
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themes based on their general meaning and similarities. The process of theming, including
the theming strategy and procedure, is also discussed extensively in Chapter 4.
Phase 4: Reviewing Themes: This phase involves a more in-depth examination of the
initial themes, whereby a preliminary theme can be merged into other themes when it
doesn’t have enough data to stand on its own, or it can be collapsed into two or more themes
when it consists of diverse data.
Phase 5: Defining and Labeling Themes: Through this phase, the core of what each theme
is about is identified, and the characteristic of the data that each theme captures is
determined.
Phase 6: Producing the Report: In this phase, the objective is to produce a report that
speaks a complete story about the data.
3.4

Thematic Network

A thematic network (TN) is an “analytic tool draws on core features that are common to
many approaches in qualitative analysis” (Attride-Stirling, 2001, p. 386). A TN (also
known as a thematic map) depicts and defines the causal relationships between themes at
different levels (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Guest et al., 2014). Building a thematic network
based on published research reveals notable themes at different levels and enables their
structuring and representation. This thematic network provides the so-called “web-like”
network that summarizes the main themes or patterns constituting a piece of text (AttrideStirling, 2001).
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In Figure 10, a thematic network arranges the abstraction of themes at three levels: Basic
(lower-order) themes, organizing (middle-order) themes, and global (super-ordinate)
themes, which each of which will be discussed as follows.

Figure 10: Thematic Network (Global Theme)

However, this three-level arrangement does not necessarily arrange themes in a
hierarchical order. It is still web representations or an organizing path regarding the cause
and effect relationships between each two causally related themes. In path causal
relationships, a global theme is a bucket or storytelling theme of various organizing themes,
where each of which is a bucket or storytelling themes of basic themes.
In this network, themes on different levels can also be in causal relationships with one
another. Constructing a thematic network is also a structured process that typically follows
similar phases in thematic analysis or complementing them. The three-levels themes
suggested by Attride-Stirling (2001) are defined and described as follows:
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Basic Themes: A basic theme is a lowest-order theme that is elicited directly from the
textual data to convey a statement of understanding around a central idea that leads to the
creation of organizing and global themes. Basic themes usually provide simple meanings
of the data under study. Therefore, they do not say much about it unless they stand enough
on their own to reflect the exact meaning or provide meanings in the context of other basic
themes to the higher-level themes.
Organizing Themes: Organizing themes are middle-order themes that organize basic
themes into groups of similar issues. They are clusters of meanings that summarize groups
of basic themes. Therefore, they are more abstract and more revealing of what is going on
in the texts. Organizing themes play the role of enhancing the meaning and importance of
broader themes and demonstrating their main assumptions. A group of organizing themes,
therefore, constitutes a global theme.
Global Themes: Global themes are super-ordinate themes that encompass the principal
metaphors in the data. They are the concluding remarks concerning a phenomenon or
significant stories in the analyzed data. Global themes are groups of organizing themes that
together introduce arguments or demonstrate given issues or reality. They make sense of
groups of lower-order themes that are distracted from and supported by the data. Thus,
global themes speak what the texts are about within the context of a given analysis,
considering that when the analyzed text is complex and constitutes various ideas, it can
yield more than one global theme. However, global themes are usually less in number than
organizing and basic themes. They form networks of causally related themes so that
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analyzing a text that yields more than one global theme can result in more than one thematic
network.
3.5

Thematic Proximity

Thematic proximity is a relational content analysis approach to identify implicit patterns
among the text’s descriptive units under study (Armborst, 2017). Although it is not an
explicitly mixed method that necessitates collecting and analyzing qualitative and
quantitative data, thematic proximity enables various statistical coefficients, a numerical
interpretation for the interrelated qualitative statements. Therefore, it provides a means to
quantify the strength of the causal relationship between the causally related unit (i.e., codes,
themes, patterns, etc.).
Using this approach aims to reduce or provide an alternative to the total reliance on subject
experts in assigning weights for the edges of the causally descriptive models. As discussed
before, assigning weights for these relationships through experts is often challenging and
does not usually result in precise weights. Thematic proximity can be measured using
various quantitative techniques, yet each technique’s appropriateness depends on the
research context and methodology. In the text mining approaches, Cosine Similarity Index,
which is a vector-based approach, is often used to compares two texts in terms of shared
words (Oleinik, 2011; Salton, 1983).
This technique produces a score between [0] when there is nothing in common and [1]
when the two texts are identical. Cosine similarity can be calculated using equation (9)
below. It measures the cosine of the angle between the two vectors of words, where the
vectors that do not share any content are at a perfect 90-degree angle from one another,
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resulting in a score of [0]. In contrast, vectors that share identical content have zero degrees
between them, resulting in a score of [1] (Acree et al., 2016).
cos θ=

𝐴𝐴 . 𝐵𝐵
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(9)

Although this approach is simple to implement and interpret, it has some downsides. First,
similarity may not necessarily reflect proximity or correlation between two compared sets
of texts. Second, since this technique placed in the broader family of text analysis
techniques that are known as “bag of words” (Acree et al., 2016), it does not take word
order or context into consideration when comparing two texts (sentence, paragraph, or the
whole set of text). Like a bag of words, this measure depends on the frequency of words in
each text, where the results would be significantly changed when the frequency of one
word (i.e., the number of times a word is mentioned) in each of the compared text is
increased or decreased.
Figure 11 illustrates how text vectors are projected on each other to form an angle that
leads to determining the value of the Cosine similarity index. In this figure, only two words
(word 1 and word 2) were considered to simplify this technique’s overall configuration,
which clearly shows that the vectors will become narrow or pull away depending on
increasing or decreasing the number of one word in each set of text. In contrast, the other
word’s number remains the same or changes inversely, thus increasing or decreasing the
angle.
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Figure 11: Text Vectors Projection in Cosine Similarity Index

Another approach to estimating thematic proximity between interrelated themes uses the
Jaccard Similarity Coefficient (c-coefficient) to analyze the frequency of the cooccurrences or overlap of descriptive units (i.e., codes, themes, patterns, or categories)
within the entire set of data under analysis. The c-coefficient is integrated into most of the
qualitative data computer-assisted software such as Atlas.ti, NVivo, QDA Miner, and
MAXQDA, and it is mostly used in content analysis and other qualitative methods. It
calculates the strength of the relationship between two units similar to a correlation
coefficient in a range between [0] for no correlation and [1] for maximum correlation;
however, no significance is provided (Friese, 2018). The c-coefficient is calculated using
the following equation (10), where n1 is the number of occurrences (grounding) of unit 1
in the whole coded text, n2 is the number of occurrences of unit 2, and n12 is the number of
co-occurrences of both codes.

𝑐𝑐 =

𝑛𝑛 12

(𝑛𝑛 1 +𝑛𝑛 2 )−𝑛𝑛 12

(10)
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Importantly, there are inherent issues with using the c-coefficient to provide accurate
measures due to some deficiencies in embedding this tool into a more logical algorithm in
qualitative software such as Atlas.ti. Even when there is a clear indication of a strong
relationship between two analytical units (themes), the c-coefficient may underestimate
this relationship’s strength, particularly when one unit is attached more often to the text
segments than the other related unit. For example, if n1 = 100, n2 = 10, and n12 = 5, c =
0.048. Furthermore, the c-coefficient does not consider the proportion of overlapping
content in determining how strong the relationship is (Friese, 2018). Figure 12 depicts two
cases of how c-coefficient is calculated and why it does not often provide an accurate
measure.

Figure 12: Possible Cases Resulted from The Use of c-Coefficient

Most recently, Armborst (2017) proposed a new statistical technique to estimate the
thematic proximity between causal descriptive units (or themes) using the so-called
thematic coefficient (t-coefficient). This method overcomes the discussed limitations using
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the other measures (i.e., c-coefficient and Cosine index) by considering the proportions of
text intersections and word frequencies instead of the frequency of code co-occurrences.
The t-coefficient estimates proximities based on the text content that every two related
units share. The more content they share, the stronger the relationship between them. This
coefficient is calculated using the following equation.
1 𝑛𝑛 12 𝑛𝑛 12
𝑡𝑡 = �
+
�
2 𝑛𝑛 1
𝑛𝑛 2

(11)

Where n1 is the total number of words classified with unit 1 (theme 1), n2 is the total number
of words classified with unit 2 (theme 2), and n12 is the number of the shared words between
the two units. A graphical representation of how the variable of t-coefficient is identified
is in Figure 13.

Figure 13: Graphical Representation of How the Variable of t-coefficient Identified

The variable explained in equation (11) can be calculated by generating word lists
associated with each theme using the retrieval tools or word lists provided by computer
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software such as Atlas.ti. The results are values in the intervals of [0,1], where [0] indicates
no correlation, and [1] indicates a maximum relationship.
Notably, the t-coefficient only yields positive values; however, the nature of the causal
relationships (i.e., positive or negative) is defined by the researcher(s) and decided by the
text’s interpretation and analysis. Furthermore, to compare the calculated values of the tcoefficient for all the connections in the thematic network(s), both of cosine similarity
index and c-coefficient will be calculated and compared. More details and numeric
comparisons will be provided in Chapter 5.
3.6

Exploratory Modelling and Analysis (EMA)

In traditional modeling approaches such as predictive modeling, the model is developed
based on known facts and sufficient knowledge to accurately reflect the modeler’s
understanding of how a system works and then predicts the model’s behaviors based on
inputs (Bankes, 1992; 1993). Such models can be verified when the systems they represent
are visible and quantifiable, their causal structure does not change over time, and the
phenomena gathers enough information (Hodges & Dewar, 1992). However, when
modeling a complex system where the model structure (i.e., how the model is built) is based
on implicit and explicit assumptions, inputs to the model (policy and decision-making
processes) are expected to encounter various uncertainties. Therefore, modeling such
systems using traditional approaches may not replicate a reliable image of how the system
works and behaves in the real world nor predict outcomes for the given inputs.
To overcome potential uncertainties in modeling complex systems, including those that are
modeled as FCMs, several research fields such as economics and environmental science
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have shifted away from predictive to explorative modeling, by which the model can be
simulated concerning a wide range of various inputs (Kwakkel & Pruyt, 2013). A capable
approach to model-based decision support with a high level of uncertainty is Exploratory
Modelling and Analysis (EMA), a quantitative technique that uses computational
experiments to explore the implications of defined assumptions and hypotheses (Bankes,
1993; Agusdinata, 2008).
The RAND Corporation has initially developed EMA to provide decision support in
situations when various types of uncertainties (i.e., parametric, structural, and
methodological) cannot be simplified or reduced (Bankes, 1992). It is a suitable technique
to simulate explorative models, particularly when critical data does not create a single
model that articulates how the system works in real-world settings (Kwakkel & Pruyt,
2013; Kwakkel et al., 2010). However, the use of EMA neither reduces nor eliminates
uncertainties around a specific problem nor simplifies it. Instead, EMA provides computer
decision support for policy analysis under the same level of complexity and uncertainty
(Bankes, 1992). For example, EMA can answer questions such as, under which conditions
can a particular policy do well? (Kwakkel & Pruyt, 2013). Furthermore, EMA is not a
modeling technique per se, but it is an approach to the modeling and the simulation
processes (Alizadeh, 2018).
In this research, the introduced Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping (FCM) is the modeling
methodology that is used within the framework of EMA. Figure 14 compares and explains
how EMA results in different outputs based on various and different inputs. In the case of
exploratory modeling, the edge weight is a range or interval that yields different outcomes,
86

through which the decision-makers can understand under which conditions the policy,
intervention, and so forth perform better. The use of exploratory modeling will allow
simulating a range of various measures that vary between “very weak” to “very strong,”
thus effectively not only simulating outcomes in one FCM model but in multiple FCM
models (Alizadeh, 2018).
Kwakkel et al. (2010, p. 5) suggest basic steps in EMA: (1) to develop a fast and simple
model of the system of interest; (2) to generate an ensemble of future worlds; (3) to specify
a variety of policy options; (4) to calculate and compare the performance of the various
options across the ensemble of future worlds, and; (5) to iterate through steps until a
satisfying policy option emerges.
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Figure 14: Graphical Representation of Explorative VS. Traditional FCM Modeling
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3.7

Model Testing for Verification

In qualitative research, the quality of research outcomes is frequently evaluated based on
the rigor with which the research was produced. According to Morse et al. (2002) and
Saunders et al. (2015), rigor encompasses research credibility, authenticity, suitability,
relevance, transferability, and objectivity. For modeling studies, Sterman similarly
recommends establishing criteria for model quality from the beginning of the research
process to prevent it from resulting in a useless model (Sterman, 2000). Accordingly, this
section develops plans for model testing and verification. A model is useful only when it
resembles the real-world system it represents, which requires testing it against what is
know about the real-world system (Sterman, 2000). Model verification is a structural
process that establishes confidence around the model regarding its purposes and usefulness
instead of declaring a model to be “correct” and approve or disapprove it (Forrester &
Senge, 1980). According to Barlas (1996), the process of model testing depends on the
model type, which he classifies into two types; (1) correlational, or purely data-driven
model, and (2) causal descriptive or theory-driven model that describes how real-system
functions. While a correlational model can pass the tests when its behaviors resemble the
behaviors of the real-system it represents, a causal-descriptive model can pass the tests only
when both its structure and behaviors match the structure and behaviors of the real system.
Barlas (1996) states that all design-oriented models, including system dynamics, are
causal-descriptive and must pass various tests to be verified. FCM models are causaldescriptive models that represent how systems function in the real world. Accordingly,
they also need to undergo model verification.
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The literature on testing and verifying FCM models recommends to borrow and modify
strategies and techniques for model verification used in system dynamics such as expected
behavior, extreme conditions, and sensitivity analysis (Jetter & Kok, 2014). This research
does the same and borrows aspects of formal model testing suggested by Forrester & Senge
(1980) and Barlas (1996), as well as tests for assessment of dynamic models proposed by
Sterman (2000). The process of model testing is graphically illustrated in Figure 15 below.
The arrows in blue refer to the process direction which flows from testing the model
structure first then the model behaviors as Barlas (1996) suggests, while the dotted arrows
in orange refer to the process feedback, which allows modifying the structure of the core
model whenever the model does not pass any of the selected tests.

FCM Core Model

Structure Tests

Direct Structure Test
Structure Confirmation Test

Structure Oriented-Behavior Tests
Boundary Adequacy Test
Extreme-Condition Test

Process Direction
Feedback
Behavior Tests
Behavior Anomaly Test
Family Member Test
Surprise Behavior Test
Sensitivity Analysis Test

Verified Model

Figure 15: The Process of Model Verification
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Structure Tests
Testing the model structure refers to examining whether the model’s relationships are an
appropriate representation of the real relationships concerning the study’s purpose (Barlas,
1996; Sterman, 2000). In this research, the model’s concepts and weighted causal
relationships that link them and aggregate the model structure are fully documented using
various computer aid software tools, namely “Atlas.ti” and research memos. Although the
documentation process is essential to ensure the quality of the model structure (Saunders
et al., 2015), verifying the model structure requires not only documentation but several
techniques using formal verification tests, by which the concepts of the model and the
causal relationships among them tested using direct structure tests and structure-oriented
behavior tests, which are discussed as follows.
Direct Structure Tests
Direct structure tests can be carried out by directly comparing the model’s structure with
the available knowledge (Barlas, 1996). There are few tests under this category of model
structure testing, including the following structure confirmation test applicable to test FCM
models’ structure.
Structure Confirmation Test: This test inspects the accuracy of the model structure. It
focuses on the aggregation model level to examine the structure for discrepancies and
faulty assumptions regarding how the model was built. This test is conducted using submodel diagrams (Sterman, 2000), by which a direct inspection is carried out to each of the
thematic networks (sub-model) individually and then collectively. This test assesses the
aggregation’s assumptions by conducting (1) a theoretical comparison with the generalized
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knowledge in the literature and (2) an empirical comparison with the available information
regarding the applications of the HROT in various industrial settings.
Structure-Oriented Behavior Tests
These tests involve simulations, and they assess the accuracy of the model structure
indirectly by applying behavior tests to uncover potential issues in the structure. Various
tests were used to examine the structure-oriented behaviors, but according to each test’s
explanation, few were applied to the FCM modeling technique. In this regard, I am using
the boundary adequacy test and extreme condition test, which are discussed as follows.
Boundary Adequacy Test: This test evaluates the appropriateness of the model boundaries
for the purpose it was built for. Conducting this test reveals whether the model boundaries
should be expanded or disaggregated to achieve the model purposes by comparing the
model boundaries with the scope of the phenomena under study. A model boundary chart
is prepared to distinguish between the internal elements (endogenous-variable) and
external elements (exogenous-constants). The model then simulated to examine whether
essential feedback(s) in the model have been omitted. In other words, to determine whether
exogenous concepts have been treated as endogenous and vice versa.
Extreme-Condition Test: This test examines the model’s responsiveness and robustness to
extreme scenarios and shocks. This stress testing involves the assignment of extreme values
to specific parameters and compares the output behavior of the model with the observed or
predicted behavior of the phenomena under the same settings. This test runs a simulation
based on various scenarios and inspects whether the outputs of such scenarios are feasible
and reasonable even when the input is at a maximum level or a minimum level. Carrying
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out this test can be through designing various strategies. The model is subjected to a high
level of stress; therefore, issues in the model structure reveal its failure to mimic the realsystem structure.
Behavior Tests
Testing the model behavior examines whether the model can demonstrate close enough
behaviors to the observed real behavior (Barlas, 1996; Sterman, 2000). While examining
the model behavior can be meaningfully conducted after examining and verifying the
model structure, the model-generated behaviors resulting from testing the structure can
establish an initial indication of the behavior’s verification. The model behaviors would be
tested using different techniques to assess how precisely the model replicates a
phenomena’s behaviors. The following tests were used to examine the model behaviors.
Behavior Anomaly Test
This test examines the model behaviors for any abnormal patterns that may arise when the
model’s assumptions are changed or deleted. Showing an anomalous behavior when a
relationship or a specific causal path is deleted or modified reveals whether this
relationship/path is essential or not. This test is conducted using a knockout loop analysis
(Sterman, 2000), by which zero out critical effects in the model. The test requires activating
a state vector with varying activation levels for a driver concept that directly impacts the
examined relationship while setting the relationship between the chosen concepts to zero,
or in other words, no connection. The resulted model behaviors show the level of
importance of this relationship in the model structure for the purpose it was built for.
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Arbitrary selecting two to three paths to examine based on this test procedure can lead to a
general understanding regarding the importance of the model causal links.
Family Member Test
This test examines the model’s robustness and capabilities to generate behaviors for other
cases in the same class that are similar to the system that the model is built to represent.
The diversity of the cases that the model can represent reflects the generalization of the
theory it embodies (Sterman, 2000). Since the model is built to represent the HROT theory,
the model’s behaviors should serve different organizational settings with other policies,
strategies, and even various industries. This test is conducted using random data that
represent different organizational or industrial operational settings. If the model generates
output that matches each input’s expectations, the model, therefore, passes the test.
Surprise Behavior Test
This test uncovers discrepancies between the model behaviors and the modeler’s
understanding of a phenomenon. When the model generates a specific behavior that has
not been observed but can exist in the real world, the model can pass the test.
Sensitivity Analysis Test
This test inspects the model sensitivity to the likely changes and variations in the model’s
parameters’ values. Suppose the model does not show radical or severe behavioral changes,
the confidence around the model increases. There are three types of sensitivity: (1)
numerical sensitivity, which results when a difference in the assumptions changes the
numerical value of the parameters, (2) behavior mode sensitivity, which results when a
change in the assumptions changes the behavioral patterns of the model, and (3) policy
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sensitivity, which results when a difference in the assumption reverses the impact or the
desirability of a proposed policy. Because the model faces additional challenges
represented by the self-quantifying-edges, it is essential to carry out a sensitivity through
the following two sequential steps.
1. Test the model without changing the assumptions by activating state vectors with
varying activation levels for a single concept at a time and then randomly changing a
bundle of concepts in the input vector to examine the range of the possible outcomes
for all the five HROT principles.
2. Repeat the same process while proposing some changes in the model assumptions and
compare the results with the first step.
3.8

Model Simulation and Scenario Planning

Model simulation is a process of imitating the modeled system by activating one or more
of the model concepts to analyze and understand the immediate change or the dynamics in
the system components and or predict its future state. Model simulation can be conducted
by planning various scenarios to study the system responses, such as changing the policies
or rules and regulations. The following discussions define and explain both model
simulations and scenario planning.
Model Simulation
With respect to the developed research framework (Figure 1), organizational reliability
(OR) or collective mindfulness is a function of change in both mindful anticipation and
mindful containment or the change in the five HROT principles. However, organizational
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reliability cannot be achieved by simply maximizing all concepts that lead to desired effects
and minimizing all those that do not. It is often unknown which concepts lead to what
effect, especially that many concepts cannot be changed directly but only through other
concepts. Because concepts are interrelated, changing the desired ones often also impacts
undesired ones. It is, therefore, difficult to determine a course of action. This can only be
achieved by simulating the model based on various combinations (scenarios) of desired
and undesired concepts (i.e., HRO-relevant concepts).
Importantly, the model of interests (i.e., the complete model of HROT) consists of (1) a
core model, which describes the concepts that contribute to the five HROT principles
(based on the literature) and (2) an outer layer that represents how specific safety
interventions impact the concepts on the boundary of the core model. The concepts on the
core model’s boundary do not change through anything in the core model but, instead,
trigger changes in the core model if they are externally increased or decreased. This can be
possible by simulating the model to investigate the dynamics of the HROT principles,
regardless of interventions (by simulating the core model) and the impact of interventions
on HROT principles (by simulating the complete model of HROT). The following two
methods of simulation are used in this research.
1. Method A: Simulating the core model regardless of intervention(s), through which
traditional FCM simulation technique is used.
2. Method B: Simulating the model of interests based on intervention(s), through which
both traditional FCM and EMA simulation techniques are used.
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Method A is used in the process of model testing for verification, while Method B is used
in the process of model contextualization. Each method is implemented using three
different approaches: A, B, and C, as explained in detail in Table 7 below. Furthermore,
before simulating the model, a squashing function must be selected that best fits the
model’s expected behaviors, modeling objectives, and the modeler’s plans to present and
visualize the outcomes (Alibage et al., 2018). The selection of the squashing function and
Lambda value is decided based on an experiment or a pilot study.
Moreover, various software-based tools can be used to simulate the model. In addition to
Microsoft Excel by Jetter et al. (2018), there is an FCM Package-based Python
programming language by Aminpour (2018), as well as FCM-package based R
programming language by Dikopoulou & Papageorgiou (2017).
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Table 7: Combinations of Model Simulation Methods and Approaches
Method

Method A

Method B

(Simulating the Core Model Without Intervention)

(Simulating the Model of Interest Based on Intervention)

Traditional FCM Simulation

Traditional FCM Simulation | EMA Simulation

Approach A

This approach is used to reflect a particular idea about starting
conditions. It involves selecting a state vector with one or more
activated core model’s concepts while the other concepts remain
off. The activation level is anything of choice, and the selection is
guided by a question that can be answered through the simulation.

This approach uses traditional FCM simulation and involves
selecting a state vector to activate one or more interventions that are
causally linked to the core model’s concepts. The activation level is
anything of choice (between 0 and 1) to investigate the impacts of
specific interventions on HROT five principles' performance.

Approach B

This approach involves selecting a state vector with one or more
activated core model’s concepts while the other concepts remain
off. Because the interest is to analyze the results of different input
vectors and their impacts on simulation results; thus, the process
is repeated for the same vector but with varying activation
degrees. This approach examines the sensitivity of the concepts of
interests to the variations in the inputs.

This approach uses traditional FCM simulation. It involves selecting
a state vector to activate one or more interventions that are causally
linked to the core model’s concepts. The process is repeated for the
same vector but with varying activation degrees to investigate the
results of different input vectors and their impact on the aggregated
simulation results to examine the sensitivity of the concepts of
interest variations to the inputs’ variations.

This approach involves selecting different state vectors and
randomly activating a specific number of the model’s concepts
(e.g., five concepts), excluding the concepts of interest. The aim
of using this approach is to analyze the overall pattern of the
modeled system’s behaviors.

This approach employs the EMA simulation technique and is used
when there are variations in the signs and the strengths of one or
more causal relationships between the interventions and the core
model’s concepts. This technique simulates a vast number of the
core model’s structures instead of only one so that it copes with the
variations (uncertainties) in the inputs.

Used in the Process of Model Testing for Verification

Used in the Process of Model Contextualization

Approach

Approach C
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Traditional FCM Simulation
FCM models can be simulated traditionally by generating initial state vectors based on the
number of the concepts in the model (N) and their initial values, which often can be [0] for
deactivated concepts and [1] or [-1] for activated concepts. Therefore, initial state vectors
for an FCM with (N=50) based on the formula (2N) can produce (2.2517998e+15).
However, it is neither wise nor practically possible to simulate the model based on this vast
number of initial state vectors, particularly with the meta-rule of FCM, which means that
many different inputs can lead to the same outcome. Instead, initial state vectors must be
chosen deliberately to produce a state of interest. The chosen initial state vectors can either
directly activate one or more of the model concepts or one or more interventions and then
run the FCM for initial values. This technique is used when the model is simulated during
the process of model testing for verification and the process of model contextualization
(see Table 7).
EMA Simulation
FCM models can be simulated using the EMA technique to overcome potential
uncertainties in the model structure, particularly the variations in the strength of the causal
relationships between the interventions and the model’s driver concepts. This technique is
conducted using the following steps.
1. Test the sensitivity of the concepts of interest to the variations in the edges’ weights
between the interventions and the driver concepts in the core model’ boundary.
2. In cases where the concepts of interest are sensitive to the variations in weights of the
examined edges, the model is then simulated using EMA, through which random
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adjacency matrices are generated to include all the possible values between the
minimum and maximum edge weights.
This technique is used when the model is simulated during the process of model
contextualization (see Table 7).
Visualizing the Outcomes
There can be various types of graph representations to visualize the outcomes of the
concepts of interest, particularly with the use of programming FCM-packages. As
mentioned previously, visualizing the simulation results depends on the choice of the
squashing function and Lambda’s value. In the interest of this research, three types of
graphs will be used: Bar graph, sensitivity analysis graphs, and radar charts.
Scenario Planning
A scenario is defined as “a set of hypothetical events set in the future [and are] constructed
to clarify a possible chain of causal events as well as their decision points” (Kahn &
Wiener, 1967, p. 6). It is a dynamic explanation that describes the key fundamentals of
uncertainties or unforeseen futures of a system under study (Nyaupane & Buzinde, 2017).
Planning scenarios is a widely used technique whereby decision-makers can elaborate on
their mental models regarding making better decisions based on plausible futures rather
than the possible ones (Amer et al., 2013). Scenario planning can be applied in the context
of systems safety as a valuable technique, particularly in predicting unexpected events or
the combinations of complex issues or future situations (e.g., implementing fully
automated operations, reduction in experts availability) that test the system readiness,
resiliency and responsiveness to such cases and potential consequences. In high-hazard
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organizations, scenario planning provides plans for worst-case scenarios so that
organizations can develop subsequent preventative actions to mitigate harmful impacts.
Amer et al. (2013) discuss and compare various approaches and methodologies to scenario
planning. However, they emphasize two major approaches: A qualitative approach that
encompasses the use of subject experts to develop and explain scenarios, and a quantitative
approach that involves modeling. However, they recommend combining both approaches
as a better means to create robust scenarios (Amer et al., 2013). Since this research uses
fuzzy cognitive mapping FCM, therefore, I am using a quantitative approach for scenario
planning, through which the following steps are required to develop, select and refine
scenarios based FCM (Amer et al., 2013): Scenario preparation, Knowledge capture
(identify key concepts and drivers), Scenario modeling (develop a causal map with
weighted causal links), Scenario development (using a different set of inputs vectors to see
the behavior of the FCM model), Scenario selection and refinement, and Strategic
decisions.
The number of alternative scenarios varies between two to six, yet, a wide range of
scenarios can be developed to accomplish the overall objective of this research, by which
organizational reliability is optimized in the face of unexpected events before, during, and
after they occur. Moreover, simulating the FCM does not provide absolute values of the
performance, but rather, it provides degrees of change in the performance. Because there
is no available information regarding which degree the organizational reliability is
considered high, a high degree of organizational reliability can be determined by
comparing the simulation outcomes of different scenarios.
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4. The Process of Building the Core FCM Model
The previous chapter provided an overview of the methodological foundations of this work.
This chapter discusses how these methods were combined to answer the first three research
questions (see Table 4) and develop a mixed-method approach for modeling HROT
principles as FCM, based on published literature. This approach was subsequently
implemented for the specific case of HROs in the offshore oil and gas industry during a
pilot and an expanded study, which are reported on in subsequent chapters. As shown in
Figure 16, my process for building the FCM model consisted of two research phases with
multiple steps each. In step 1 of the first phase, I performed a systematic literature review
to search for and select published research on HROT based on predefined criteria and
review guidelines. In step 2, I extracted and refined the qualitative knowledge by
conducting a structured qualitative coding process, followed by step 3, through which I
performed a structured theming process, which resulted in creating the research collective
cognitive map (CM).
In the second phase, the research transitioned from qualitative to quantitative work: I
quantified the causal links of the cognitive map developed in the first phase by employing
another structured process that consisted of three steps. Step 1 included retrieving and
filtering shared content, step 2 included calculating edges’ weight, and step 3 included
examining the relevance of the used technique. This allowed me to convert the cognitive
map into a fuzzy cognitive map (FCM) entirely based on the literature. The following
sections present the process of model building and its implementation.
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Thematic Analysis and Network

Qualitative Process

Step 1: Material Selection
(Selecting Published Literature)

Step 2: Coding Process
(Developing Codebook)

Step 3: Theming Process

Phase 1

Phase 1: Creating the Collective Cognitive Map (CM)

Chapter 4

Qual-Quan

(Developing Thematic Network)

Transitioning from Qualitative Method
to Quantitative Method

(Preparing the Shared Lists of Words)

Step 2: Calculating Edges’ Weights
(Conducting the Numerical Calculations)

Phase 2

Step 1: Content Filtering and Reserving
Thematic Proximity

Quantitative Process

Phase 2: Converting CM into FCM

Step 3: Examining t-Coefficient Relevance
(Benchmarking and Comparing Results)

Figure 16: The Process of Building the Core FCM Model Based HROT Principles
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4.1

Phase 1: Creating the Collective Cognitive Map (CM)

In phase one of this research, I created a cognitive map representing the concepts and causal
links between concepts discussed in the HROT literature. It provides the starting point for
the creation of the FCM model in phase 2. To ensure that the cognitive map fully and
accurately represents the state of the literature, I used a systematic, transparent, and fully
documented process, based on the principles of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006;
2014), and thematic network (Attride-Stirling, 2001), discussed previously. To support this
work, I used Atlas.ti, software for qualitative data analysis.
The work took place in three steps. The first step involved defining criteria and selecting
research publications on HROT to be included in the analysis. In the second step, the
selected publications were carefully reviewed and coded. Simultaneously, a codebook of
the most significant concepts and relationships between them was developed to document
and clarify their meaning. In the third step, the codes are “themed” (i.e., combined into
broader categories or themes), based on their meanings and relationships, resulting in a
thematic network (or cognitive map) of causally related concepts. This network represents
the overall cognitive map. The following sub-sections discuss these steps in more detail.
Step 1: Selection of Published Research
I used a systematic literature review to select a list of publications that represents the
HROT’s state-of-the-art. Unlike traditional or narrative literature review, which seeks to
critically examine and critique the status and gaps of published literature on a specific topic,
a systematic literature review is defined as:
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“a review of a clearly formulated question that uses systematic and explicit methods to
identify, select, and critically appraise relevant research, and to collect and analyze data
from the studies that are included in the review” (Moher et al., 2009, p. 1006). The
objective is to select published research that meets pre-defined criteria to ensure quality
and content validity and to cover not only the theoretical principles of HROT but also
empirical research and theory applications in various industrial settings.
In this step, I used Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses
PRISMA guidelines by Moher et al. (2009). These guidelines provide a basis for an
improved systematic review by which I followed a checklist of multiple items and a fourphase flow diagram. However, the checklist used is not a tool that assesses the systematic
review quality (Moher et al., 2009). Since the scope of this review is to select online
publications rather than conducting statistical analysis, this review does not cover the part
of the so-called meta-analysis. The following discussions explain how I accomplished this
step.
Searching Strategy
I followed a strategy for searching publications using five online databases: Scopus,
ScienceDirect, Academic Search Premier, Web of Science, and Google Scholar during
1987 when the first project on HROT was published until 2018 when this search was
conducted. I used various keywords, including “high reliability organizations,” “high
reliability theory,” “HROT,” “HROs,” “organizational reliability,” “organizational
mindfulness,” and “mindful organizing” to search for documents in the English language
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only. The initial search yielded (562) research items included various document types with
multiple contents, objective(s), methods, and findings.
Selection Strategy
Following the PRISMA guidelines discussed above, I subjected the initial search outcome
of (562) documents to a screening process based on the predefined inclusion/exclusion
criteria listed in Table 8.
Table 8: Predefined Criteria for Selecting Publications on HROT
Inclusion Criteria

Exclusion Criteria

A publication selected if it is:

A publication excluded if it is:

 A book, a book chapter, peer-reviewed
journal article, conference proceedings, or
an official report.
 Entirely

focused

on

HROT

and

its

applications.
 It is driven by the (HROT) theoretical

 It lacks any of the inclusion criteria.
 A duplicated document or furthered with
marginal or no clear contributions.
 Focused on HROT and HROs, but the
content does not add more than a repetition
of what other documents already have.

framework.
 Empirical research that tests and validates
the construct of HROT.
 Research on HROs includes implementation
opportunities, challenges, and critiques in
various industrial settings, particularly in
high-risk and high-hazard operations.

By refining the search into peer-reviewed journal papers, conference proceedings, books,
books chapters, and official reports, the search outcome was reduced to (139) documents
including (63) peer-reviewed journal articles, (54) conference proceedings, (7) book series,
(6) books, and (9) official reports. However, publications that met the inclusion criteria and
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screening process were only (47). Table 23 in Appendix B: Selected Research Publications
includes the list of the selected studies to conduct the qualitative phase of this research, and

Identification

Figure 17 below graphically illustrates this process.

Records Identified
Through Database
Searching (n=562)

Additional Records
Identified Through
Other Sources (n=0)

Included

Eligibility

Screening

Records After Duplicates
Removed (n=544)

Records Screened
(n=544)

Records Excluded
(n=405)

Full-Text Articles Assessed for
Eligibility (n=139)

Full-Text Articles Excluded,
With Reasons (n=92)

Studies Included in
Qualitative Synthesis
(n=47)

g
Figure 17: The Process of Selecting Relevant Publications
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Step 2: Coding Process
Coding in qualitative analysis is a process of segmenting the data 13 into various segments
and labeling them based on the meanings they embody to understand the relationships
among them better. This process goes beyond just segmenting the data into a broader and
in-depth analysis. The extracted knowledge is refined iteratively to create ideas that make
sense when interpreted based on a structured pathway. Text segments vary in terms of their
length as they can be one sentence or a paragraph, and they usually are labeled with a single
word or a short phrase (i.e., code) that is either chosen from the segment itself or that is
given by the coder. Some segments can have more than one label (code), particularly when
conveying various and overlapped meanings.
Since the objective is to create a causally-descriptive cognitive map that represents the
complex and dynamic phenomenon of organizational reliability, the process of coding is
designed to identify the most significant factors across the whole set of the selected text
that contributes in a causal construct to the creation of the five HROT principles. The
process also identifies factors that preclude achieving organizational reliability. This step
involves the selection of a coding approach and coding strategy.
Coding Approach
There are various coding approaches to be used when conducting qualitative research. Yet,
the suitability of each approach depends on the research method since the process of coding

13

Qualitive data can be interview transcripts, participant observation, field notes, journals, documents, open
ended survey responses, drawings, artifacts, photographs, videos, internet sites, email correspondence,
academic and fictional literature, and so on (Saldana, 2016)
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is the foundation for any qualitative inquiry. Because this research uses thematic analysis
(TA), I selected a codebook approach 14 for its relevance to this research’s scope and
objective. This approach ensures reliability and allows flexibility as both approaches are
essential for analyzing unstructured text and adopt a dual coding strategy.
Coding Strategy
Based on the coding manual for qualitative researchers by Saldaña (2016), I followed two
strategies to code the data: Deductive and inductive coding. Deductive coding means
applying a predefined list of codes (concepts) that have been identified based on reviewing
and understanding the whole set of text. This strategy tests and verifies the significance of
each predefined analytical unit in terms of its grounding in the selected literature and
relevancy to the general definition of the HROT five principles. However, inductive coding
searches for possible and additional significant and relevant concepts that emerge from the
data during the implementation of the coding process, including meanings and descriptions
of what makes and precludes the phenomenon’s development.
Following either strategy or both of them necessitates the following coding heuristics 15,
which I browed from Armborst (2017) as guidelines to conduct the coding process:
14

Three coding approaches suggested to conduct thematic analysis TA (Clarke, 2017): Reliability, reflexive,
and codebook. Reliability approach is used when the coding process is highly structured and guided by a
coding frame and when the emphasis is on ensuring accuracy. The coding structure of this approach is usually
developed prior to the analysis and then applied to the data. The reflexive approach consists of a high level
of flexibility since the emphasis is on engagement with the data and the depth of the interpretation. Therefore,
coding is free of any structured frames, which means that codes continuously evolve, change, rename, split,
and merge until they make sense with respect to the objective of the interpretation. However, the codebook
approach is in the middle of the two discussed approaches.
15

Coding heuristics are defined as “standardized rules that guide the decision of the researcher about when
to create a new analytical unit, how to label it, and how to separate codes, categories, and themes from each
other” (Armborst, 2017, p. 2).
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1. Internal Homogeneity: to maximize cohesive validity, by which all the contents of one
unit (code and later theme) are similar.
2. External Heterogeneity: to maximize the discriminant validity, through which the
contents of two different units (code and later theme) are about two different things.
3. Code Overlaps: to follow heuristics 1 and 2; codes overlap as low as possible and as
often as needed.
Coding Procedure and Outcomes
Following the codebook approach and the coding heuristics discussed above, I conducted
the process of coding using Atlas.ti software and employing both inductive and deductive
strategies across two cycles of coding (Saldaña, 2016). Figure 18 illustrates how the overall
coding process was conducted. The following sections discuss the coding process in
completing the first and second cycles of coding and its outcomes.

Figure 18: The Process of Coding Textual Data
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First Coding Cycle: Since the objective is to create networks of causally related
components; therefore, “causation coding” was used in this coding cycle. This type of
coding “recommends procedures for extracting attributions or causal beliefs from
participants data about not just how but why particular outcomes came about” (Saldaña,
2016, p. 174). Causation coding can be used to examine causalities among variables, for
mediating variables, and for both within and between literature analysis. Therefore, it can
be shaped into a causation model. It is classified under the procedural coding method,
which comprises a pre-established coding scheme or ways of analyzing qualitative data.
This method explains why a situation happens by identifying combinations of specific
conditions and the variables that mediate between them.
Figure 19 is a screenshot of Atlas.ti that explains how documents were coded, and
causalities were identified between pairs of codes. In this example, few causalities can be
elicited from this small portion of text. From this example, it is evident that success breeds
“Complacency,” which is a state of overconfidence that increases the possibility of
undiscovered events to go through the system and accumulate towards accidents. I labeled
such events’ potentials and all similar concepts as “Cues of Evolving Failure,” while I
labeled complacency and similar concepts with the same label when coded. Both
“complacency” and “cues of evolving failure” were uniquely defined, and their relationship
is documented in a separate and numbered research memo 16 for quality control purposes.

16

A research memo is a note-based review or observation that can be placed anywhere in the project to
document an important issue, which in the case of this research was attached to every pair of causally related
codes as a technique to ensure quality and validity of the coding structure (Saunders et al., 2015).
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The first cycle of coding resulted in a list of 134 uniquely defined and causally related
codes with a total of 435 connection (positive and negative) based on five code families
that represent the five HROT principles.

Figure 19: Screenshot of Atlas.ti to Show How Documents Were Coded

Second Coding Cycle: In this coding cycle, I used pattern coding to search for
commonalities and similarities among the generated codes during the first coding cycle.
This cycle synthesized the developed list of codes by (1) merging codes that implied similar
or common meanings and descriptions and had corresponding impacts within their context,
and (2) by splitting codes that were comprised of complex meanings and interpretations
into two or more codes within their context. The objective was to ensure that all codes
(deductive and inductive) were unique, distinctive, and exclusively defined, by which
potential duplications and undesired repetitions were eliminated. The final codebook that
resulted from this cycle consisted of 112 causally related and uniquely defined codes with
409 positive and negative connection based on five codes families
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Coding Reliability
The process reliability 17 of coding qualitative data refers to the consistency in conducting
the coding process by a single or multiple coders overtime. It can be measured by
duplicating the research efforts under different conditions, such as different times, and then
examining the similarities and differences in readings, interpreting, and analyzing the data
under study (Krippendorff, 2004).
According to Braun et al. (2016), agreement and the use of Inter-Rater Reliability (IRR)18
within qualitative methods that heavily rely on interpretation, such as thematic analysis, is
not advocated. The coding process in TA is flexible, and codes evolve throughout the
process to reflect the coders’ engagement with the data; therefore, agreement of two or
more coders around specific codes does not mean that they are valid (Braun et al., 2016).
Furthermore, McDonald et al. (2019) conclude, based on reviewing the literature on
qualitative methodologies, that researchers may not seek agreement and IRR when coding
is the process rather than the final product as in TA.
The TA’s primary goal is not to categorize data but to inductively identify concepts and
themes and uncover meanings representing a phenomenon. However, in my work, I used
TA inductively to identify thematic networks and determine the weight of the causal
relationship between each two causally related themes (see Section 3.5), which constitutes
17

18

According to Krippendorff (2004), there are three types of coding reliability:
 Replicability of results across coders (i.e., Inter-Rater Reliability (IRR)), is a statistical measurement to
establish an agreement between two or more coders.
 Stability or consistency of a single coder overtime (i.e., Intra-Rater Reliability).
 Accuracy of an established coding scheme compared with others.

Agreement and Inter-Rater Reliability (IRR) stems from realist/positivist assumption and infers that there
is a precise reality in the data that possibly captured through the process of coding (Mackey & Gass, 2005;
Cook, 2011).
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an innovative approach to creating FCM models from texts. Therefore, I decided to use
Intra-Rater Reliability to ensure stability or consistency in the process of coding. IntraRater Reliability ensures that data is judged the same way when the same researcher codes
the same data at different times (e.g., time X and time Y) or even at the beginning and the
end of the process (Philp, 2003; Mackey & Gass, 2005).
I employed a Test-Retest technique and subjected the same selected material to the same
coding process, but as a minimum two weeks apart. I then calculated the coding reliability
using a Simple Percentage Score that compares the degree of agreement resulting from the
two coding attempts. An interval of two weeks is assumed to be sufficient to reveal any
disagreements between the two attempts’ outcomes (Mackey & Gass, 2005). Therefore,
the coding process was repeated after two weeks, which resulted in a disagreement around
(9) codes, while (103) final codes were approved. Based on that, IRR was calculated as
(91.96%). According to Mackey & Gass (2005) and Riffe et al. (2014), anything above
75% is considered acceptable, although percentages over 90% are ideal. Table 9 consists
of the codes and connections numbers across all the steps of the coding process.
Table 9: Number of Codes and Connections Over the Steps of the Coding Process
Coding Stage

First Coding Cycle

Second Coding Cycle

Post Coding Reliability

(Causation Coding)

(Pattern Coding)

(Intra-Rater Reliability)

No. of Codes

134

112

103

No. of Causal Links

435

409

368

Codes
Connections
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The list of the generated and approved final codes in the developed codebook, which
consists of 103 uniquely labeled and defined codes based on five code families, is provided
in Table 24 in Appendix C.
Step 3: Theming Process
Qualitative theming is a process of thoroughly examining the data under study to search
for patterns (themes) of meanings that are related to the research question(s) at hand. This
process simplifies, organizes, and interprets the complex content of the data into more
understandable issues based on their interrelationships’ structure. Therefore, a theme is an
abstract description of a set of interrelated issues (Armborst, 2017), and technically, as
illustrated in Figure 9, it is a product of qualitative coding (Saldana, 2016).
Themes are generated by grouping codes based on their causal relationships and causing
an outcome. For example, acoustic instruments such as guitars and violins (assumed as
codes) are distinct by design, material, use, and even musical tones. Yet, they produce
acoustic music (i.e., the theme of music). The following sections discuss the strategy and
procedure that I followed in conducting the process of theming in more detail.
Theming Strategy
Building on the objective of the coding process, the aim of theming the selected published
research is to identify the most significant and causally related factors that enable
implementing and continuously sustaining the five HROT principles and the factors that
prevent a successful and consistent implementation. Therefore, I employed a theming
strategy that uses domain summaries or storytelling themes (Clarke, 2017). Both desired
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and undesired factors and their relationships and joint effects around the central concept
(i.e., organizational reliability) are considered.
Since the five interrelated principles characterize HROT as a structured pathway for
conducting the coding process, this structure continues to be the foundation for the theming
process. The five principles are treated as global themes. Each theme consists of or is
caused by a varying number of causally related organizing and basic themes as lower and
middle order themes that are generated based on the developed codebook.
Theming Procedure and Outcomes
I conducted the theming procedure following the same heuristics discussed in Section
4.1.2.2 as guidelines that ensure internal homogeneity, external heterogeneity, and theme
overlap. As previously mentioned, I considered each of the five HROT principles as a
global theme, and I followed the thematic arrangement discussed in Section 3.4. Each
principle, thus, formed a web-like network (Attride-Stirling, 2001). The following substeps discuss the overall procedure of theming.
First: Examining the Final Codes: I examined the final codes within each coding family
(principle) regarding their definitions and causalities as well as their potential in causing a
particular outcome. Codes with potential theming attributes were themed as basic themes
(lower-orders) or organizing theme (middle-order) and were labeled and defined
accordingly. However, final codes that are unique and do not share similar or general
concepts or the same outcomes within their families were converted into either a basic or
an organizing theme, depending on their impact on the global theme, and were given the
exact label and definition.
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Second: Examining the Basic and Organizing Themes: I examined the generated basic
themes within each theming family for standard theming criteria. They were grouped to
form organizing themes (middle-order). Each organizing theme was uniquely labeled and
defined. The same rule was applied to any basic theme that did not have any relationship
with other basic themes within its theming family to develop an organizing theme. Such
basic themes were considered as an organizing theme that has a direct causal relationship
to the global theme.
Third: Arranging the Three-Levels Themes: I followed the arrangement of three levels
themes discussed in Section 3.4 as guidance or a causal path for how themes in each
theming family were linked, and thus, created. However, causal relationships between
themes were identified based on this arrangement and based on their contributions in
causing one another within each theme’s family, as well as their contributions in creating
themes within the other families regardless of their level of arrangement. Table 25 - Table
29 in Appendix D: Codes to Themes Development includes and illustrates the paths of
grouping (converting) the final codes into themes within each group of coding-theming
families (i.e., each principle).
Since I used Atlas.ti to conduct the coding processes and then the theming process,
causalities among themes were automatically updated when causally related codes were
themed. For example, in the coding family of sensitivity to operations STO, each of
“Contribution, Representation, and Subordination” of the workforce was uniquely labeled
and defined as final codes.
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According to the literature, these three codes (activities) represent the level of the
workforce participation in remaining sensitive to the operations, and they jointly causing
what is called “Heedful Interrelation” (see Table 24 in Appendix C: Final Codes Labels
and Definitions for definitions). Therefore, I themed these three activities into a basic
theme that I labeled “Level of Employee Participation.” As a result, this basic theme is
becoming what is causing “Heedful Interrelation” as an organizing theme that leads to the
creation of Sensitivity to Operation STO as a global theme. Figure 20 illustrates how this
example case of codes was treated using Atlas.ti. Furthermore, text segments or quotations
associated with the final codes were merged automatically by Atlas.ti to form one extended
segment related to the developed theme. Therefore, and because of reducing overlapping
codes, the third heuristic (theme overlap) was achieved.
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Figure 20: Illustration Example of the Theming Process
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Fourth: Developing the Thematic Network: By successively merging codes into basic
themes, basic themes into organizing themes, and organizing themes into global themes,
my work resulted in five thematic networks (one for each global theme) that represent the
five HROT principles. Each global theme consisted of several basic and organizing themes
that were frequently causally connected to basic and organizing themes in the other
thematic networks. The five thematic networks were integrated into a single network that
represented the HROT cognitive map. At its core was the concept of organizational
reliability (OR). Figure 21 conceptualizes how the five global themes were integrated into
a single HROT thematic network (or Cognitive Map). This cognitive map consists of three
classes of causalities: Intra-Causalities that link themes within each network, InterCausalities that link themes within the five network, and Core-Causalities that link the five
global themes to the core objective (i.e., OR). This classification is essential as it helps
distinguish between the causal links among the concepts (themes on different levels) in the
cognitive map and is used to quantify the causal relations in the single map.

Figure 21: Conceptualization of Developing HROT Cognitive Map
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The detailed thematic structure of the first global theme: Preoccupation with Failure
(PWF), is provided in Table 10. The thematic structure of PWF is provided here to
demonstrate how each principle of the five HROT principles is structured and how its
components (i.e., basic and organizing themes) are defined and arranged. Figure 22 depicts
the thematic network of PWF, which is developed with the network tool of Atlas.ti.
The thematic structures of each of RTS, STO, CTR, and DTE are summarized in Table 11,
and their detailed thematic structures are provided in Table 30 - Table 33 in Appendix E.
The developed thematic networks of these four principles are depicted in Figure 48 - Figure
51, respectively, in Appendix E.
Importantly, in these thematic structures and networks, the global themes are the general
objectives that needed to be maximized to maximize organizational reliability. Global
themes are caused by all the organizing themes in directed relationships, and these
organizing themes are caused by basic themes within the same network as well as basic
themes of other networks. Moreover, each basic and organizing theme is marked with
either a positive sign to infer a desirable concept in the model that needs to be maximized
or a negative sign that infers an undesirable concept that needs to be minimized.
Finally, Table 12 lists the final statistics of each of the five thematic networks (global
themes) and the final HROT cognitive map, including the total number of concepts
(themes) in each network, basic and organizing themes, and the total number of causal
connections. The single thematic network or the cognitive map based HROT five principles
is created with Atlas.ti and depicted in Figure 23.
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Table 10: Thematic Structure of Preoccupation with Failure (PWF) 19
Preoccupation with Failure (PWF) - Global Theme
Logical Reasoning (+)
Logical reasoning is thinking in a rational, sensible way. It involves,
in the context of preoccupation with failure, a combination of system
knowledge and expectation domain. This type of reasoning requires
understanding and knowing the physical interconnections and
parameters of the systems and how they work as a whole.
Understanding weaknesses in technologies, faults in the operations,
gaps in the procedure, and the orders by which errors (failures) in
the system are triggering each other is also imperative. This type of
knowledge becomes applicable when combined with the scope of
the system’s expectations, processes, and operations. Whenever
something comes from outside the frame (domain), it is considered
an anomaly requiring an action.

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme
Basic Theme
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→

Failure Knowledge and Attentiveness (+)

→

Anticipating and Controlling Latent Signals (+)
It is defined as the pattern of practicing a continual search for any
discrepancies and suspicious cues (anomalies), catching and resolving
them within a reasonable time before they grow up into serious
problems. An anomaly indicates something wrong that does not fit into
a series, or in other words, something that is a departure from common
order, form, or rule. An anomaly has been described as a contrast in the
quality of the successive segments of a stream of thoughts and serves as
a motive to examine intentions and expectations. Controlling latent
(unnoticed) signals is as important as anticipating them since those
signals (e.g., small errors, near misses), which accumulate, could create
a failure in the system. It is also known as the conversion of a cue into
a clue. These cues continue to evolve until a failure happens, particularly
when people misjudge or misinterpret their evolution.

Capable systems that anticipate, detect, and control latent signals
understand that failures can evolve into the system or subsystems to
cause the entire system to collapse. Acquiring and sustaining failure
knowledge is critical to understanding the accumulations of the
unnoticed cues and latent signals. For the organizational property to
be supported, specific experience, and other knowledge types,
particularly system knowledge, are required. Therefore, an HRO
develops and maintains repositories of failure as sources for
information inquiry, such as experts and people with domainspecific knowledge. Due to the accumulation of experience in

The text in the table represents the contemporaneous notes of the researcher during the TA process.

dealing with a wide range of failures, it has been widely
acknowledged that maintenance departments in each organization
have become central to or are the source for organizational learning.
Failure knowledge can also be sustained through integrating and
maintaining a system of failure databases based on the practice of
continual failure reporting, updating, and analysis. A failure report
constitutes all types of failures, regardless of size and nature. This
practice requires a culture that encourages and rewards failure
reporting because the management sees the value of keeping the
organization is fully informed and aware of any potential cues.
Furthermore, the failure report should be combined with a continual
update and analysis that diagnoses the symptoms and investigates
the causes. However, besides failure knowledge, anticipating and
controlling latent signals is required, as is attentiveness or sensitivity
to failure. Sensitivity to failure is defined as the vigilance regarding
the system’s expected and unexpected failure, which increases its
readiness and responsiveness.
Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme
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This refers to the commitment to the precisely articulated, defined,
and established standards and domain of risks and hazards.
Standards refer to the protocols, checklists, and the criteria of the
procedures, processes, responsibilities, job descriptions, rules of
teamwork and collaboration, quality of competencies,
qualifications, and skills, in addition to the training quality and
assurance. Articulating standards is essential to ensure that all the
members have a working understanding of how the system works as
a whole and how they work within the system, which guides them
to ensure that they follow and exhibit safe practices and behaviors.
On the other hand, the risk boundaries refer to the scope of the
defined risks and hazards that can be controlled and
managed. Setting boundaries means to coherently articulate a risk

→

Normalization (-)
Normalization is defined as tolerating and treating the abnormal as
usual. For example, deviance overlooks the standardized procedure
during specific emergencies by claiming that the procedure does not
make sense to follow in coping with such conditions. However,
accepting and following this deviance over time, in fact, normalizes it,
which eventually becomes the new procedure. The same explanation
can be applied to accepting or tolerating a partial failure or a certain
level of risk beyond the predefined domain. Normalization could
happen gradually, such as the phenomenon of creeping change or
reliability drift, which requires excellent attention and adherence to both
standards and risk boundaries.

or a hazard and what is not, why the organization may accept a
certain level of risk, and how it can be reduced and mitigated.
Overlooking the standards or accepting a certain level of risk beyond
the boundaries may lead to the so-called normalizing deviance, or in
this context, the reliability drift.

→

Precaution as a Mind-Set (+)

To integrate a precaution mindset, an organization needs to establish
a culture of listening to various voices and inputs. In other words, to
encourage people to raise concerns and to speak up about their fears
regarding potential cues and allowing them to ask questions
regarding what is wrong or what could go wrong. This creates an
awareness of vulnerability, which helps in developing a course of
learning. Voicing concerns should be combined with calibrations
such as continued reporting and tracking, gaining feedback, and
following-up. Furthermore, a precaution as a mindset requires
establishing the freedom to have contradictory points of view so that
members of the organization are urged to criticize each other when
necessary. This spirit has widened the foundation of various inputs
that increase the variety in dealing with the unexpected.

Organizing Theme

Precaution as a mindset is a cultural pattern that HROs develop to
integrate a mindset of both wariness and doubt. Integrating wariness
means to embed feelings that failures can happen at any time. This is
very important because successful organizations become less worried
over time in terms of safety or reliability. Success produces
complacency, which may lead to underestimating reliability in the entire
or subsets of the organization. Precaution also requires the integration
of doubt as a state of mind since dealing with doubts is safer than dealing
with a naïve certainty. HROs adopt a doubting mindset, knowing that
smooth operations do not reflect reliability because dynamic processes
could always bring surprises and unexpected outcomes. This mindset
encourages a spirit of contradiction while discourages the spirit of the
accord.

Complacency (-)

→

Underestimate Reliability (-)

Organizing Theme

Underestimate reliability is a product of the incorrect certainty that
interim success is a true reflection of long-term reliability. When
success is achieved (i.e., reliability is high), organizations tend to
reallocate their resources or limit them (e.g., due to financial reasons;
reducing costs, etc.), believing there is no longer a need for such
resources to promote a higher level of safety, thereby changing beliefs
regarding reliability. Underestimating reliability minimizes the
preoccupation with failure and shifts the focus toward other goals.

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs (+)

Basic Theme
Basic Theme

Complacency is a state of mind that results from experiencing
continued success over time. This eventually leads the organization
members, particularly managers, to be overly confident and highly
satisfied. In fact, complacency reduces people’s awareness of the
unexpected, and it is considered a door for unforeseen events to pass
through and occur.
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Figure 22: Thematic Network (PWF): Developed with Atlas.ti

Note: Blue lines infers positive causal relationships while red lines imply negative relationships.
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Table 11: Summary of the Thematic Structure of Each of RTS, STO, CTR, and DTE
Reluctance to Simplify (RTS)
Basic
Themes

Organizing
Themes

Distinctions

Neglecting
Significant
Information (-)

Requisite
Variety and
Complexity
(+)

Organizational
Variety (+)

Redundancy
(+)

Organizing for
SenseDiscrediting (+)

Interpretation
and Recursive
Interaction (+)

Organizing for
Action-Based
Inquiry (+)

Sensitivity to Operations (STO)

Commitment to Resilience (CTR)

Basic
Themes

Organizing
Themes

Basic
Themes

Organizing
Themes

Loss of

Staying

Attention (-)

Focused (+)

Elasticity and
Recovery (+)

System
Flexibility and
Adaptability (+)

Sustaining
Dynamic
Situational
Awareness (+)
Loss of
Situational
Awareness (-)

Simple
Operations as
an Integrated
Map (+)

Pressure (-)
Level of
Employee
Participation (+)

Heedful
Interrelating (+)

Self-Interest (-)
Interruptions
and Adjustments
(+)

Structure (+)

Dysfunctional
Momentum (-)

Personal
Competence and
Confidence (+)
Reconstituting
the Evolving
Present (+)
Learning from
Failure/
Incident (+)

Improvisation
(+)

Deference to Expertise (DTE)
Basic
Themes

Organizing
Themes
Structure
Flexibility (+)

Self-Awareness
(+)

Respectful
Yielding (+)

Available
Expertise (+)

Sensemaking (+)
Responses
(Actions)
Repertoire (+)

Compressed
Experience (+)

Domain-Specific
Experience (+)
Ignoring
Expertise (-)
Overreliance on
Experts (-)
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Table 12: Phase 1 Final Findings Statistics

(Themes)

No. of Basic
Themes

No. of
Organizing
Themes

No. of Global
Themes

No. of
Connections

PWF

10

5

4

1

22

Table 10

Figure 22

RTS

9

4

4

1

17

Table 30

Figure 48

STO

12

6

5

1

18

Table 31

Figure 49

CTR

10

4

5

1

13

Table 32

Figure 50

DTE

9

2

6

1

9

Table 33

Figure 51

OR

51*

21

24

5

138**

Collective

Figure 23

Network

No. of Concepts

Thematic
Structure

Graphical
Representation

*51 concepts (themes), including 50 themes based on the five thematic networks and one theme representing organizational
reliability OR as a central concept that integrates the five networks into a single network.
**138 connections, including 79 connections of themes within networks (intra-connection), 54 connections of themes over the
five networks (inter-connections), and five core-connections that connect global themes and cause organizational reliability OR
as shown in Figure 21.
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Figure 23: Thematic Network of Organizational Reliability: Developed with Atlas.ti

Note: Each global theme (i.e., principle) represents a sub-network in a different color. Organizational reliability in gray, PWF in
yellow, RTS in brown, STO in green, CTR in red, and DTE in purple.
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4.2

Phase 2: Converting the Cognitive Map (CM) into (FCM)

In this phase, the research shifted from purely qualitative to quantitative: I quantified the
strength of the causal links in the developed cognitive map and thus, converted it into an
FCM. In this process, I employed thematic proximity (Armborst, 2017) to determine the
causal weight, which provides an alternative to subject matter experts assigning weights
based on their judgment. As discussed in Section 3.5, thematic proximity estimates the
strength of the relationship between causally related themes regarding the textual content
they are sharing. For the reasons discussed in Section 3.5, I used t-coefficient (eq. 11) as
the numerical measure to determine causal relationships’ strength. The process is described
below. In total, 133 weights were determined using t-coefficient. The developed cognitive
map consists of 138 causal links: five links that connect the five principles to the central
concept of organizational reliability (OR), 79 links that connect themes within networks
(intra-connection), and 54 links that connect themes between the five networks (interconnections). No weights were assigned between the five core concepts (i.e., the five
HROT principles) and their main outcome (i.e., organizational reliability) because the
literature assumes that all five principles have to be present and strongly contribute to
achieving organizational reliability.
Step 1: Content Filtering and Retrieving
In this step, words within the text segments associated with each two causally related
themes (source and target) are retrieved using the word list tool in Atlas.ti. The retrieved
words then filtered through a filtration panel provided by Atlas.ti software to remove
undesired and floating letters (e.g., a, ab, wi, etc.), numbers that are not related to the
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content (e.g., page and numbers, references, etc.), characters (e.g., <>, /\, #, +-, _, %, $,
etc.) and words abbreviations that do not stand on their own to provide relevant meanings
(e.g., ing, inc, rafe, etc.). The objective is to consider only words that provide concrete
meanings and relevancy rather than just augmented content. I repeated this step for all the
133 causal relationships in the map (i.e., intra and inter causalities). Figure 24 is a snapshot
of the Atlas.ti interface that explains how this step was conducted.

Figure 24: Example of Retrieving and Filtering Words in Textual Documents

The filtered words retrieved in Excel sheets to efficiently conduct simple mathematical
calculations that determine the total number of words associated with each source (n1), and
the total number of words associated with each target (n2), and then counting the shared
words (intersected words) between them (n12).
Step 2: Calculating the Weight of the Edges
I calculated the value of the t-coefficient for each of the 133 causal links by plugging the
calculated variables during the first step (n1, n2, and n12) into equation (11), which resulted
in varying weights that represent the strength of the relationships between each causally
related pairs of themes (see Table 34 in Appendix F).
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Importantly, t-coefficient yields values between [0] and [+1]; however, the nature of the
relationship between each two causally related themes (i.e., whether it is positive or
negative) has been identified previously based on the literature during the coding and
theming processes (see Figure 19 and Figure 20).
Quantifying all the causal links in the HROT cognitive map has converted it into a fuzzy
cognitive map FCM. It was visualized and analyzed with mentalmodeler.com. The
developed FCM based on HROT five principles is shown in Figure 25, and its preferred
state and metrics are listed in Table 13.
Table 13: FCM Preferred State and Metrics
Total Components
Density

51
0.05411

Total Connections
Connections Per Component

Number of Driver Components

10

Number of Receiver Components

Number of Ordinary Components

40

Complexity Score

138
2.70588
1
0.1
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Figure 25: FCM based HROT Five Principles: Developed with Mentalmodeler.com

.
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Step 3: Examining the Relevance of t-Coefficient
As discussed earlier in Section 3.5, two other measures were considered as a benchmark to
examine the relevancy of using the recently published t-coefficient in the context of FCM:
The Jaccard similarity index or (c-coefficient) and the Cosine similarity index. Since the
entire qualitative process was conducted using Atlas.ti, the values of the c-coefficient for
all the 133 connections were calculated automatically by generating cross tables of themeco-occurrence Atlas.ti provides. These tables brought together each pair of causally related
themes to estimate the strength of the relationship between them based on two factors: (1)
the number of times each pair of themes co-occurred within the same text segments, and
(2) the number of times each theme of the causally related pair was used (i.e., grounded)
in the entire project. Atlas.ti, as the software, has integrated these factors into a built-in
algorithm based on the Jaccard index to automatically determine the value of the ccoefficient for each causality. Furthermore, the previously retrieved and filtered lists of
words in the first step were used to calculate the Cosine index of similarity using equation
(9) for all the 133 causal relationships.
This process yielded two other different weights for each causal link in the map, as listed
in Table 34 in Appendix F. The three weights of each edge in the model varied concerning
the range between the minimum and maximum values calculated by each measure. Based
on the yielded results by the three techniques and given the limitations of the c-coefficient
and Cosine index discussed in Section 3.5, the following points explain why t-coefficient
is a more reliable and relevant technique to quantify the weights of the edges of the HROT
cognitive map, particularly with the use of thematic analysis TA as a qualitative method.
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First: Thematic analysis TA requires more engagement with the data to understand the
meanings, content, and stories behind the unstructured text rather than focusing on the
frequency of words and themes groundings and themes co-occurrences. Given that, neither
the use of c-coefficient (focused on grounding and co-occurrence) nor the use of cosine
similarity index (focused on word frequencies) was expected to yield more reliable
outcomes.
Second: Changing the frequency of one word in the entire set of the words associated with
either the source theme or the target theme significantly changes the calculated outcome
when the cosine similarity index is used (the higher the frequency, the less the weight),
while it can have a very slight to no effect on the outcome if the t-coefficient was used.
This means that duplicated or similar content can dramatically change the edges’ weights
if the Cosine similarity index was used. However, duplicated content would not change
any of the contribution factors (i.e., generated themes) and their relationships. For example,
the strength of the negative relationship between “Interruption and Adjustments” as a
source theme and “Dysfunctional Momentum” as a target theme was estimated as (0.482)
based on the t-coefficient and (0.669) based on the Cosine index (connection no. 38 in
Table 34 in Appendix F). However, if the number of one shared word in this particular case
(e.g., action) is doubled (i.e., increased from 13 to 26) within the word set of either the
source or the target, the strength of the relationship would change slightly to become
(0.478) with respect to the t-coefficient, but would be reduced to (0.501) with respect to
the Cosine similarity index.
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Third: If a pair of causally related themes co-occurred several times, but one theme was
significantly more grounded (used) than the other, the c-coefficient would yield a minimal
value regardless of the potential significance of this relationship. For example,
“Misestimating Reliability” as a source theme is observed to decrease the practice of
“Preoccupation With Failure” as a target, yet, the edge weight of this negative relationship
based on the c-coefficient was (-0.009), which is almost zero (no relationship). The source
theme was grounded only (7) times while the target was grounded (124) times within the
entire selected set of text. On the contrary, the t-coefficient did not consider these factors,
but rather, it considered the content that this pair of themes shared. Therefore, the strength
of this relationship-based t-coefficient was (-0.364), as shown in connection number (60)
in Table 34 in Appendix F.
Fourth: To compare the calculated weights of the model’s edges based on the three
measures, I categorized them into weak, moderate, and strong with respect to the minimum
and maximum values yielded by each measure (see Table 34 in Appendix F). For example,
in the t-coefficient, the calculated minimum edge weight was (0.173), and the maximum
was (0.945). Therefore, a weak edge weight ranged between (0.173-0.430), a moderate
edge weight ranged between (0.431-0.687), and a strong edge weight ranged between
(0.688-0.945). This categorization enabled defining a percentage of compatibility between
the yielded edges weights by the t-coefficient with respect to the c-coefficient and Cosine
index on the one hand, and the compatibility of the c-coefficient and Cosine index on the
other hand. By counting the edges’ weights that fell into the weak, moderate, and strong
categories, the edges’ weights calculated by the t-coefficient were compatible by (80%)
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with the edges’ weights calculated by the c-coefficient and by (73%) with respect to the
resulted edges’ weights calculated by the Cosine similarity index. However, the results by
the c-coefficient and those by the Cosine index were compatible with (59%). Although
there are no standards to compare the compatibility percentage between the three used
measures, particularly t-coefficient with respect to the other two measures, the calculated
compatibility percentage (80%) and (73%) infer a positivity regarding the relevance and
the validity of the t-coefficient.
Furthermore, I plotted the three measures on the same plot shown in Figure 26, where each
point on the x-axis represents one causal relationship, and the y-axis represented its
strength. The three weights of each causal relationship for most causalities show similar
patterns. However, with respect to how the low, moderate, and high weights were defined,
the graph shows that the three measures have demonstrated few differences. This also
infers positivity regarding the validity of t-coefficient as a reliable measure to quantify the
edges of the FCM models and verifies that the appropriateness of each thematic proximity
technique depends not only on the main research methodology but also on the context of
eliciting the qualitative knowledge.
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Figure 26: Edges’ Weights Comparison Based on Three Techniques
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5. Model Preliminary Application (Pilot Study)
This chapter presents how I conducted the third research phase of this dissertation. I
examined and evaluated the FCM-HROT model for feasibility and usefulness with respect
to the real-world settings of the offshore oil and gas industry across a pilot study. A
thorough evaluation to examine and verify the worth of the research artifact (i.e., the
developed model) is highly emphasized to ensure its quality and effectiveness (Gregor &
Hevner, 2013).
A pilot study is a small-scale study usually conducted before implementing the full-scale
or expanded research, which is reported on in the next chapter (Chapter 6). It guides the
development of the research plans, informs, and gives feedback to the expanded research
(Yin, 2017); thus, it is critical for a well-organized study design for both qualitative and
quantitative research. This is particularly true when the study has a precise set of intentions
and objectives to ensure methodological rigor (Ismail et al., 2018).
As shown in Figure 27, I designed this study to be consisting of an iterative process that
allows model refinement in each step. In the first step, I initially tested the model for
verification using couples of the model testing methods to ensure that both its structure and
behaviors are initially verified before conducting the actual pilot testing. In the second step,
experts from the offshore oil and gas industry were gathered in a workshop, through which:
(1) I contextualized the model based on the participants’ inputs, thus, evaluated it’s worth
based on real-world-data, and (2) I directed the research towards practicable outcomes for
the industry.
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Figure 27: Pilot Study Design

The industry workshop is the core work in this pilot study since the process of evaluating
the effectiveness and usefulness of the developed FCM-HROT model depends on the
outcomes of the model contextualization procedure. As shown in Figure 27, the task
requires the industry practitioners’ total involvement to be achieved. This process’s
outcomes, including the experts’ feedback, have been applied to the model, refined based
on, and prepared for the expanded study (next chapter). The following sections discuss how
I performed this pilot study.
5.1

Model Initial Testing for Verification

In this process, I subjected the developed FCM-HROT model to a couple of testing
methods to examine its structure and behaviors based on the preliminary research
assumptions. In this phase of the pilot study, tests included a structure confirmation test,
extreme conditions, and sensitivity analysis. These tests were performed to prepare the
model for real-world evaluation. Since extreme conditions and sensitivity analysis tests
involve model simulations to be carried out, I followed “Method A” (see Table 7),
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including both “Approach A” and “Approach B.” The model’s structure was then refined
based on the model behaviors resulted from these tests, as in the following discussions.
Structure Test: Structure Confirmation Test:
I conducted this test by comparing the structure of each thematic network individually then
collectively with respect to the theoretical and empirical studies on HROT. This considers
that the labels of the model concepts (themes) were given based on merging codes during
the process of theming. Since these codes were labeled based on each contributing factor’s
meanings and definitions, conducting this test was beyond just comparing the concepts’
labels. This test is more of a comprehensive review and a comparison that resulted in a
verified structure. The process involved examining the concepts and the relationships
among them using the tool of the co-occurrence tables and co-occurrence explorer of
Atlas.ti as guidance to review and inspect the model structure. However, this test might
have encountered subjectivity, which I coped with by subjecting the model to extreme
conditions as a structure-oriented-behavior test and sensitivity analysis as a behavior test.
Both tests are discussed as follows.
Behaviors Tests: Extreme Conditions and Sensitivity Analysis Tests
Conducting these tests involved simulating the FCM-HROT model based on the simulation
approaches in Method A (see Table 7). The simulation process has been conducted using
the Python FCM package developed by Aminpour (2018), as follows.
First: I performed these tests following both “Approach A” and “Approach B” by
activating a state vector with different activation levels for single concepts at a time and
then examined the performance of the HROT five principles based on these varying inputs.
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Since the five HROT principles are well-described in the literature, the system’s behaviors
were clearly predicted.
In this process, twenty concepts (themes) of the model were individually activated (100%
turned on) and subjected to extreme conditions to analyze the model for sensitivity. In two
cases, namely “Ignoring Expertise” and “Self-Awareness,” the model showed unexpected
behaviors, which indicated that some discrepancies exist in its structure. Therefore, I
examined the structure by tracing back every assumption that was made during the entire
creation process of the model. This action necessitated examining all the steps in the
process, starting with the original text, where all research arguments and suggestions
concerning these cases were investigated. Indeed, there were wrong assumptions that
required an essential calibration of the model’s structure. Thus, I modified it accordingly
and re-calculated the t-coefficient for all the concepts in question. After this modification,
the model behaved as expected. Figure 28 presents the HROT principles’ state before and
after modifying the model structure for these two cases.
Second: I tested the model using “Approach C” of “Method A” to determine the behaviors
with respect to the variations in the concept values by randomly varying up to five concepts
in the input vector at a time to examine the range of the possible outcomes for all five
HROT principles. The model did not show any abnormal behaviors and performed as
expected. Figure 29 presents two different cases, as shown in Graph A and Graph B, which
has given expected behaviors of interest concepts.
In the first case as in Graph A, it is evident that many cases when preoccupation with failure
PWF showed a high degree, each of sensitivity to operations STO, commitment to
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resilience CTR, and reluctant to simplify RTS have demonstrated high degrees as well, yet,
deference to expertise DTE has been in the middle. However, in the other case, as in Graph
B, when many cases have maximized the degree of deference to expertise DTE, the degree
of PWF has been degraded. Both cases have shown behaviors like those of real-world
behaviors, as the literature on HROT has described, which confirmed that in many cases,
various efforts would not lead to achieving a similar degree of change for all the principles
at the same time.

State of Principles After Modifying the Model Structure l

Second Case (Self-Awareness)

First Case (Ignoring Expertise)

State of Principles Before Modifying the Model

Figure 28: Sensitivity Analysis Test Before and After Modifying the Model Structure
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Graph A: First Case (5 Random Concepts)

RTS
CTR

PWF

DTE

STO

Graph B: Second Case (5 Random Concepts)

RTS
CTR

PWF

DTE

STO

Figure 29: Examples of Model Testing for Verifications (Uncertainty Analysis)
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5.2

Model Contextualization Procedure

The FCM model generated and tested in the earlier steps represents a generalized HROT
dynamics model, based on research done in many organizational contexts. It is,
independent of industry, the core of organizational reliability. However, as discussed
above, managerial interventions (e.g., training programs, leadership practices, incentive
structures) do not work equally well in each industry context. To assess and plan
managerial interventions for offshore oil and gas, the general model needs to be
contextualized to the industry’s specifics settings. This occurs by identifying the
relationship between managerial interventions and elements of the core model. The
contextualization permits the simulation of managerial interventions under various
scenarios that consider different combinations of model variables to represent internal
factors (under the company’s control, such as its incident reporting procedures) and
external factors (in the business environment, such as new government rules and
regulations).
Model simulations can be used to determine the varying degree of effectiveness of different
interventions under different conditions. Notably, the simulation considers all model
elements concurrently. Thus, it can identify if a planned intervention with positive impacts
on some of the five HROT principles has unintended negative consequences for other
HROT principles. This information can be used to improve interventions by avoiding or
reducing negative impacts and selecting an array of interventions that are likely to enhance
organizational reliability. Scenario planning and model simulation techniques can thus be
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used to determine the system’s possible future state and uncover gaps and weaknesses in
the safety system.
To contextualize the model for offshore oil and gas, I first selected and defined industryrelevant managerial interventions that are either already used in the industry or debated as
something the industry should use. I then had to determine how these interventions can be,
in principle, represented in the core model and how industry experts could do so in practice.
Figure 30 graphically illustrates the model contextualization procedure through which
industry experts participate in modeling the selected managerial interventions by
establishing causal relationships with the concepts in the outer layers of the model, or other
words, HRO-relevant concepts. Experts also specify the nature of the established
relationships and assig their strength; then, the model is simulated by selecting initial state
vectors to activate each intervention individually or as groups of interventions. The
outcomes of this process would be visualized to reflect the responses of the concepts of
interest (i.e., the five HROT principles) to the applied interventions. These steps cumulated
in the preparation and execution of a workshop with industry practitioners. Each of these
steps is described below and is used in both this pilot study and the expanded study in the
next chapter.
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Figure 30: Graphical Representation of the Process of Model Contextualization
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Selecting Relevant Managerial Interventions
A managerial intervention is an action taken by the management to implement arranged
policies or procedures such as making a change in people’s beliefs and behaviors or
enhancing their competencies and skills. This is usually necessary, particularly regarding
safety-related practices. There are many interventions that organizations can apply to
improve their safety-related practices; however, successful implementation of an
intervention depends on the industrial context and its operational settings. For example,
fostering social ties based on mutual respect may work well for a specific healthcare
industry organization. Yet, it may not work at all for organizations in the offshore oil and
gas industry.
High reliability organizations usually design and implement interventions that can be
critical to the limited use of trial and error. Interventions, particularly those designed to
enhance safety performance in high hazard organizations, often are costly, and chances that
such interventions can make noticeable changes are not guaranteed; therefore, the selection
of interventions can be very challenging.
I selected a list of thirteen managerial interventions that have been discussed within the
literature of both high reliability organizations theory and the offshore oil and gas industry.
These managerial interventions (see Table 14) are expected to provide adequate inputs,
through which the model is simulated to examine the system’s behaviors.
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Table 14: Selected Managerial Interventions
Intervention

Definition and Description

Stop-Work-Authority

Employees and contractors are trained to stop working on an activity if, in their opinion, a continuation of the work poses a
threat to human health, property, or the environment. This extends to stop-work cases that are not covered by government or
company regulations. People are celebrated for stopping work, even if service is disrupted. Encouragement of stop-work
authority is particularly emphasized when rank (line workers, contractors) or conditions (layoffs and economic worries, high
production pressure) make it likely that people fail to stop work.

Reporting of Near Misses

Management actively encourages the reporting of near misses and safety-critical events while reducing barriers faced when

and Safety-Critical

reporting. Possible approaches: (1) clear definitions of what constitutes a reportable incident, (2) supervisor sets example

Events

(i.e., supervisors report themselves), (3) reporting as an expectation in performance evaluation, (4) immediate positive
feedback for the reporting employee, pointing out the problem that may have been avoided as a result of him/her taking
action, (5) no blame or fear of punishment for the reporting employee, (6) if the level of reporting is generally low: honorable
mention or other visible (but not financially significant) rewards for units which are top reporters, (7) After correct action is
taken, inform the reporting employee about it, (8) where appropriate, publicize the report and the corrective action beyond
the immediately affected organizational unit.

Foster Social Ties and

It is creating a work environment that fosters social ties building on mutual respect. Actions can include mentoring new team

Mutual Respect

members, creating opportunities for social interactions, and setting clear expectations for respectful behavior. This addresses
reliability challenges that occur when people do not know each other well enough, do not interact frequently, have modest
mutual knowledge but move from one area or role to another, or do not collaborate over extended periods.

Foster a Sense of

The assessment processes of safety involve the employees on all levels. Everyone takes personal responsibility for the process

Personal Accountability

and personal safety, as well as environmental oversight. Personal accountability requires self-assessment and self-reflection

for Safety on All Levels

and competencies in identifying hazards and improving the work processes.

148

Implementing Safety

Gather employees from different levels for a daily short face-to-face meeting. The meeting is designed to give frontline staff

Huddles

and others in the system prospects to stay informed, assess events, make and share plans for safeguarding well-organized
operations. This allows them to make sense of any situation, errors, and worries and to review options for resolving issues or
reducing them in the future. Safety huddles can also be done via phone or video conferencing or in-person with varying times
of implementation. Some organizations do multiple huddles a day (e.g., at every shift change or once in the morning and
once in the afternoon).

Practicing Tabletop

Scenario-based training that brings participants around a table to assess and reflect on different features of preplanned

Exercises

scenarios. Participants simulate the scenario in their minds, through discussion, without running the exercise in real life. They
discuss the scenario experience face-to-face and share their responses. This allows them to understand roles and
responsibilities and solutions to different situations.

Practicing Post-Event

Meetings held after an event (a real-world incident or a simulation/exercise) to discuss, summarize, and learn from the

Debriefings

activities the team has just experienced. Debriefing can be arranged for different events and focused on failures but also
successes. De-briefing can help employees to manage feelings and concerns about the event they went through.

Practicing Emergency

Emergency drills are extensively realistic (often physical) simulations of significant accidents or hazard-scenarios and safety

Drills

action plans for responding to such events. Drills are implemented at different levels of the organization and may encompass
the entire emergency organization. Observers are appointed to closely follow the drill and summarize the drill’s problems
and accomplishments in an evaluation report.

Institutionalizing

People’s desire to expand efforts that beneﬁt others because they empathize with them or think of them as someone they like,

Prosocial Motivation

want to be loyal to, or are responsible for. Prosocial motivation can be increased by orienting individuals toward others and,
for example, pointing out how individual choices relating to safety impact others.

Institutionalizing

It describes a mixed feeling, such as feeling confident and cautious, or optimistic, and alerting what could go wrong. This is

Emotional Ambivalence

often described as having doubts and hope. Having such mixed feelings makes people more open to alternative perspectives,
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improving their ability to anticipate failures and effectively respond to the unexpected. Managers can exploit this by providing

the missing view or considering it in task assignments (e.g., given meaningful and challenging tasks that need to be done
carefully and without overconfidence to less experienced employees).
Managing Reliability

People and organizations form habits that often cause processes that operate according to standards to degrade over time and

Drift

drift towards lower reliability levels. This can result in a slow and steady uncoupling of practices from the formally written
procedures. This can be managed through continuous monitoring, control, and acting against the drift.

Practicing Individual

Mindfulness is a mental state accomplished by concentrating one’s perception of the present moment while calmly

Mindfulness

acknowledging and accepting one’s feelings and thoughts. It can be trained and practiced, e.g., by kicking off work with a
short meditation/breathing exercise, taking conscious short breaks between tasks, and inviting short (self-) reflections.

Implementing

They are creating learning opportunities that employees can access at the point and time of need when they encounter a

Just-In-Time Learning

critical situation. This can be a new task for them, a technical problem, or a safety incident. In these situations, learners are
highly motivated to learn and to implement their new knowledge immediately. Access is facilitated 24/7 through
communication technologies (e.g., phone apps). Learning is facilitated through prepared content (e.g., manuals, training
videos) and access to colleagues and experts. The learner can submit content about incidents, causes, and solutions, thus
contributing to the knowledge base.
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Applying Interventions to the Core Model
According to the definition of the selected interventions and how they potentially influence
specific HRO-relevant concepts, I developed an approach to apply these interventions to
the core model through the several driver concepts on its boundary (i.e., core model
exogenous concepts). The established relationships between each intervention and the
concepts are either increasing relationships with a strength of [+1] or decreasing
relationships with a strength of [-1]. These relationships and their nature (i.e., increasing
or decreasing) have been extracted from the literature, while their weights were suggested
to be [+1] for positive and [-1] for negative as default strength. However, industry
practitioners decide whether there is a relationship, its nature, and weight in the real-world
contextualization process. Table 15 is an example of how these relationships are
established and provided to the industry practitioners during the contextualization
procedures. The other twelve interventions and the list of the corresponding HRO-relevant
concepts are provided in Table 35 in Appendix G.
Table 15: Example of How Scenarios Based Interventions Established
Intervention (Source)

Stop-Work-Authority

→

HRO-Relevant Model Concepts (Target)

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

-

Dysfunctional Momentum

-

Pressure

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

Simple Structure

+

Structural Flexibility

+

System Flexibility and Adaptability
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5.3

Industry Workshop

The underlying research and the process of building the FCM-HROT were presented in
April 2018 at an industry workshop, which has been hosted by the Center for Offshore
Safety (COS) in Houston, TX. This workshop was a part of a funded project to strengthen
the offshore oil and gas industry’s safety culture and has been facilitated by a team of three
senior researchers and three doctoral students, including myself. This workshop was the
core task of conducting the pilot study. I preliminary evaluated the feasibility and
usefulness of the created model with respect to industry experts’ opinions and based on
real-world context.
The workshop has been attended by twenty-two participants with various operational and
safety-related responsibilities, including safety managers, safety auditors, safety engineers,
HSE managers, and safety trainers, and influencers. Besides COS representatives,
participants attended from pioneering and leading oil and gas companies such as BP, Shell,
ExxonMobil, Chevron, Rowan Companies, Subsea7, and BHP.
The workshop lasted for three hours and a half. It included one hour for project presentation
and exercise descriptions, 45 minutes to conduct exercises by participants, 30 minutes
break, 45 minutes reporting practices, and 30 minutes for general discussions. The
following section discusses the preparations for the workshop and data collection.
Preparing the Workshop
This workshop required a certain level of arrangements, included communications with
COS to host the workshop, and decisions regarding the time, date, and place to where it
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has been held. With the assistantship of COS, participants from the mentioned major oil
and gas companies have been invited to attend the workshop at the COS location. I prepared
the required material, including brochures and handouts that have been distributed to the
participants, comprising the definitions of each managerial intervention and the suggested
list of the corresponding HRO-relevant concepts and instructions on how to conduct the
exercise. The research team assisted with examining these materials for readability, clarity,
and information coherence, as well as the preparation regarding the agenda, plans, task
assignments, and activities to collect the data during the workshop.
Data Collection
As mentioned earlier, this workshop meant to collect data from industry experts based on
their field experience so that the model is contextualized with respect to the research
context. The workshop participants were grouped into three breakout teams and provided
with previously prepared handouts (see Appendix H) that included a set of defined
interventions and lists of corresponding defined HRO-relevant concepts (the first three
interventions in Table 14). Each team was assigned with one intervention and was asked
to do the following:
1. Review the provided definitions of the intervention and the corresponding list of the
HRO-relevant concepts.
2. Deliberate to decide whether the examined intervention increases, decreases, or has no
influence on any of the concepts in the provided list (i.e., no established relationship).
3. Assign a weight to each established relationship based on a scale of three points: Slight
(0.33), moderate (0.66), and extreme (0.99).
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Each team spent around 45 minutes to conduct this exercise and 30 minutes to report their
decisions to the other teams. Teams’ inputs, comments, and suggestions were collected and
documented by facilitators from the researchers’ team.
Model Simulation and Behaviors
During the workshop, and to show the participants how their decision-making process has
influenced the five HROT principles’ behaviors, we applied the collected inputs to the
model, as illustrated in Figure 30. Using mentalmodeler.org, adjacency matrices were
generated and then entered a Python FCM package to simulate this model. Since the
strength of all the relationships provided by the practitioners were exact values (no
variation as they reached agreements), therefore, the model has been simulated following
“Approach A & Approach B” of “Method B” (see Table 7), through which, we selected a
state vector to activate each intervention individually, and then collectively. Using
hyperbolic tangent (eq. No. 8) as a transferring function with a Lambda value of (2), we
simulated the model to show sensitivity analysis and bar graphs that presented the
simulation outcomes, which illustrated the effects of their opinions on the concepts of
interest and for all the concepts in the core model.
The participants found that the generated results were remarkable, particularly with respect
to the cases where their inputs did not match the research expectations regarding the nature
and the scale of the interventions’ impacts. However, simulating the model based on the
three examined interventions has presented behaviors similar to the industry system’s
behaviors as expected. The following cases demonstrate significant observations based on
this pilot study.
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Case 1: Practitioners make decisions based on real-world operations to avoid conflicts with
their strategies and interventions. This was observed in some of the decisions made by
Team 1 and Team 3. In the exercise, both teams found that the suggested positive impacts
of the interventions on a few model concepts contradicted their strategies. These two cases
are marked in orange color in Table 36 and Table 38 in Appendix H. However, these cases
resulted in different outcomes depending on the centrality of the affected concepts,
feedback loops, and the connection strength with other core model concepts.
The change made by Team 1 led to a slightly negative influence on the performance of the
directly linked principle (CTR), as shown in Figure 52 in Appendix H. In contrast, the
change made by Team 3 led to a highly negative impact on the directly linked principle
(RTS). Even higher adverse effects on the indirectly linked principle (PWF), as shown in
Figure 54 in Appendix H . Both teams justified their decisions based on their real-world
strategies. For example, Team 3 urged that Intervention 3 “fostering social ties based on
mutual respect” found to be contradicting with a mentoring program that they recently
implemented in one of the organizations since this intervention increases “action-based
inquiry,” which increases the dependability of some employees to enquire information
from experts rather than their assigned mentors.
Case 2: Designing and implementing an intervention does not necessarily improve or
negatively influence the five principles all together at the same time. This outcome was
observed by applying Intervention 2, which showed no influence on the fifth principle
(DTE), as shown in Figure 53 in Appendix H. In real-world operations, the five principles
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cannot be maximized simultaneously, but managers can make trade-offs to enhance the
overall performance.
Case 3: For every intervention, there can be some undesired side effects, which can be
reduced by designing and implementing other interventions. Integrating both Intervention
2 and intervention 3 at the same time has led to acceptable performance of the five
principles by mitigating the side effects of Intervention 3 discussed in Case 1 above. Figure
55 in Appendix H presents these observations.
5.4

Summary of the Results

The resulted outcomes of simulating the developed FCM-HROT model with respect to
real-world data verify its structure, behavior, and feasibility of the purposes it was built for.
Based on these results, it is possible to model a complex phenomenon such as
organizational reliability based on published research, especially when the study is
designed and implemented rigorously. The combined utilization of thematic analysis,
thematic networking, and thematic proximity methods resulted in the development of an
FCM model with self-quantified edges as a unique and novel approach to access knowledge
purely from literature. When standardized, this approach can contribute to broader research
as a new methodology for building and utilizing FCMs and other modeling techniques.
This study proves the importance of selecting the inference function and Lambda, which
involves trade-offs for both the sigmoid and the hyperbolic tangent functions. If the results
were mapped into the more easily interpreted range of [0,1] or [-1,1], there would be a
steep rise in the functions’ slope resulting in an increase in the tipping point, which may be
difficult for industry experts to understand. Based on a simple comparison test I made as
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shown in Figure 56, I selected Hyperbolic Tangent as an inference function (eq. No. 8) for
simulating the model in the expanded with Lambda value of 2 for the reasons discussed
above.
An important lesson learned from this pilot study is that providing the participants with
suggested causal relationships between the examined interventions and HRO-relevant
concepts is not a practical approach, particularly when the nature of the suggested
relationships (i.e., increasing or decreasing) is recommended. This approach seemed to
have pushed the participants in directions that they might not want to go, based on their
experience to the contrary and/or how their organizations are operating. Accordingly, the
suggested relationships, their natures, and strengths would be provided to the participants
of the expanded study (next chapter) as lists of options to freely choose from based on their
experiences and what best fits the organizational and operational settings of their
organizations.
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6. Model Application (Expanded Study)
In this chapter, I implemented the fourth phase of this dissertation. I performed an
expanded study to apply and contextualize the developed model based on larger-scale
expert-provided data. Figure 31 illustrates this study’s design, which is an iterative process
that consisted of several steps. In the first step, I subjected the core model to additional
verification tests to further examine it for unforeseen and potential discrepancies. In the
second step, I used the same contextualization procedure that I developed and used during
the pilot study workshop (see Section 5.2 and Figure 30). However, in this study, I collected
the data through an online survey to receive a larger number of responses, including from
experts that were not available for an in-person workshop. The survey asked experts to
determine the causal connections between the interventions (see Table 14) and HROrelevant concepts in the core model. As I had expected, there were disagreements among
the participants about some causal relationships and weights. I handled the resulting
uncertainties using EMA. The following sections discuss the steps for conducting this study
and the interpretations and analysis of the results.

Figure 31: Expanded Study Design
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6.1

Model Testing for Verification

I further examined the model’s structure and behaviors for any latent issues that the
previous tests which I carried out before conducting the pilot study might not capture.
Therefore, this series of model testing (discussed in Section 3.7) is another layer of
examining the model and prepare it for this expanded study. In these tests, I used qualitative
knowledge as a foundation for comparison and verification. The tests I carried out in this
study include the model boundary adequacy test as another examination of the model’s
structure-oriented behavior, behavior anomaly test, family member test, and surprise
behavior test. These tests verify the model structure and behaviors and prepare it for
research contexts beyond the offshore oil and gas in future research. The following sections
discuss how I carried out each one of these tests.
Boundary Adequacy Test
To evaluate the relevance of the core model boundaries, I developed the model boundary
chart (Sterman, 2000), as shown in Table 16. This chart is developed based on the literature
that I used to create the core model, and through which I distinguished between the
endogenous 20, the exogenous 21 , and the excluded 22 concepts. As mentioned before, the
developed core model consists of the concepts that contribute to the five HROT principles
and forms the main structure of the complete model of HROT, which includes an outer
20

Endogenous elements are the model-driven concepts through which the exogenous elements provide
enforced changes. These elements include the concepts of interest (i.e., the five HROT principles).
21
Exogenous elements are the model driver concepts that form the outer layer of the model. The endogenous
elements receive enforced changes through, for example, activating any of the driver concepts or enforcing
external changes such as implementing interventions, policies, etc.
22
Excluded elements are concepts that can affect organizational reliability but are not contributing to any
of the five principles.
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layer that represents safety interventions and how they impact the concepts on the core
model’s boundary. For example, the concept “Loss of Situational Awareness” is on the core
model’s boundary; thus, it is exogenous (see Table 16) because it does not change through
anything in the core model but, instead, triggers a change in the core model if it is externally
increased or decreased. From the perspective of the complete model of HROT, that also
includes the outer layer of interventions; it is, however, endogenous.
With respect to the core model, endogenous concepts such as “Failure Knowledge and
Attentiveness ” (see Table 16) are driven concepts that do not change through anything in
the core model unless they are increased or decreased by the core model’s exogenous
concepts. Because this test is meant to examine the boundary of the core model thus, only
endogenous and exogenous concepts listed in Table 16 were examined. By following
Approach A of Method A (see Table 7), I simulated the model by activating each
exogenous concept individually to assess the effects on the endogenous concepts. This
process has been repeated 22 times (the number of exogenous elements) and resulted in
verified model behaviors that confirm none of the essential feedback was omitted, which
means none of the exogenous concepts have been treated as endogenous and vice versa.
Table 16: Core Model Boundary Chart
Endogenous Concepts

Exogenous Concepts

Excluded Concepts

Logical Reasoning

Compressed Experience

Managerial Interventions

Anticipating and Controlling
Latent Singles

Ignoring True Expertise

Government Policies, Rules, and
Regulations

Failure Knowledge and
Attentiveness

Self-Awareness

Industry Regulations

Normalization

Understanding the Situation in
Real-Time

Organization Size

160

Precaution as a Mind-Set

Requisite Variety

Production/Service Capacity

Listening to Various Voices and
Inputs

Structure Flexibility

Product/Service Demand

Misestimating Reliability

Loss of Situational Awareness

Product/Service Price

Distinctions

Simple Structure

Labor Market

Obscuring and Neglecting
Significant Information

Self-Interest

New Technologies

Organizing for SenseDiscrediting

Loss of Task Attention

Environment/ Operations Site
Conditions

Organizational Variety

Adherence to Standards and
Risk Boundaries

Action Interpretation and
Recursive Interaction

Complacency

Elasticity and Recovery

Organizing for Action-Based
Inquiry

Improvisation

Redundancy

Sensemaking

System Flexibility and
Adaptability

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

Personal Competence and
Confidence

Respectful Yielding

Learning from Failure/Incidents

Available Expertise

Domain-Specific Experience

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

Overreliance on Experts

Operations as Integrated Map

Pressure

Heedful Interrelating

Level of Employee Participation

Interruptions and Adjustments

Dysfunctional Momentum

Organizational Reliability
Preoccupation with Failure
Reluctance to Simplify
Sensitivity to Operations
Commitment to Resilience
Difference to Expertise
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Behavior Anomaly Test
This test examines the model for unusual behaviors that result from changing or removing
specific causal relationships in the model, or in other words, changing the model structure.
Showing any anomalous behaviors when a causal path is changed or deleted infers that this
causal path is a part of the model structure. When omitted, the model would not imitate the
anticipated behaviors of the phenomena it represents. I conducted this test through the
following two steps.
1. I randomly selected three causal paths at the heart of the core model as listed in Table
17, which consists of the model driver concepts in column (A) that indirectly derive
changes in the concepts of interest (i.e., the five HROT principles) in column (C),
through the intermediate model concepts listed in column (B).
2. I simulated the model following Approach A - Method A (see Table 7) for each case
individually before and after deleting the mediating concepts in column (B).
The results of simulating the model for each case are graphically shown in Figure 32, which
compares the five HROT principles’ behaviors in each case before and after deleting the
intermediate concepts in column (B).
Depending on how each intermediate concept is defined, and since these intermediate
concepts have direct relationships with the five HROT principles, their influences on the
principles’ behaviors were predicated. For example, in the first case, deleting
“Complacency” has increased the degree of change in each of the four affected principles,
and notably, that PWF resulted in an increasing outcome. This is, in fact, an abnormal
(anomalous) behavior because complacency is a cultural trait that exists in every
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organization, and its adverse effects cannot be removed simply by eliminating it rather than
coping with it during the ordinary course of operations. Thus, complacency is an essential
concept in the model to mediate the relationship between redundancy and the five
principles to consistently warn the decision-makers that redundancy can result in adverse
effects.
Table 17: Selected Cases for Behavior Anomaly Test

Case

(A)
Driver Concept

→

(B)
Mediated Concept

→

(C)
Concepts of Interest

(To Be Removed)
1

Redundancy

-→

Complacency

-→

Five Principles

2

Precaution as a Mind-set

+→

Sensemaking

+→

Five Principles

3

Interruption and
Adjustment

+→

Anticipating and
Controlling Latent Singles

+→

Five Principles
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After Deleting Complacency

Case 1

Before Deleting Complacency

After Deleting Sensemaking

Case 2

Before Deleting Sensemaking

After Deleting Controlling Latent Signals

Case 3

Before Deleting Controlling Latent Signals

Figure 32: Changes in the Five HROT Principles Based on Behavior Anomaly Test
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Family Member Test
This test required simulating the model based on at least two different contexts (industries
or organizations). Each simulation is expected to show behaviors that imitate the behaviors
of the context it represents, as described in the literature. I selected the healthcare industry
besides the offshore oil and gas to make this comparison since there is a rich literature on
healthcare concerning practicing HROs since 2001.
Frankel et al. (2006) urge that several US healthcare organizations took initiatives to
enhance safety, including the introduction of the so-called “red rules,” which, if not
followed, can result in potential dismissal (Jones & O’Connor, 2016). Such rules infer that
a culture of raising concerns regarding patients’ care is not fostered or is deficient.
However, raising concerns in offshore oil and gas claimed to be encouraged and rewarded
in some organizations (Lekka & Sugden, 2011; National Academies, 2016). This specific
behavioral aspect (i.e., raising concern) is a part of the model structure that defines and
evaluates the HRO-relevant concept “Listening to Various Voices and Inputs.”
I, therefore, simulated the model following Approach A - Method A (see Table 7) to
measure the degree of change in the five HROT principles based on changing the level of
activating this concept, considering a low degree in healthcare while an adequate degree in
the offshore oil and gas. Simulating the model based on that has resulted in behaviors that
are verifying what has been described in the literature regarding the two selected industries,
which infer that the model has passed the test as shown in Figure 33. It is evident that RTS,
STO, and CTR have shown less degrees in healthcare since people in this industry are less
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allowed to improvise when needed, less to communicate issues, and they are mostly
regulated to treat cases based on similar contexts.

Effects on HROT Principles - Offshore Oil and Gas

Effects on HROT Principles - Healthcare

Figure 33: Simulation Results of the Family Member Test

Surprise Behavior Test
Testing the model based on a surprise behavior test required subjecting it to an external
force (i.e., managerial intervention) through a list of HRO-relevant concepts. I simulated
the model following Approach A - Method B (see Table 7) and graphically illustrated in
Figure 30. This test required experts’ opinions to establish and weigh the relationship
between the applied intervention and model concepts so that the model can mimic the realworld system’s behaviors. Therefore, I used the experts’ feedback provided at the end of
the pilot study workshop.
However, in real-world operations, practical implementation of some managerial
interventions can generate conflicts with other interventions, programs, and initiatives that
organizations have already applied. Consequently, in real life, a theoretically increasing
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relationship between the HRO-relevant concept and the examined intervention is
decreasing, so managers can manage any possible conflicts. Indeed, I observed this case
when I linked the model to one of the interventions, namely “Fostering Social Ties Based
on Mutual Respect” (see Table 14 for definition). One of the HRO-relevant concepts that
this intervention assumed to increase is “Organizing for Action Based Inquiry” (See Table
30 for definition). However, experts perceived this relationship decreasing during the
workshop since this intervention was found to create conflict with another intervention.
Simulating the model based on the experts’ opinions has generated a specific behavior that
can exist in the real-world operation but is not theoretically anticipated, which indicated
that the model had passed the test. Figure 34 compares the model behavior based on the
literature (left) and based on the industry experts’ opinions (right) regarding this case.

HROT Principles Based on Literature

HROT Principles Based on Experts’ Opinions

Figure 34: Model Behavior Based on Literature VS. Experts’ Opinions
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6.2

Data Collection

I collected the required data for this expanded study through an online survey that I
designed based on the model contextualization procedure to gather information from the
offshore oil and gas industry experts. The following sections discuss the participants and
the recruitment process, and the survey design and administration.
Participants and Recruitment
Like the pilot study, industry participants in this expanded study play an essential role in
contextualizing the model based on their organizations’ organizational and operational
settings. Therefore, the participants’ experiences and their role in safety-related practices
have been a significant concern, making the process of recruiting them critical and
challenging. Practitioners from the offshore oil and gas are difficult to reach out to, and
when possible, they mostly apologize to take part due to the sensitivity of their duties and
the fear that such studies may risk their jobs. However, there have been three channels to
recruit participants: (1) Business cards and personal information that I collected from the
attendees of the offshore oil and gas 2017 and 2018 annual forum by Center for Offshore
Safety COS in Houston, Texas, (2) a list of email addresses provided by the COS, and (3)
LinkedIn accounts as I searched participants with different expertise and safety positions
in the offshore oil and gas.
Participants’ roles that I recruited to participate in the survey included: HSE or HSSE
managers, IDAC members and consultants, Offshore rig administrators, safety managers,
safety auditors, safety directors, safety officers, safety specialists, safety coordinators,
safety advisors, safety influencers, safety trainers, safety consultants, compliance
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managers, compliance coordinators, industrial psychologists, risk managers, operations
controllers, operators. The final list consisted of 150 experts with different positions and
responsibilities who presently or previously worked in leading and pioneering offshore oil
and gas organizations such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, PB, Schlumberger, Halliburton,
Baker Hughes, Rowan Companies, Subsea7, and others.
Survey Design and Administration
I designed and created an online survey with Qualtrics to collect the required data for this
study. The survey is designed to provide a one by one defined intervention and a one by
one question regarding whether increasing the intervention’s implementation would
increase, decrease, or make no change on a defined HRO-relevant concept. This survey
examined thirteen interventions (see Table 14), and each intervention has been questioned
several times based on the number of potential HRO-relevant concepts (see Table 35 in
Appendix G). Participants responded to the questions by selecting one of the given options
to indicate a relationship, the relationship’s nature (i.e., increasing or decreasing), and its
strengths, as shown in Figure 35.
This design aims to examine the positive and negative effects of the thirteen selected
managerial interventions on the five HROT principles. This process facilitated studying
the cultural behaviors and the structural design and patterns of the research context in realworld operations. It revealed the strengths and weaknesses of safety-related practices,
reflecting the industry’s capabilities of either becoming or continuously practicing HROs.
Because surveying participants regarding thirteen interventions is a time-consuming
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process and somehow overwhelming, therefore, the survey is designed to automatically
randomize and limit surveying each participant about only two interventions.

Intervention

Model Concept

- 0.99

- 0.67

- 0.33

0

0.33

0.67

0.99

Figure 35: Screen Shot of the Expanded Study Online Survey with Qualtrics

I tested this survey for its flow, clarity, and effectiveness using the Qualtrics software’s
testing data. Then I distributed it through multiple channels to reach out to the previously
identified participants from the offshore oil and gas industry.
The survey was distributed to 150 potential experts via their email addresses and directly
through their LinkedIn accounts; however, only 31 complete responses and 17 partial
responses with a percentage of completion between 50-85% have been recorded. I
considered responses with 70% partial completion and above in the final use of the data;
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therefore, the data points’ final sample consisted of 40 usable responses. Furthermore, I
analyzed the data using Qualtrics for collecting the responses per each causal relationship
between the examined interventions and every HRO-relevant concept-the analyzed data
presented in the following sections of the model simulation and behaviors.
6.3

Model Simulation and Behaviors

In this section, the discussions comprise simulating the model based on the selected
managerial interventions. The simulation process included using two techniques:
Consolidative FCM as a traditional simulation method, and explorative FCM as an
Exploratory Modelling and Analysis (EMA) method. The purpose of this lengthy process
is threefold:
1. Subjecting the model to more managerial interventions and a more comprehensive
range of expert-provided data to examine in depth its appropriateness and usefulness.
2. Evaluating the capacity and readiness of the offshore oil and gas operations for
practicing HROs based on experts’ opinions.
3. Managing uncertainties resulted from experts’ disagreements around specific causal
relationships, thus, understanding the effects of different management styles and
decisions on safety-related practices and behaviors.
This section presents the process and results of simulating the model based on the
collected data; however, the detailed analysis and interpretations of these results are
provided in section 6.4.
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Traditional FCM Simulation
In the traditional model simulation method, I applied the selected managerial interventions
to the core model through lists of the HRO-relevant concepts based on the previously
discussed contextualization procedure (see Table 35 in Appendix G). The nature and
weight of each intervention’s causal relationship with the corresponding HRO-relevant
concepts have been calculated using the median of the collected data. The median provides
the middle value or the central tendency of the data set so that disagreements among
participants concerning a specific causal relationship can be resolved. For instance, if three
participants disagreed around a specific relationship: the first selected slightly increasing
(+0.33), the second chose moderately increasing (+0.67), and the third selected moderately
decreasing (-0.33), the final determination based on the calculated median is slightly
increasing relationship (+0.33). Table 39 in Appendix I) consists of the resulted edges’
weight of all the relationships based on the median of the experts’ opinions.
I simulated the model using Approach A - Method B (see Table 7). I used hyperbolic
tangent (tanh (x), Eq. No. 8) as an inference function, and I selected lambda’s value to be
2. The selected thirteen interventions have been activated individually and then collectively
(i.e., as groups) by clustering them based on each intervention’s expected outcomes. The
following sections discuss the simulation process based on individual (one by one
intervention) and then groups of interventions.
Simulation-Based on Individual Interventions
I simulated the model based on individual interventions by fully activating (100% turning
out) one intervention at a time and let the system reaches the study state. I visualized each
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intervention’s effects on the five HROT principles (concepts of interest) using bar graphs.
The degree of change in each principle presented graphically, as shown in Figure 36 and
Figure 37. Simultaneously, the numerical outcomes based on these simulation processes
are provided in Table 18, including the five HROT principles and Organizational
Reliability (OR).
Importantly, I calculated the degree of OR using the five principles’ sum-product,
considering that each principle is equally participating in making the degree of
organizational reliability OR (i.e., each principle represents 20% of the OR’s degree). For
examples, if: PWF = 0.75,
RTS = 0.68,
STO = 0.00,
CTR = 0.85,
DTE = 0.25, therefore:
OR = (0.75*20% + 0.68*20% + 0.00*20% + 0.85*20% + 0.25*20%) = 0.51.
Figure 36 and Figure 37, as well as Table 18, show that only seven interventions out of the
thirteen selected and applied to the model have positively influenced all the five HROT
principles simultaneously as they presented increasing degrees of change. These
interventions include Post-event debriefings, tabletop exercises, emergency drills, personal
accountability, social ties and mutual respect, prosocial motivation, and emotional
ambivalence. These managerial interventions should be given further attention by the
industry to develop positive and higher organizational reliability levels. Furthermore,
communication as a means to stay informed by huddling and reporting issues has positive
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impacts on only four principles, which is expected since communication does not directly
affect the fifth principle (i.e., DTE) similar to what, for example, training interventions
have. However, communication in real-time as a method for learning has yielded
counterproductive effects. In contrast, the stop-work authority has shown adverse effects,
particularly on PWF, considering that interventions resulting in decreasing or negative
degrees of change are undesired and wasteful management efforts.
Notably, there have been several cases where the model simulation based on individual
interventions has shown that maximizing the activation level or implementing an
intervention does not always result in desired outcomes. For example, the full activation
level (100% turning on) of “Fostering Social Ties and Mutual Respect” has positively
influenced PWF with a change of (0.453) while activating the same intervention with a half
activation level (50% turning on) has resulted in a higher degree of PWF (0.575) as shown
in Figure 38 below. More details on results interpretation and analysis are provided in
Section 6.4.
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Figure 36: Model Simulation Based on Individual Interventions (1)
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Figure 37: Model Simulation Based on Individual Interventions (2)
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Table 18: Numerical Outcomes of the Five HROT Principles and Organizational Reliability (Based Individual Interventions)
Interventions

PWF

RTS

CTR

DTE

STO

OR

Stop-Work Authority

0.891

0.391

-0.602

-0.796

0.296

0.036

Reporting of Near Misses and Safety-Critical Events

0.906

0.896

0.993

0.000

0.962

0.751

Fostering Social Ties and Mutual Respect

0.453

0.977

0.917

0.728

0.908

0.797

Fostering a Sense of Personal Accountability for Safety on All Levels

0.995

0.805

0.780

0.641

0.936

0.831

Implementing Safety Huddles

0.901

0.897

0.994

0.000

0.992

0.757

Practicing Tabletop Exercises

0.876

0.906

0.997

0.796

0.998

0.915

Practicing Post-Event Debriefings

0.906

0.914

0.998

0.872

0.999

0.938

Practicing Emergency Drills

0.901

0.910

0.998

0.842

0.998

0.930

Institutionalizing Prosocial Motivation

0.742

0.432

0.644

0.680

0.835

0.667

Institutionalizing Emotional Ambivalence

0.893

0.802

0.867

0.979

0.922

0.893

Managing Reliability Drift

0.557

0.317

0.000

0.000

0.775

0.330

Practicing Individual Mindfulness

0.875

0.759

0.424

0.000

0.994

0.610

Adopting Just-In-Time Learning

-0.900

-0.854

-0.995

0.000

-0.998

-0.750
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Activation Level (50%)

Activation Level (100%)

0.850

0.977
0.684

0.644

0.908
0.728

0.575
0.443

0.917

0.453

Figure 38: Comparison of Model Simulation Based on Different Activation Levels

Scenarios Based on Grouped Interventions
In their efforts to improve safety-related practices, managers do not just do one thing. Still,
in selecting interventions, they tend to focus on areas such as workforce training, work
design, communications, and so forth. Therefore, I developed scenarios based on grouping
the selected managerial interventions into five groups considering the anticipated
improvements that these interventions are designed to achieve, as listed in Table 19.
Simulating the model based on these scenarios required activating each group and letting
the system reach the study state. The effects of each group on the five HROT principles
are visualized using a bar graph, by which the degree of change in each principle is
presented, as shown in graphs A, B, C, D, and E in Figure 39. Moreover, the numerical
outcomes of this simulation process are provided in Table 20, which includes the degrees
of change in the performance of the five HROT principles as well as organizational
reliability (OR).
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From the results of simulating the model based on individual interventions (see Figure 36
and Figure 37), some interventions have positively influenced the five HROT better than
others within the same cluster or group of interventions (see Table 18 and Table 19). I
grouped these interventions with the best influences under a category of best performance
interventions. Then I followed all the required steps to simulate the model as a
consolidative FCM based on this group. The outcomes of this process are presented in
graph (F) in Figure 39, and the numerical values are provided in Table 20.
It is apparent from the simulation results that the group of reframing work training has
achieved a very ambitious level of OR, which is clearly demonstrated as very high degrees
of change in the performance of all the five HROT principles that range between (0.88) to
(0.99). However, like simulating the model based on individual interventions, this
experience has shown that not every group of interventions could influence all the five
principles concurrently, such as reframing work communication. Grouping interventions
do not always result in the same or similar positive degrees of change in all the five
principles, such as simulating the model based on reframing work design. Moreover,
grouping best performance interventions yielded an ideal level of OR; however, these ideal
results pose two questions: (1) how costly or feasible is to design and implement a group
of interventions to reach such an outcome, and (2) how possible in practice to implement
all these interventions at the same time without developing any counterproductive effects?
Such questions worth investigation in future research. More details on the results analysis
and interpretations are provided in Section 6.4.
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Table 19: Scenario Based on Grouped Interventions
Scenario/ Cluster Name

Interventions

Description

Reframing Work Design

 Stop-Work Authority
 Managing Reliability Drift
 Institutionalizing Emotional
Ambivalence 

These interventions are meant to reframe how the work is designed to manage
emergencies, resolve unforeseen mishaps, and deviations from procedures. By
doing so, management authorizes front-line workers to stop work when needed.
This design motivates workers to trust their competence yet continue to consult
experts when required.

Reframing Work
Communication

 Implementing Safety Huddle
 Reporting Near-Misses/ Incidents 

These two interventions practiced leveraging the level and quality of
communications, raising concerns, receiving and passing instructions, and
getting informed about mishaps solutions and recommendations on how to avoid
them.

Reframing Work
Training






Reframing How to Relate
Colleagues Peers

 Institutionalize Precocial Motivation
 Fostering Social Ties and Mutual
Respect 

Management intervenes to develop and promote work environments that
encourage social activities that strengthen how colleagues’ peers are relating to
each other. These activities also motivate workers to follow the standards and
rules that ensure the safety of the self and others’ safety yet maintain a high level
of respect.

Reframing How the
Work Should Be Done

 Practicing Individual Mindfulness
 Fostering Sense of Accountability and
Safety on All Levels 

Management intervenes to affirm that everyone is accountable for his/her job
duties, particularly concerning safety-related practices. The workforce is
practicing individual mindfulness, which is some self-actions to clear out their
thoughts and strengthen their abilities to stay focused on their work
responsibilities.

Best Performance
Interventions

 Five Best Performance Interventions
Marked with  Sign

The interventions in this scenario represent the interventions that showed the best
outcomes for the five HROT principles.

Emergency Drills
Tabletop Exercise
Just-In-Time-Learning
Post-Events Debriefings 

These interventions do not provide essential training but rather train workers and
prepare them for pre and post emergencies as well as keep workers informed and
trained in real-time while they perform their jobs.
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A

B

C

D

E

F

Figure 39: Model Simulation Based on Grouped Interventions
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Table 20: Numerical Outcomes of the Five HROT Principles and Organizational Reliability Based on Grouped Interventions

Interventions

PWF

RTS

CTR

DTE

STO

OR

Work Design

0.906

0.790

0.316

0.830

0.957

0.759

Work Communication

0.907

0.910

0.996

0.000

0.970

0.756

Work Training

0.907

0.914

0.997

0.881

0.964

0.932

Relating Colleagues Peers

0.468

0.976

0.921

0.582

0.919

0.773

How the Work Should Be Done

0.995

0.845

0.906

0.641

0.999

0.877

Groupe of Best Performance Interventions

0.992

0.932

0.993

0.941

0.993

0.999
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Explorative FCM Simulation Using EMA Technique
The participants of the industry survey did not agree on the weights for all connections
between interventions and the core model concepts, resulting in uncertainty about what
model structure best represents expert knowledge. As planned, I conducted EMA to
address this uncertainty. However, EMA is computationally demanding and timeconsuming, which is why I first subjected the model to a series of sensitivity analysis tests
to identify causal relationships between the interventions and HRO-relevant concepts for
which the choice of weights has an impact on HROT principles.
The survey allows participants to (1) decide whether or not there is a relationship between
the intervention and each HRO-relevant concept, and (2) choose a sign and a strength at
the same time when they decide that there is a relationship, so that, uncertainty or
disagreement ranges among participants includes both the strength of the relationship and
its sign. For example, if three participants disagree around a relationship: one decided that
there is no impact, or no relationship (selected 0), the second decided that there is a slightly
decreasing impact (selected -0.33), and the third decided that there is a moderately
increasing impact ( selected +0.66); therefore, the uncertainty range is [-0.33, +0.66]. The
survey results show that 52 out of 70 causal relationships, where participants disagreed on
the sign and strength of the relationships (i.e., provided different inputs. The extreme range
of uncertainty based on the results is [-0.66, +1], and a typical range is [0, +0.33] 23. The
subsequent EMA discussions focused on the relationships with uncertainty ranges only.

23

I consider this range typical since the uncertainty interval is relatively small, which means that the
generated random numbers (selected to be 100,000) would yield similar and more concentrated results.
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Sensitivity Analysis Test
As discussed in Sections 3.8.1 and graphically illustrated in Figure 30, the model has been
tested for sensitivity following Approach B - Method B (see Table 7) for model simulation.
Each intervention was individually activated to examine only one HRO-relevant concept
at a time. Individual examination of each concept required ranging the edge’s weight from
[-1] to [+1] while fixing the other edges’ weights to the default values. The default value
means [+1] for all the increasing relationship and [-1] for all decreasing ones. In this
process, I selected hyperbolic tangent (tanh (x)) as an inference function, and I set the
lambda value to 2.
I repeated this test 52 times (the number of the critical relationships) to examine each causal
relationship with uncertainty range, yet only 20 causal relationships where one or more of
the five principles have shown sensitivity to the variations in the edges’ weight. These 20
cases are modeled and simulated using the EMA technique, which is discussed in detail in
the next section.
Figure 40 below compares some examples of sensitive and insensitive behaviors of the five
HROT principles resulted from this step, and Table 21 lists the 20 cases where the HROT
principles were found to be sensitive, including the corresponding ranges of uncertainties
based on the collected data via the online survey.
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Principles Sensitive to Edges’ Weight Variations

Principles Insensitive to Edges’ Weight Variations

\

Figure 40: Sensitivity Analysis Based on Edges’ Weight Variations
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Table 21: Cases Where the HROT Principles Found to Be Sensitive to Edges’ Weight Variations

Intervention

HRO-Relevant Concepts That Cause
Sensitivity
System Flexibility and Adaptability

Stop-Work Authority

Reporting of Near Misses
and Safety-Critical Events

Fostering Social Ties and
Mutual Respect

Fostering a Sense of
Personal Accountability
for Safety on All Levels
Institutionalizing
Prosocial Motivation

Practicing Individual
Mindfulness

Sensitive
Principles

Uncertainty
Ranges
[From, To]

CTR

[-0.33, -0.67]

Simple Structure

CTR, RTS

[-0.67, 0]

Structure Flexibility

CTR, RTS

[-0.67, 0.67]

Pressure

DTE

[-0.33, 0.67]

Level of Employee Participation

STO

[-0.33, 0.67]

Dysfunctional Momentum

STO, CTR

[-0.67,0.67]

Adherence to Standard and Risk
Boundaries

RTS, PWF

[0.67, 1]

Dysfunctional Momentum

STO

[0.67, 1]

Organizational Variety

RTS

[-0.33, 0.67]

Redundancy

PWF, CTR

[-0.33, 0.67]

Self-Awareness

DTE, PWF

[0.67, 1]

Ignoring Expertise

DTE

[-1, 0.67]

Level of Employee Participation

STO

[0.67, 1]

Self-Interest

STO, DTE

[-0.33, 1]

Self-Interest

DTE, CTR

[-0.33, 1]

Self-Awareness

All Principles

[0, 0.67]

Self-Interest

All Principles

[-0.33, 0.67]

Adherence to Standard and Risk
Boundaries

PWF, RTS

[-0.67, 1]

Personal Competence and Confidence

RTS, CTR

[0.33, 1]

STO

[0, 1]

Staying Focused
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Simulation-Based on Individual Interventions
The use of the EMA technique to simulate the model based on interventions required
assigning uncertainty ranges for the weights of the previously identified sensitive
relationships between each intervention and the HRO-relevant concepts. As listed in Table
21, an uncertainty range is a numerical interval representing participants’ disagreements
spans around a specific causal relationship and arranged from minimum to maximum in
the form of [from, to] as previously explained.
Following the discussions in Section 3.6, I simulated the model following the procedure
described in Approach C - Method B (see Table 7) to activate each of the interventions
listed in Table 21 individually. In this process, I used hyperbolic tangent (tanh(x)) as an
inference function, and the lambda value was set to 2. I placed the weights of the identified
critically causal relationships to the corresponding explorative ranges. The effects of each
intervention on the concepts of interest are presented using a radar chart. This chart exhibits
the outcomes of both the explorative and the median value so that a comparison can easily
be made. Because this process generates random numbers within the explorative ranges
depending on the number of the process’s iterations, I conducted several experiments using
the “stop-work authority” intervention, which I selected arbitrarily to determine the best
random number that the process should generate to produce clearly readable outcomes. As
shown in Figures 41, 42, and 43, the chart remained difficult to read until 100000 iterations
were used, and obviously, more iterations beyond 100000 did not provide significant
changes rather than consuming more time to produce the chart. Thus, I selected 100000 as
the number of iterations in the process of simulating the model-based EMA.
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1000 Iterations

5000 Iterations

Figure 41: EMA Outcomes Based on 1000 and 5000 Iterations
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10000 Iterations

50000 Iterations

Figure 42: EMA Outcomes Based on 10000 and 50000 Iterations
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100000 Iterations

150000 Iterations

Figure 43: EMA Outcomes Based on 100000 and 150000 Iterations
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Following the entire procedure discussed above to simulate the model-based individual
interventions resulted in the outcomes shown in Figure 44, Figure 45, and Figure 46. From
these figures, disagreements in the participants’ opinions regarding the potential influence
of an intervention on the corresponding HRO-relevant concepts is not a negative
management outcome. The reflection of uncertainties resulted from such disagreements
can also be seen in a positive enhancement in the degree of changes in the five HROT
principles. HROs always encourage contradiction spirits among the decision-makers to
treat each case by its specific context. For example, in graph A - Figure 44, disagreement
has expanded the possibilities of DTE to reach out with positive degrees of change and
provided better outcomes of both STO and RTS. The same observations can be seen with
respect to DTE and PWF in graph A - Figure 45, and DTE in graph B of the same Figure.
However, disagreement impact on PWF in graph B - Figure 46 shows that PWF can be
negative concerning how the decision-makers perceive the effects of practicing individual
mindfulness on the workforce’s focus during the normal course of operations. Negative
influence can also be seen in the potentials to reach negative degrees of change in each of
the five principles based on Institutionalized Precocial Motivation, as in graph A - Figure
46. More details on results analysis and interpretations are provided in Section 6.4.
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Stop-Work Authority

A

Reporting Near Misses and Safety-Critical Events

Bi

Figure 44: Effects of Individual Interventions on HROT Principles Based EMA (1)
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Fostering Social Ties and Mutual Respect

A

Fostering a Sense of Personal Accountability for Safety on All Levels

B

Figure 45: Effects of Individual Interventions on HROT Principles Based EMA (2)
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Institutionalizing Prosocial Motivation

A

Practicing Individual Mindfulness

B

Figure 46: Effects of Individual Interventions on HROT Principles Based EMA (3)
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Scenario-Based on Grouped Interventions
I simulated the model using the EMA technique based on grouped interventions. However,
only two of the five groups listed in Table 19 were used in this process: Reframing How to
Relate Colleagues Peers and Reframing How the Work Should Be Done. The other groups
either have no explorative ranges (see Table 21) as in the group of Reframing Work
Training or have only one intervention with an explorative range as in the groups of
Reframing Work Design and Reframing Work Communication. Moreover, EMA
simulation does not apply to a group of best performance interventions since this type of
simulation does not yield outcomes that show exact degrees of changes, but instead, it
yields ranges of possibilities, which makes the differentiation between interventions based
on best performance is impractical. Figure 47 shows the outcomes of simulating the model
based on the two identified groups of interventions using the EMA technique. In graph A,
it is evident that grouping interventions did not reduce the ranges of uncertainties. Still, it
shows that Reframing How to Relate Colleagues Peers has yielded tradeoffs between the
degree of CTR and the degree of STO, or in other words, the more the CTR, the less the
STO. What is interesting is that the boundaries of the darker area towards the center of the
graph show that PWF can go extremely negative, but this can be when RTS and STO go
towards very high degrees, which is expected because redundancy comes into play when
social ties are beyond the allowable limits. Moreover, graph B, Reframing How the Work
Should Be Done, reflected that grouping intervention under uncertainty (i.e., diversify
opinions in the right directions) could enhance what conformity (median weights) could
not. More details on results analysis and interpretations are provided in Section 6.4.
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Reframing How to Relate Colleague Peers

A

Reframing How the Work Should Be Done

B

Figure 47: EMA Simulation Based on Grouped Interventions
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6.4

Results Interpretation and Analysis

This section provides extensive details on the interpretation and analysis of the simulation
results presented in Section 6.3. At first, I provide the interpretation and analysis of
simulating the model using the traditional FCM method based on the median of the
collected data. Then, I discuss the interpretation and analysis of the simulation results using
the EMA technique, considering participants’ disagreement or the uncertainty ranges. In
the second part, the analysis includes a comparison between the results of the two
techniques.
Results of Model Simulation Using Traditional FCM
Based on the simulation outcomes presented in Figure 36, Figure 37, and Figure 39, as well
as the numerical results provided in Table 18 and Table 20, it is evident that neither every
managerial intervention (or group of interventions) impacts all the five principles at the
same time nor it influences them with the same level of impact. Furthermore, all the
simulation processes have been conducted by fully activating (i.e., 100% turning on) each
intervention or group of interventions; therefore, the obtained results, in most cases, present
the maximum possible degrees of change in the five HROT principles as well as the overall
performance represented in organizational reliability OR. However, as mentioned earlier,
the maximum activation level does not always yield maximum or even desired degree of
change, as shown in Figure 38, where more activation level has caused one of the
principles, namely PWF, to decrease. The following sections discuss the traditional
simulation process-based intervention case by case.
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Stop-Work Authority
Model simulation based on “Stop-Work-Authority” (see Table 14 for definition) shows
that PWF, RTS, and STO increase due to implementing this intervention; however, CTR
and DTE decrease, as shown in Figure 36. Overall, OR increases only very minimally by
0.036 (see Table 18). These outcomes occurred because the study participants assigned a
decreasing relationship between this intervention and one of the HRO-relevant concepts
labeled “Structure Flexibility” with direct causal connections with CTR and DTE. In
particular, and according to what they have mentioned, Stop-Work-Authority as an
intervention minimizes the flexibility of the system structure, which, in turn, reduces the
ability to migrate the decision-making process to the frontlines in times of emergency and
limits frontline worker’s ability to improvise when needed. Participants perceive this
intervention to stop the operations sometimes for irrational reasons instead of continuing it
while coping with trying conditions as in HROs. One of the experts has commented on this
intervention by the following:
“This intervention did not have a mandated directive from top management, and for that
reason, there were issues with users of the facility thinking they had domain over the lower
level technicians. Stop work authority can empower malicious behavior if workers feel as
if they are not treated justly or are, in general disgruntled. Under ideal circumstances, stop
work authority works very well.”
Another participant perceived the problem of this intervention falls in two main categories:
“The issues around disruption to the business (time, cost, etc.). While these are the ones
that "get the headlines," this is essentially a leadership issue more than a team issue.
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Training the right people in the right leadership skills is key to solving this type of issue,
more so than any stop-work intervention. The right leaders will drive this behavior
regardless of the existence of a formal "stop work authority" or not.”
In general, granting Stop-Work-Authority does not improve organizational reliability in the
offshore oil and gas industry and might be mismatched with prevailing work culture and
management norms.
Reporting of Near Misses and Safety-Critical Events
Simulating the model based on this intervention (see Table 14 for definition) resulted in
highly increasing effects on each of PWF, RTS, STO, and CTR; however, it did not affect
DTE (see Figure 36). Although organizational reliability OR increased by a little over
0.750 (see Table 18), it is evident that this intervention cannot make a concurrent influence
on all the five HROT principles. DTE has not changed because this intervention has no
direct or indirect link to any concept that impacts the organization’s structure, which is
expected.
Participants based on their inputs perceive this intervention as a practical means that yields
increasing impacts on HROT principles; however, they commented otherwise to explain
that there is a hesitancy to report specific incidents due to fear of blame or punishment:“
There is a reluctance to report certain incidents due to fear of retribution.” Another
feedback summarizes the situation as: “The goal was to instill HRO principles, but it
required a great deal of work to win the trust and for all employees to know they could
offer input without reprisal.”
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This intervention can leverage the organizations’ capabilities in the offshore oil and gas
industry to practice HROs positively. However, this industry needs a better strategy to
promote a culture that encourages reporting all types of errors since not all organizations
have such a culture.
Fostering Social Ties and Mutual Respect
Fostering Social Ties and Mutual Respect (see Table 14 for definition) has positively
influenced all the five principles with varying degrees of changes between a minimum of
0.453 for PWF and a maximum of 0.977 for RTS (see Figure 37), and the overall OR has
increased, by 0.797 (see Table 18). The reason behind the relatively low degree of PWF
when compared to the degrees of the other four principles is that more social ties among
employees can increase the overreliance on one another, which in turn breeds undesired
complacency. One of the participants provided a comment claiming based on his/her
experience in implementing this intervention the following:
“Social ties between employees can create ways of blackmailing subordinates through the
usage of personal knowledge and pressuring. There is also the problem of being "too
familiar" and no longer identifying the shortcomings of coworkers in everyday operations.
This loss of critical evaluation can cause lax behavior between workers and prevent them
from being significant enough to avoid short cuts”.
In general, practicing this intervention resulted in promising outcomes; however,
organizations must be careful because fostering social ties should not exceed the levels that
can adversely affect personal accountability for safety.
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Fostering a Sense of Personal Accountability for Safety on All Levels
Simulating the model based on this intervention (see Table 14 for definition) increased the
degree of all five HROT principles simultaneously, as shown in Figure 37. The degree of
OR has been positively increased, by 0.831 as in Table 18. In this particular case, the
participants have shown a high level of consensus around the impacts of this intervention
on the corresponding list of HRO-relevant concepts. The outcomes have presented
behaviors similar to the expected behaviors, as reported in the literature on HROT.
Implementing Safety Huddles
Safety Huddle (see Table 14 for definition) provides a base for each day’s communications
and shifts discussions among the workforce, particularly those in frontlines. Implementing
this intervention has increased four of the five HROT principles: PWF, RTS, STO, and
CTR, as shown in Figure 36. The increase in the degrees of the mentioned four principles
has led to increasing OR’s degree by 0.757 (see Table 18). However, this intervention did
not change DTE’s degree, which is also expected since it has no direct or indirect link to
any concepts within DTE’s network. Therefore, implementing a safety huddle requires
implementing other interventions that can substitute the missed effect on DTE.
Practicing Tabletop Exercise, Emergency Drills, and Post-Event Debriefing
The individual simulation of the model based on each of these training interventions (see
Table 14 for definitions) increased the degrees of all five HROT principles, as shown in
Figure 36. As a result, it has increased the degree of OR by 0.915 for Tabletop Exercises,
0.938 for Post-Event Debriefings, and by 0.930 for Emergency Drills (see Table 18). The
positive behaviors of the principles resulting from simulating the model based on these
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interventions conclude that training the workforce is highly effective in practicing and
achieving HROs. One of the participants has commented on these interventions explaining
the significance of training:
“A great deal of experience in practicing emergency drills, U.S. Navy, and O&G platforms.
Tabletops do help the training but do not replace the actual exercises where you learn the
most, actually going through the motions.”
Another participant confirms that the offshore oil and gas industry practice emergency
drills often and recommends such training for those newly employed:
“The O&G Industry drills frequently. The more experience a person has, the better they
are at performing in the ways desired in a drill. For example, new arrivals aboard an O&G
facility, construction site, must be oriented about the site, emergency response
expectations, sounds of various types of emergencies, leadership expectations for safe work
performance, etc. When a drill does occur, the expectations are familiar and may mean the
difference in life or death. So, after several (or many) drills, the actions depend less on the
available subject matter expert or supervisor.”
There is no doubt; training is one of the most significant investments that organizations
make to build their workforce’s skills and competencies to practice HROs. However, the
methods of training are crucial factors in how practical the training would be. As in the
first comment above, virtual training is useful but cannot replace the actual training where
the workforce learns most—considering that the DTE’s positive degree resulted from
building workforce competencies based on intensive training and practices.
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Institutionalizing Prosocial Motivation
The results of simulating the model based on this intervention (see Table 14 for definition)
show increasing impacts on all five HROT principles, particularly PWF and STO, as in
Figure 37, which caused the OR to present an increasing degree 0.677 as in Table 18. The
reason why STO showed the most growing degree of change when compared with the other
principles is that all the participants who exercised this intervention have assigned an
extremely increasing relationship between the intervention and the model concept labeled
“Level of Employee Participation” that has a direct connection to STO. Participants
perceive this intervention as an approach to develop confidence and trust in the corporate
vision as one of the participants has pointed:
“The company has offered soft training for staff leadership, like your Pro-Social
Motivation. The immediate impact was increased understanding and trust in the corporate
vision.”
Practicing this intervention is highly recommended because it is very well aligned with the
trust that HROs rigorously build. Although this intervention has no direct impact on RTS,
however, RTS showed an increasing degree, which resulted as a side effect (desired)
caused by the causal relationship with concepts in the other principles networks that have
direct links with the intervention.
Institutionalizing Emotional Ambivalence
It is evident through Figure 37 that simulating the model based on this intervention (see
Table 14 for definition) has resulted in increasing degrees for all the five HROT principles.
As a result, the degree of OR increased by 0.893 (see Table 18). This outcome is predicted
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since participants’ inputs have met the expectations regarding each causal relationship
between this intervention and the list of the corresponding HRO-relevant concepts.
Indeed, emotional ambivalence promotes a culture that motivates the workforce to believe
in their competencies and skills as they operate safely; however, they remain skeptical that
issues can occur anytime during the normal course of operations, and despite their
competencies, they do not mind to enquire information from more skilled people in the
organization.
Managing Reliability Drift
This intervention (see Table 14 for definition) is majorly focused on enhancing the practice
of STO, which has been achieved (see Figure 36), with an increasing degree of 0.775 (see
Table 18). While both PWF and RTS also resulted in increasing degrees, this intervention
had no effects on both CTR and DTE and, therefore, the overall OR is 0.330. However,
one of the predictions is that this intervention would increase the relationship with DTE
since when the operations procedure drifts, the decision-making process shifts to those who
know the context of the problem better to fix it without turning the operations off. The
participants decided that there is no relationship with DTE with no comment on why they
chose so. Perhaps and according to the following statement by one participant, they might
have considered drift can occur in human behaviors, not in the technical procedure:
“Managing Reliability Drift, as described, is managing human behavior by coaxing
humans to "be better." I've never viewed this type of management as sustainable. Managing
Reliability Drift that focuses on enabling humans to make the reliably safe and correct
work decisions easier than making the decisions that cause, enable drift.”
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With this comment, it is evident that this intervention is essential but requires a clear
definition so that people can understand the meaning behind it. This might be investigated
in future research.
Practicing Individual Mindfulness
Practicing individual mindfulness (see Table 14 for definition) is designed to help people
in the front line, particularly operators, prepare themselves mentally before starting their
daily tasks. They can stay focused on work activities. Thus, they maintain a high level of
STO. The simulation results show that STO’s performance is increasing (see Figure 37);
however, the results also show no impact on DTE and low degrees of CTR, PWF, and RTS
when compared with STO. In general, the simulation process yielded an increasing degree
of OR by 0.61 (see Table 18). One of the participants has commented on the following:
“Practicing Individual Mindfulness is a great deal like being a violinist in a symphony. It
requires daily practice and also sharing the practice with the people in your sphere of
influence (the symphony members, one's family, and one's church and civic organizations.
AS the practice becomes a habit, the people around you each day are positively
influenced.”
With respect to the definition of this intervention and how the practice has been proved to
be an effective means to help frontline workers stay focused on their duties, this
intervention does not increase all the five HROT principles simultaneously.
Adopting Just-In-Time Learning
From the results of simulating the model based on this intervention (see Table 14 for
definition), it is evident that the decreasing effects on four of the five HROT principles:
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PWF, RTS, CTR, and STO (see Figure 36) conclude the undesirability of applying this
intervention in real-world operations. These four principles’ decreasing degrees resulted in
an overall degree of OR below zero by 0.750 (see Table 18). Industry experts perceive justin-time learning as a distracting means instead of a training or communication method to
inform people in real-time about issues happening in the process. According to one of the
experts, this intervention can cause a problem with workers’ skills:
“The oil and gas industry is very training intensive and the offshore roles, in particular,
demanding. A system of just in time learning would create challenges in the delivery, but
timing and location, as well as issues with a competency to be deployed.”
An intervention is typically designed and implemented to positively influence an
organization’s total performance, particularly in terms of safety; however, when an
intervention is tested, and the results are mostly counterproductive, the intervention should
not be practiced, especially in this industry.
Grouped Interventions
Simulating the model based on groups of interventions (see Table 19), rather than
individual interventions, showed that each group has achieved improvements in most or all
of the five HROT principles but affected the principles differently, as shown in Figure 39.
In one instance (i.e., interventions targeted at reframing work communication - graph C),
the model simulation shows that this group of interventions led to a substantial increase in
four of the five principles (PWF, RTS, CTR, and STO); however, this group did not change
DTE. Moreover, in three instances, namely the group of interventions for reframing work
design (graph A), reframing how to relate colleagues peers (graph D), and reframing how
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the work is and should be done (graph E), simulations identified one or two HROT
principles that showed a much smaller increase than the other principles. This indicates
that focus on single groups of interventions (e.g., an initiative solely focused on
communication or relationships between employees) will leave some essential HROT
principles relatively or entirely unaffected. However, one exception is the group of
interventions designed to train employees (graph B) based on both actual work training and
training by simulation. These measures are found to have a strong positive influence on all
five HROT.
Apart from training, none of the groups of interventions is capable of producing strong
improvements across all HROT principles, which limits the possibility of achieving
organizational reliability, particularly if OR turns out to be determined by the weakest
contributing principle. Accordingly, focused company initiatives for improving HROT
principles should be mindful of where they will fall short and consider adding interventions
specifically designed to support the HROT principle that the initiative fails to sufficiently
improve.
From a modeling and practical perspective, this raises the question if it might be possible
to design a program for organizational reliability that selects the best intervention from
each group of interventions and what magnitude of improvement it would generate.
Simulation results (presented in graph F) show that this strategy would result in a very
pronounced improvement of all HROT principles – the best intervention from each group
thus appear to be synergistic enough to deliver results that outperform those of any single
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group of interventions. A focus on these interventions may allow companies to cover all
areas with relatively limited effort.
Results of Model Simulation Using Explorative FCM (EMA Technique)
This section covers the analysis and interpretations of the EMA simulation results based
on individual and grouped interventions presented in Figure 44, Figure 45, Figure 46, and
Figure 47. As provided in Table 21, the EMA simulation was done for only six
interventions. All the simulation processes using EMA have been conducted by fully
activating (i.e., 100% turning on) each intervention or group of interventions so that the
obtained results, in most cases, present the maximum possible degrees of change in the five
HROT principles as well as the overall organizational reliability OR. However, as
mentioned earlier in traditional simulation, which is also observed in the EMA simulation,
the full activation level did not always improve performance. In some cases, it has yielded
counterproductive effects.
As discussed earlier in Section 6.3.2.2, each time the model is simulated based on EMA,
the simulation process was iterated 100000 times, and each time the process was iterated,
a random number is generated within the uncertainty range as an edge weight that results
in an impact on one or more of the five HROT principles. The effect is plotted as a thin
line on the radar chart to represent the behaviors of the principal(s) under the impact. When
the same or a close random number is generated as another edge weight (the subsequent
iteration), its influence is plotted over the first line or closely next to it. Therefore, a thick
line or a dark shaded area on the radar charts infers that a large portion of the generated
random numbers (i.e., edges’ weights) was auto-selected to be either the same or very close
208

to one another within the uncertainty range. These thick lines and shaded areas on the chart
are given considerable attention when the simulation results are analyzed and interpreted.
Practicing Stop-Work-Authority
Based on graph A in Figure 44, although the ranges of possibilities have been expanded to
include better degrees of change in each of STO, DTE, and RTS as well as a relatively
small increase in CTR, however, CTR still presented a negative degree of change, which
can be seen in the range between -0.75 and -0.25. These results validate the participants’
notion regarding the contradiction that this intervention can create by decreasing the extent
of the structure’s flexibility and workforce capabilities to make the required improvisation
when is needed since this intervention stops the operations rather than continuing them
while coping with issues when occur.
Reporting of Near Misses and Safety-Critical Events
Simulating the model based on this intervention has shown identical results to the median
(see graph B in Figure 44). The explanation for this situation is that the uncertainty ranges
of the edges’ weights between this intervention and the two HRO-relevant concepts are the
same [0.67, 1], as listed in Table 21. These ranges are relatively small and within the same
sign direction (i.e., positive). This infers that all the generated random numbers were within
and around the median value of the participant’s inputs. However, even with these minor
uncertainty ranges, maximizing the implementation of this intervention cannot ensure the
synergetic practice of HROs, since the degree of DTE will always be zero (i.e., no effects
on DTE). This means that other interventions must be implemented together with this
intervention to ensure that all five principles are influenced concurrently.
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Fostering Social Ties and Mutual Respect
Uncertainty existed concerning the weight of connections between this intervention and
six HRO-relevant concepts. Graph A in Figure 45 shows that this uncertainty has little
effect with respect to the outcomes of RTS, CTR, and STO. EMA simulation shows that
these concepts increase for all possible model structures and increase close to the broadest
possible increase for a large majority of model structures. Thus, the results largely mirror
those of simulating the model based on the median edge weight (indicated by the orange
line). However, for STO, a large number of models lead to a lower increase than the
conventional FCM model. Nevertheless, given the uncertainty, the intervention is a robust
means to improve these three principles.
With regard to PWF and DTE, most models show an increase over the increase achieved
in the conventional FCM model (orange line), meaning that the uncertainty of edge weights
leaves room for the possibility that the intervention might actually be more effective than
what the conventional model assumes. However, there is one important caveat: In some
models, PWF decreases as a result of the intervention. From a practical point of view, this
means that managers cannot be entirely sure that “fostering social ties” does not backfire
and have unintended negative consequences. This speaks to the need to understand better
the dynamics that could cause such an effect and resolve uncertainty, carefully monitor
PWF, and design interventions focused on social ties while also emphasizing PWF.
Fostering a Sense of Personal Accountability for Safety on All Levels
There exists considerable uncertainty with regard to the weight of the relationship between
the intervention of “Fostering a Sense of Personal Accountability” and the causally
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connected concept “Self Interest,” With a range of [-0.33, 1], the participant could not even
agree on the sign. However, the results of simulating the model using EMA are similar to
those from the simulation process using traditional FCM with an edge weight based on the
median (see graph B in Figure 45). Indeed, the degree of change for PWF, RTS, and STO
is indistinguishable from a simulation-based on median edge weights, which is expected
since only DTE and CTR have shown sensitivity to the variation in the weight of this
critical relationship. For DTE and CTR, the outcomes in response to different edge weights
show that the intervention achieves improvements under all tested edge weights, and even
for the worst case, the improvement is still 0.65 of the best case. Accordingly, the
intervention is a robust strategy that is advisable even under existing uncertainty.
Institutionalizing Prosocial Motivation
This intervention encountered uncertainty around the relationships with two HRO-relevant
concepts: Self-awareness and self-interest (see Table 21). The range of uncertainty around
the relationship with self-interest is relatively broad [-0.33, 0.67], which explains that the
participants disagreed even on the sign of the relationship and because this concept has
indirect relationships with many concepts in the other principles networks, thus, simulating
the model based on this intervention has resulted in a wide range of possibilities in the
degrees of change in all the five principles. The ranges of degree possibilities vary from
negative to a little beyond the positive median line. Based on what graph A in Figure 46
shows, there can be four possible interpretations for the simulation results:
1. The achieved degrees are the same as or little over the median of the edges’ weights,
which means between a little over 0.40 and 0.90.
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2. The achieved degrees are represented in the darker line between 0.00 and 0.25,
although they are low to slightly increasing degrees within a positive range.
3. The achieved degrees are within the shaded area between the median and second
thicker lines, which also provides positive yet low degrees.
4. Degrees within the decreasing (negative) area.
This concludes that although disagreement (contradiction spirit) of decision-makers in
HROs are practically encouraged and welcomed, it is in some cases can lead to a wide
range of uncertainty when it spans over a broad range of disagreements such as the one
mentioned above. When there is another range of uncertainty (i.e., another critical edge
weight), the outcomes can be a long list of possibilities.
Practicing Individual Mindfulness
Three critical causal relationships between this intervention and HRO-relevant concepts
encountered disagreement in participants’ opinions (see Table 21). Despite that the
uncertainty range around one of the relationships is very large [-0.67, 1], simulating the
model based on this intervention resulted in outcomes that consist of degree possibilities
mostly around PWF, by a broad range [-0.50, 0.90] and RTS, by slight [0.35, 0.75].
However, most, if not all, the iterations considered numbers within the median range of the
edges’ weight are clearly presented in graph B Figure 46. By viewing the possibilities that
match the median line as the maximum attainable degrees, this intervention remains has no
effects on DTE since there are no direct and or indirect relationships with any concepts
within the DTE network. Furthermore, even when the implementation of this intervention
is maximized, which already has been, the degree of CTR cannot be increased beyond 0.50
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because there is no direct relationship between the intervention and any HRO-relevant
concepts within the CTR network.
Grouped Interventions
As mentioned earlier, the process of simulating the model as EMA based on groups of
interventions included the use of only two of the five groups listed in Table 19: Reframing
how to relate colleagues peers and the group of reframing how the work is and should be
done. These two groups consist of interventions that encountered uncertainties, or in other
words, participants’ disagreements. The following discussion analyzes and interprets the
results of the simulation processes of these two groups.
Concerning the first group (reframing how to relate colleagues peers) as in Graph A in
Figure 47, EMA simulation based on this group resulted in ranges of possibilities:
1. It mirrored the degrees of change based on the median of the data for each of RTS,
CTR, and STO.
2. It achieved higher (preferable) degrees beyond the data median for both PWF and DTE.
3. The graph shows that when the degree of PWF is within the maximum range of
possibilities (i.e., between 0.75 - nearly 0.85), the degree of STO can be below the
median line (i.e., between 0.50 - nearly 0.75), which at the same time increased the
degree of DTE.
This also concludes that simulating the model based on groups of interventions using EMA
enables practitioners to understand how their decision-making, including their
disagreements, can yield tradeoffs. In the best decision scenarios, practicing HROs can
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never deliver equal outcomes for all the principles. However, this group of interventions
has positively influenced all the five principles at the same time.
Furthermore, simulating the model based on the group of reframing how the work is and
should be done yielded degrees for all the principles that paralleled the degrees resulted
from simulating the model based on the data median (see graph B in Figure 47). The graph
shows that the simulation yielded an increasing range of degrees for DTE beyond the
median line. There is one possible interpretation of why the simulation did not result in
ranges of the degrees for PWF, RTS, CTR, and STO, like DTE, is that each of PWF, STO,
and CTR already reached maximum degrees based on the median. No range was left
beyond the median, and because RTS has no direct effects on the grouped interventions,
the simulation did not generate a range of degrees beyond the median. However, it is
sensitive to the variations in the relationship between these interventions and the HRO
concepts (see Table 19). Because the second intervention directly affects DTE with the
most extreme range of uncertainty [-0.33, 1], the simulation resulted in a range of degrees
for DTE.
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7. Summary and Discussion of Results
In this chapter, I step back from the detailed results described above to draw conclusions.
In the following Section 7.1, I will compare and contrast the results of my different analyses
to distill the gained insights with regard to two topics – what I learned about HROT
principles as a system and what I learned about practical needs and means to improve
safety-related practices in the offshore oil and gas industry. In Section 7.2, I will review
the research questions underlying this work in light of these findings.
7.1

Summary of Results
HROT Principles as a System

High Reliability Organizations Theory (HROT) has been developed by studying real-world
systems of interdependent and causally related cultural elements (concepts). My work, for
the first time, makes this system perspective explicit by modeling the principles tenants of
this theory with FCM. The resulting model suggests, not surprisingly, that all the five
HROT principles are contributing to developing organizational reliability (OR) and that
they are interrelated because they affect, and are affected by, many of the same concepts.
Works on HROT usually consider the principles to be synergistic (“a package”) and
recommend improving all of them to the furthest possible extent. However, this research
shows through FCM modeling and simulation that few managerial interventions can
simultaneously improve all five principles (i.e., achieving the package) and that
improvements in some principals can impair others’ implementation. A case in point is
simulating the model for “Stop-Work Authority” (see graph A-Figure 44) and “Fostering
Social Ties and Mutual Respects” (see graph A-Figure 45), which resulted in worsening
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of some principles. Moreover, there have been several cases where model simulations show
that increasing the activation of a concept (e.g., from 50% to 100%) does not yield any
further improvements in desired outcomes but may actually worsen them, as shown in
Figure 38.
The common recommendation to work towards improving all HROT principles is thus,
most undoubtedly wrong. At best, it is inefficient because it causes organizations to invest
in interventions even after there are no marginal returns anymore. In many cases, it may
even be detrimental to the desired results. Instead, organizations need to carefully select a
suite of interventions that are designed to work together. My investigation of grouped
interventions shows that selecting a few effective interventions (one from each major type,
such as work design, communication, human relations – see graph F in Figure 39) yields
very high improvements, whereas focusing on interventions in just one area frequently
leads to limited or no improvements of some principles (see few cases in Figure 36 and
Figure 37). In other words, not surprisingly, there is no silver bullet either in the form of a
single intervention or a focus area for interventions that improve the system regarding all
the five principles. The only exception is management actions for training the workforce
(see Figure 36, and graph B in Figure 39), which have led to achieving the package.
Training not only leveraged the workforce competencies to cope with the unexpected but
also strengthened their culture to practice what prevents the unexpected from occurring.
The package also has been achieved when management intervened to develop a culture
that both motivates the workforce and emphasizes accountability for safety at the same
time (i.e., the case of “Emotional Ambivalence” see Figure 37).
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Perhaps even more important, FCM modeling and simulation demonstrated what – maybe
counterintuitively – does not work as a means for improving HROs practices. Figure 36
shows the simulation results based on two interventions where communication is the main
practice: “Safety Huddles” and “Reporting near-misses and safety-critical events.” They
resulted in very similar performances; however, no effects on DTE. Even when grouping
these two interventions into one group, the results were similar (graph C in Figure 39).
Though good communication is regularly mentioned by practitioners (see comment in
Section 6.4.1.2) as a means for improving safety (and sometimes treated as a silver bullet),
communication-focused interventions do not result in improvements across all the five
principles.
Similarly, there currently is some enthusiasm for (but also criticism of) just-in-time
learning, live communication and reporting, and other in-time updates because it seems
easier to motivate employees to learn and retain information when there is an actual need
for information. The results of the simulation process show such methods to be
counterproductive. This is in line with some of the expert’ opinions provided in the survey,
namely that just-in-time learning through computer screens or other gadgets can be
distracting rather than informative and that employees, particularly operators, must focus
on their task, stay sensitive to the operations, and always be cautious and alert.
Model for Decision Support and Training
The discussion above shows that decision-makers in companies need to carefully select a
combination of interventions and evaluate their indirect and potentially unintended
consequences, which requires some form of decision support. The innovative approach
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designed and implemented in this research delivers just that, namely a carefully designed
and tested decision support system (DSS) that aids organizational decision-making
regarding safety-related practices. Management in any industry, including the offshore oil
and gas, can use this simulation model (i.e., FCM based HROT) to (1) Understanding the
effects of the management actions on safety-related practices and (2) testing the feasibility
and effectiveness of designing interventions, strategies, and policies before practically
implement it. As decision support, this model enables the decision-makers to simulate
scenarios through which they understand and predict how their assumptions and current
and planned structural designs, strategies, and behaviors impact HRO principles. Scenarios
can be any internal change (i.e., within the core model) or external change (i.e., new
strategies or interventions that affect the core model’s concepts).
The FCM model is likely also suitable as a training platform, similar to “microworlds” or
“management flight simulators” developed in business (Papageorgiou et al., 2008), where
decision-makers get to experience the impact of their actions through simulation. This is
particularly promising when coupling the model with learning approaches for safety
cultural training. Simulation-based training, such as tabletop exercises, are actually quite
common in the industry (see comment by the practitioner in Section 6.4.1.6). I modeled
three training interventions (emergency drills, tabletop exercises, and post-event
debriefings). They have strong positive effects on all the five HROT principles, ranging
from 0.79 to a maximum of 0.99. This shows that: (1) Training is highly influential and
continuously essential for safer operations, and (2) practitioners from the offshore oil and
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gas share a similar mindset regarding training, making an FCM-based training platform,
based on the model developed in this dissertation worth pursuing.
Diversity of Perspectives
Safety culture research investigates the complex, challenging to observe systems with
limited data and long timeframes. It inevitably must rely on the expertise and opinion of
the people involved in the system, such as operators and safety engineers. This work makes
an essential contribution to this practice: it has shown that EMA is a practical means to
overcome uncertainties resulting from disagreements and variations in the experts’
opinions. The experts’ opinions collected through the online survey comprised wide ranges
of disagreements or uncertainties regarding specific relationships between the applied
interventions and HRO-relevant concepts. These disagreements are normal outcomes for
diversity in personal opinions, experiences, duties, and educational backgrounds.
Disagreements are, in fact, aligned with the organizational variety and contradiction spirit
that the HROs built as a groundwork for redundant and extensive deliberation when issues
occurred. To overcome high levels of conformity that leads to the undesired simplification
and normalization, HROs encourage contradiction with the goal to enhance the
performance of the five principles, particularly RTS. Rather than forcing people to agree
on a single perspective and model, EMA preserves these disagreements and plots a range
of possibilities. Instead of only one structure (e.g., one crisp weight of the causal
relationship), EMA models thousands of alternative structures, which are visualized. This
has several benefits. First, for EMA to be practical, I had to identify those edges that
mattered for the model outcomes overall versus those that did not impact the system’s
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dynamic. This helps decision-makers to focus their attention only on disagreements and
uncertainties that matter. Second, in many cases, EMA shows a range of models that predict
better performance with regard to HROT principles than the “crisp,” traditional FCM
model, such as in graph A in Figure 44, graph A in Figure 45, and graph A in Figure 46.
This can encourage action in a situation in which many teams do not act, namely when they
disagree and when things are uncertain. (Of course, the opposite, namely a large number
of EMA models that show worse results than the traditional FCM model, are also possible,
though this case did not occur in my study). And third, EMA helps decision-makers
understand that even a relatively small difference in an edge weight, if occurring at critical
edges, could result in a large change on the system level. This not only sensitizes them to
appreciate the dynamics of the system but also helps them determine which uncertainties
or disagreements are worth resolving through further discussion or research and where they
need to pay attention during the implementation of decisions.
Industry Insights
The participants from the offshore oil and gas who took part in this research through the
workshop and the survey have explained the logical reasoning behind their assignment of
causal connections and causal weights (see Section 5.3.3). They also made comments that
help interpret the simulation results (see Section 6.4.1). These comments reflected on the
existing situation regarding safety performance and culture in this industry and, together
with the simulations, provide industry insights:
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1. Stop Work Authority: According to the study’s participants, when organizations
authorize people to stop-work 24 whenever and wherever it is needed, people in upper
levels may overestimate their granted authorization. Accordingly, they may excessively
dominate the workforce in the lower levels, and as a result, they could negatively affect
the level of their participation and commitment to resilience. This evidently has been
observed in the results of simulating the model based on this intervention with respect
to the experts’ opinions as it has negatively affected the performances of CTR, DTE,
and STO, which seamlessly explains this cultural shift.
2. Reporting Events: Fearing punishment for reporting near-misses and safety-critical
events prevent safety culture from emerging. The people involved in the operations lack
information that is critical for them to become aware of what is happening and how to
resolve issues. On the flip side, encouraging the reporting of near-misses and safetycritical events can lead to a significant improvement in the performance of each of PWF,
RTS, CTR, and STO, as shown in the simulation results in Figure 36. However, it is not
a silver bullet for achieving safety culture because it did not improve all five principles
simultaneously (i.e., achieving the package).
3. Fostering Social Ties: It has positive impacts on the performance of HROT principles.
However, excessive social ties among colleagues can result in a cultural tendency of
24

Based on a conversation with an expert from the offshore oil and gas industry regarding the use of this
intervention, stop work authority has become a double-edged sword. While the use of this intervention has
been emphasized since 2013 when BSEE has reinforced not only authorizing any offshore personnel who
witness an imminent risk or dangerous activity to stop the work but also to make them responsible for using
it. However, this intervention has not been used as anticipated. For example, some people in frontlines still
reluctant to use it due to fearing punishment, while others have used it on occasions that it did not require to
stop the operations. The use of this intervention in the offshore industry requires more guidance and training.
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complacency and dependence on one another, particularly when searching for errors and
detecting and correcting anomalies on time. Model simulations show this: stronger
social ties among employees result in a reduced preoccupation with failure (PWF). A
remedy for this negative cultural tendency is to concurrently foster a sense of personal
accountability, so that leadership and employees self-assess and self-correct their
participation in maintaining safer operations. Accordingly, personal accountability
resulted in high-performance levels in most of the five HROT principles, particularly
PWF.
4. Pro-Social motivation and Emotional Ambivalence: Based on the responses of the
industry’s participants who took part in this study, some organizations in the offshore
oil and gas industry are notably practicing these two interventions. While the expected
outcomes from these two interventions are different because each one is designed to
achieve specific purposes, they complement each other. As prosocial motivation builds
confidence and trust around the corporate vision and the self, which increases the
employee's level of commitment and participation, emotional ambivalence maintains
caution and alertness that things can go wrong. The model simulation results based on
each intervention individually agree with the industry practitioners’ feedback because
these practices lead to the comprehensive and relatively high-performance practice of
HROs.
7.2

Review of Research Questions and Results

This section summarizes my findings related to the research questions that I posed in
Section 2.8.4.
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Addressing the lack of System Perspectives
In Section 2.8.1, I identified the need to approach and represent HROT five principles from
a system perspective. I stated two objectives, namely (1) to develop a novel, mixedmethods approach to modeling the principles of HROT as a Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM),
based on published, peer-reviewed research, and (2) To develop a comprehensive FCM
system model of HROT, using the novel approach. Achieving these objectives required
answering a series of methodological questions relating to analyzing the literature and the
FCM modeling process, which I will discuss one-by-one.
Research Question 1: How can research publications on HROT be analyzed to
identify

and

represent

relevant

concepts

and

causal

relationships?
I answered RQ 1 by first conducting a systematic literature review to identify relevant
sources and then analyze them by combining thematic analysis and thematic network
techniques – two separate but related qualitative inquiry methods. I chose these methods
(and used Atlas. ti, a software for qualitative research) since my objective was to analyze
the published literature on HROT for relevant concepts and causal relationships and build
a network of these causally related concepts transparently and rigorously. My work
demonstrates (for the first time, to my knowledge), that thematic analysis and thematic
network technique are well suited as methodological foundations for FCM modeling.
Research Question 2:

How can the weight of causal relationships be inferred from
qualitative data in research publications?
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This question deals with a reoccurring problem in all FCM studies, namely the proper
assignment of causal weights, which often occurs based on expert judgment. Because my
work builds on published literature, this was not an option. Accordingly, I had to develop
a novel way of inferring causal weights from qualitative data and using a measure called
“t-coefficient,” based on a recently published paper by Armborst (2017). This approach
leverages my qualitative analysis and uses a statistical measure for thematic proximity,
which provides information about the strength of causal connections between themes
because I coded the research texts with a focus on causality. Because my method is novel
regarding the approach and with regard to its application to FCM models, I had to ensure
its validity. I achieved this by comparing results to other quantitative measures used to infer
weights of causal relationships from qualitative data, as well as by carefully testing the
resulting FCM model.
Research Question 3:

How can information about concepts, causal relationships,
and relationship weights be used to develop a general FCM
model of HROT?

RQ3 was focused on applying the results for RQ 1 and 2 to create a generally applicable
model of HROT and, in the process, develop a structured, mixed-method approach for
creating and testing FCM models based on published literature. The result was an FCM
model that represented the five HROT principles and the concepts that contribute to them,
as well as the interdependencies between contributing concepts, principles, and the overall
objective of organizational reliability. The developed FCM-HROT is a standardized model
that does not represent a specific industry since it characterizes the phenomenon of
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organizational reliability (OR) in any system. Therefore, this model is like a core engine
for any industry that aspires to contextualize and use it to improve its organizational
reliability.
Testing and running simulations based on the model reveal several things about the model
and – by extension – HROT theory, which is discussed in more depth in Section 5.1 and
Section 6.1. Importantly, the model is policy sensitive, meaning that it can identify
concepts (or combination of concepts) that impact the five HROT principles differently
and lead to different levels of organizational reliability. Moreover, the model clearly shows
the systemic nature of organizational reliability because concepts frequently impact
multiple HROT principles through direct and indirect effects, and these impacts can lead
to unintended consequences. In particular, as I had hypothesized when beginning this
research, it is difficult to simultaneously improve all HROT principles because
improvements in one of the principles can reduce other principles. Accordingly, a system
model for understanding HRO dynamics is essential from a theoretical perspective, as well
as a practical planning tool.
Research Question 4: How can uncertainty about the appropriate model structure be
managed in the modeling process?
One of the challenges of modeling organizational reliability is the lack of directly
measurable concepts and reliable data on real-world systems: companies simply do not
track all the elements that are understood to contribute to organizational reliability. This is
the main reason why HROT research strongly relies on qualitative research. Accordingly,
there is uncertainty about the appropriate model structure that best reflects and replicates
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the real-world system’s behavior, resulting in RQ 4 above. In my research, I have addressed
this in two ways:
First, I subjected the model to a series of verification tests that I borrowed from the
literature on system dynamics and adapted to my case. I examined the model structure and
behavior to identify discrepancies between what the model shows and what behavior one
would expect according to the literature. Although two cases (see Section 5.1.2) have
shown abnormal behaviors that required thorough examination and calibration of the model
structure, the model has passed all the tests during both the pilot and expanded studies.
Second, I identified causal relationships that were uncertain because study participants
assigned different weights and coped with this type of uncertainty by implementing the
procedures of the EMA technique, which results in an ensemble of scenarios, each
reflecting different model configurations and input vectors. I used these insights to identify
managerial interventions that were robust in the sense that they delivered desirable and
largely similar results, regardless of how the model structure varied in the EMA process.
Managers can choose these robust strategies and be confident that they will deliver the
desired results. I also identified situations in which uncertainty about the model structure
did not permit a confident selection of the best intervention. This information alerts
decision-makers to cases where they might want to invest more time and effort into data
collection, closely monitor the outcomes of chose interventions to understand how they
impact objectives and accompany interventions with additional actions to prevent possible
undesired results. Thus, my work developed practical pathways for managing uncertainty
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about model structure in many FCM modeling projects that are applicable beyond this
research scope.
Addressing the Lack of Contextualization for Offshore Oil and Gas
In Section 2.8.2, I identified the need to contextualize HROT principles for the specific
conditions in offshore oil and gas and stated the objective to do so with the help of experts:
Research Question 5:

How can the FCM model of HROT practices be contextualized
to the specific settings of the offshore oil and gas operations?

This step is necessary so that the model reflects real-world behaviors and predicts the
outcomes of interventions. Contextualizing the model requires expanding the core model
of general HROT dynamics by adding an outer model layer that describes managerial
interventions and how they relate to the core model’s exogenous driver variables. I
identified the interventions by reviewing the academic and practitioner literature and
established their linkages to the core model with industry practitioners’ help. The latter
occurred in two phases: (1) a Pilot study, by which I collected the required data to
contextualize the model from industry experts during an in-person workshop, and (2) an
expanded study, where I collected a more comprehensive range of data via an online
survey. In both studies, I provided a list of interventions and the corresponding lists of
HRO-relevant concepts (i.e., exogenous variables in the core model). I asked them to
provide their opinions on whether a specific intervention increases, decreases, or does not
affect the concepts (to determine relationship directions and signs) and to what extent (to
determine relationship weights). The result is a new model that reflects HROT principles
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and interventions, based on experts’ knowledge of their industry. Simulating interventions
in the model shows how they change the five HROT principles and contribute to safety
culture.
Addressing the Lack of Practical Planning Approaches
In Section 2.8.3, I have identified the need for a comprehensive approach that is supporting
HROs planning since the industry decision-makers lack support in selecting interventions
that: (1) can be expected to improve organizational reliability, (2) are synergistic with other
planned interventions to improve reliability, and (3) are robust under changing conditions.
Thus, I stated my objective to evaluate the FCM model as a tool for planning HROs
practices and achieve it. It requires answering the following research question, which I
discuss before.
Research Question 6: How can the contextualized FCM model of HROT practices be
used to support safety decision-makers in the offshore oil and
gas industry?
I answered RQ 6 by introducing and implementing a structured process that constitutes
planning interventions to leverage organizational reliability by enforcing positive cultural
changes in the workforce’s behaviors and attitudes. This process is completing the process
of contextualizing the core model. In addition to the selection of individual or groups of
interventions based on the outcomes that they are anticipated to make, this process also
consists of simulating the model based on the selected interventions using traditional and
EMA simulation techniques and then analyzing and interpreting the resulted performance
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of the five HROT principles. Through several simulations, the process has shown that the
resulting performances have significantly reflected the relevance and the desirability of the
applied intervention or group of interventions to the offshore oil and gas operations with
respect to the opinions of the industry’s safety decision-makers.
This process has shown that the contextualized model of HROT can support the safety
decision-makers by focusing their efforts in planning and implementing various safety
programs, interventions, strategies, and policies and selecting the plans that yield desired
cultural changes and that are feasible and synergetic with the other plans that the
organizations have already implemented. This is particularly essential since selecting the
right plan often requires actual experiments (sometimes by trial and error) as well as the
allocation of various resources, outstanding efforts, and long times. Moreover, the use of
the EMA technique with FCM has, in fact, leveraged the implications of this tool in
attaining ranges of outcomes instead of only one for each case, which expands the basis of
the decision-making process and enables safety decision-makers to comprehensively
deliberate and decide which plans they should consider and which ones they should not.
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8. Research Limitations and Contributions
This chapter discusses the limitations of this research and the theoretical, methodological,
and practical contributions it has made. Section 8.1 addresses all the limitations that this
research has encountered and coped with, while Section 8.2 states in detail all the
contributions.
8.1

Research Limitations

This research has several limitations, including context data limitations (to contextualize
the model) and the limitations inherent in the literature and the utilized method. These
limitations are discussed in the following sections.
Context Data Limitations
Attaining data from the research context (i.e., the offshore oil and gas industry) to
contextualize the model was difficult. Industry practitioners told me that some people
working in this industry avoid participating in such studies because they fear repercussions
for their jobs or companies, even if they are not identifiable in research reports (as was the
case for the workshop) or if their identity is unknown to the researchers (as was the case in
the survey). This is particularly true for operators on the offshore rigs, who are also difficult
to reach. Accordingly, the people in my study are more involved in safety consultation and
management on corporate levels as well as safety and health regulations, auditing, and
compliance (e.g., safety manager, safety influencers, HSE, compliance managers, risk
managers, operations remote controllers, etc.). While they are undoubtedly knowledgeable
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about safety interventions and effects, their perspectives are limited by their roles and the
companies they work for.
Future studies may want to include more employees in different roles, including those on
the front-lines and a more diverse set of companies, including smaller operations.
Literature Limitations
Despite the rich and broad literature on high reliability organizations theory HROT in
describing how organizations can theoretically achieve highly reliable performance, not
every aspect has been explicitly discussed, particularly based on a cause and effect
reasoning. Therefore, interpreting the theoretical arguments concerning HRO-relevant
concepts and how they cause one another might encounter certain subjectivity levels,
especially that drawing an underlying path for these augments based on the causes and
effects is critical in developing a causal-descriptive model. That is why I used a particular
coding strategy and procedure and followed certain types of qualitative coding (causation
coding) that put the entire process on the path of causality. This design has effectively
reduced the level of subjectivity and retained research quality.
Moreover, the literature does not provide explicit information about which concepts
contribute more versus less to organizational reliability. Still, some concepts are more
extensively discussed and more deeply investigated in the literature than others. This is
reflected in the coding process in two ways: (1) concept grounding, which means the
number of times the concepts are mentioned in the selected documents, and (2) concept
centrality in the FCM-HROT model that results from the coding process.
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Another literature limitation is that some factors, such as those I considered excluded from
the core model boundaries (e.g., labor market - see Table 16), can potentially have
significant effects on the performance of the five principles through one or more of the
corresponding HRO-relevant concepts. However, the literature on HROT discusses these
excluded factors only marginally. It focuses on the factors that I already extracted and
included in the developed core model as exogenous and endogenous elements. This poses
a question that worth future investigation to examine the relevance of some excluded
factors to whether or not they should be considered exogenous or endogenous elements of
the core model.
Methodological Limitations
This research uses the fuzzy cognitive map (FCM) as the main methodology, which has
several inherent limitations that apply to this research. I have created the FCM model across
two phases: Developing a cognitive map and assigning weights to each causal link in the
map. In this research, the cognitive map has been developed by following a logical design
and semi-automated techniques. Combining the used methods is, to my knowledge, new to
FCM methodology and has yielded a relatively large cognitive map (51 concepts and 138
causal links), which makes assigning weights to this large number of connections using
expert opinions is very difficult. Thematic proximity was used to overcome this issue,
which is also new to FCM. Although it was tested and found to be a reliable combination,
the use of these techniques is new and yet to be standardized.
Furthermore, FCM does not consider time lags in the computational process, which may
not reflect the actual reality but otherwise predict it. For example, in real-world operations,
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implementing an intervention such as practicing emergencies can increase both awareness
and experience of the workforce; however, while knowledge can be increased at the same
time when the practice is held, experience takes years to be developed. Nevertheless,
modeling these activities using FCM can yield increases in both awareness and experience.
The literature has suggested using the so-called “dummy concepts” to break up the longterm causal link into several causal relationships (Jetter, 2006). But this approach can add
more complications to the developed FCM because it increases the number of concepts and
causal relationships, mainly when time lags present in the model.
Another limitation is that the simulation results of the FCM-HROT model can provide
degrees of change in the performance of the five HROT principles rather than absolute
values, which makes the interpretation of the results somewhat subjective.
8.2

Research Contributions

Based on the outcomes from this research, the following sections discuss the theoretical,
methodological, and practical contributions.
Theoretical Contribution
This research has made the following theoretical contributions, perhaps for the first time
in the literature on high reliability organizations theory (HROT).
1. Moved the Academic Research on High Reliability Theory (HROT) from its current
state of a more qualitative and theoretical context to a more quantitative and practical
space that can assess the potential capabilities regarding HRO-relevant practices in
complex and high hazard systems. Despite more than thirty years of extensive academic
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research on HROT, the theory for various reasons has remained in the conceptual
construct with few attempts to move it into practice. This dissertation has attempted to
move the research on HROT to the real-world space by empirically testing
organizational reliability based on expert-provided data and practically achieved its
theoretical construct of the five principles (i.e., the package) in few cases, through which
all the five principles have been influenced concurrently, such as the outcomes of
simulating the model based on training interventions.
2. Developed a Comprehensive System Model Based HROT that, perhaps for the first
time, empirically verifies why implementing the HROT five principles could lead to
accomplishing reliable performance and also explains why HROT can achieve what
alternative approaches could not achieve for complex systems. This model serves as a
platform for testing theoretical assumptions regarding safety culture and safety-relevant
practices and as a reference for expanding the boundaries of high reliability theory by
testing new hypotheses.
3. Created a Reliable Assessment Technique by which organizations can assess their
readiness or the level of the ongoing progress to becoming HROs. This technique
enables organizations to quantitatively identify the extent to which they implement the
HROT five cognitive processes with respect to their policies and strategies regarding
safety-related practices. It can inform organizations whether a specific theoretical
approach is attainable due to their practical and organizational settings.
Methodological Contribution
The following are the methodological contributions that this research has made.
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1. Developed a Novel Approach to Modeling Complex Systems by integrating various
methods and techniques, including fuzzy cognitive maps FCMs, thematic analysis, and
thematic network for the first time as an innovative, structured, tested, and fully
documented process that represents a groundbreaking approach for modeling complex
phenomenon based on purely published literature. This approach, in fact, has expanded
the practice of FCM methodology to build models from peer-reviewed published
research through the use of thematic analysis and thematic network for the first time by
identifying latent patterns and causally related themes, and as a means to elicit the
required qualitative knowledge for building cognitive maps.
2. First Time Self-Quantifying the edges of a Cognitive Map through the use of thematic
proximity technique to convert the content of the published qualitative and textual data
of the causally related arguments by the theorists and the academic experts into
numerical values that represent the strength of these relationships. For the first time, this
method alternates the use of subject experts in building and quantifying the edges of
FCM models.
3. Combined EMA with FCM to Overcome Uncertainties and Interpret Disagreements
that often result from the variations and differences in the experts’ opinions regarding
the signs and the weights of causal relationships in the FCM models. Combining these
methods allows simulating a vast number of the FCM model structures instead of only
one, as in the traditional simulation of consolidative FCM models. Therefore, the
simulation process yields a range of outcomes that represent various degrees of change
in the performance of the concepts of interest. This enables a broader span for
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interpreting the outcomes of each case. Accordingly, disagreements can result in a wide
range of tradeoffs, which provides safety decision-makers with more possibilities to
make the best decisions and chose the plans that align better with the organizational and
operational conditions of their organizations.
Practical Contribution
As this research has empirically tested and evaluated the developed FCM-HROT model
with respect to the experts-provided data, the following summarizes its practical
contributions.
1. Created a Practical Tool for informing safety decision-makers and guiding their
decisions around safety-relevant approaches and practices. This tool will help their
understanding of how to best achieve higher levels of safety. Practitioners can use this
tool to test the feasibility and effectiveness of designing and implementing managerial
interventions, safety programs, and initiatives with respect to their organizational
strategies before allocating resources to implement these programs. They can also test
their strategies and safety policies and scenarios by simulating the model to anticipate
the system’s current and future state based on these specific strategies.
2. Established a Platform for Training where the model (as a flight simulator) will help
practitioners, particularly operators and frontline workers, experiment with simulated
emergencies. These simulations test and enhance their commitment to resilience
through learning how to anticipate, cope with, and learn from failures, as well as
learning how to prevent and/or mitigate the consequences of large-scale accidents.
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Appendix A: Empirical Studies on HROs
Table 22: Empirical Research Studies on Organizational Reliability and Mindfulness
Authors, Year

Research Context

Research Method

Research Outcomes

(Hales, et al., 2012)

Health Care

Action Research

This study shows that the five mindful principles can be counterproductive at
the beginning of implementation, but they become part of daily activities to
improve reliability. The research shows an improvement in the number of
adverse incidents between a nurse and the patient’s family.

(Carlo, et al., 2012)

Architecture

Case Study

The analysis reveals that collective mindfulness emerges from struggling with
inconsistencies in the five mindful elements. Implications for further study of
collective mindfulness and the assumption of IT capabilities were discussed as
well.

Construction

(Bigley & Roberts, 2001)

Fire Department

Case Study

The study reveals that there is a possibility of new, highly bureaucratic, and
temporary organizational forms that can reach reliability under a broad range
of working conditions with high uncertainty and instability.

(Madsen, et al., 2006)

Health Care

Case Study

The study shows that the design of Pediatric Intensive Care Units was a
continuing effort, and its most stable component was a vision of distributed
knowledge and decentralized intensive care.

(Rerup, 2009)

Pharmaceutical

Case Study

The link between the three studied dimensions (stability, vividness, and
coherence) suggest that attention is not just a structural phenomenon that can
be enacted and controlled by top management, but rather, it is a discrete and
evolving process that can help to understand the dynamism of how
organizations detect weak cues and learn from rare events when examined
carefully.

Case Study

The study concluded that information technology decreases mindfulness and
obstruct organizational adoption by promoting cognitive inertia and making the
enactment of change more challenging.

Industry

(Valorinta, 2009)

Retail Organizations
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(Roth, et al., 2006)

Railroad Operations

Interview-Based
Study

The research found various informal tactics that workers have developed across
multiple railroad skills as proactive communications that leverage shared
situation awareness across the distributed organization, facilitate work, and
contribute to the overall efficiency, safety, and resilience to errors.

(Cooren, 2004)

Drug Rehabilitation

Observational
Study

The findings show that a form of collective intelligence can be found more
generally in patterns of conversational behaviors (representation, contribution,
and subordination). The managers are shown to be constructing, amending, and
adding a series of textual blocks that ultimately represent the group’s
heedfulness.

(Klein, et al., 2006)

Health Care

Observational
Study

The study found that “dynamic delegation” advances action teams’ high ability
to perform reliably while also building their newcomer team members’ skills.
Further, we suggest that extreme action teams and other “improvisational”
organizational units may achieve swift coordination and reliable performance
by melding hierarchical and bureaucratic role-based structures with flexibilityenhancing processes.

(Weick & Roberts, 1993)

Aircraft Carrier

Observational
Study

Reliable performance may require a well-developed collective mind in the form
of a complex, attentive system tied together by trust, which seems simple;
however, traditional understanding appears to favor a different configuration: a
simple, automatic system tied together by suspicion redundancy.

(Casler, 2014)

Aerospace

Case Study

Based on evaluating NASA concerning a ten dimensions framework, the study
concluded that NASA is consistent with high reliability regarding effectiveness.
Yet, efficiency and representativeness are counter to the developed modelbased HROs. NASA can be seen to show features of an HRO only concerning
the degree of risk involved in operations and the complexity of operational
processes.

(Busby & Iszatt‐White,
2014)

Construction

Case Study

The study identified four main types of understanding construction workers
have about reliability, namely, (1) confirmative; (2) performative; (3) adaptive;
and (4) informative understanding.
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(Goldenhar, et al., 2013)

Health Care

Interview-Based
Study

The study based on the five themes model proposes that huddle leads to
enhanced competencies and quality of information sharing, improved levels of
responsibility, empowerment, and a sense of community. Together, these
cultural attributes develop a culture of collaboration and trust that improves the
workforce quality of collective perception and improved capability for reducing
patient harm.

(Høyland, et al., 2018)

Health Care

Interview-Based
Study

HROT principles were found in both sectors, as they appear strongly tied to
informal safety mindsets and practices. Safety principles may be subsidiary to
other day-to-day operations and disruptions, which may adversely reduce the
rate of damaging events and accidents across these sectors.

and
Construction
(Cox, et al., 2006)

Nuclear/Oil and Gas

Case Study

The study shows that reducing accidents and near misses, as workers feared
losing their jobs and apportionment of blame from direct supervisors and
middle managers.

(Samuels, 2010)

Health Care

Case Study

The study found that although extensive efforts to improve care, outcomes
remain low, and barriers hard to defeat. Change management strategies that
embrace organizational and individual accountabilities are warranted.
The author
discusses
using
a high-reliability framework
as
a
change management strategy.

(Mitropoulos & Cupido,
2009)

Construction

Case Study

The study recommends that operators focused on error prevention as a crucial
aspect to enhance production and reduce the likelihood of accidents

(Vogus & Sutcliffe,
2007a)

Health Care

Multisite crosssectional SurveyBased Study

The developed Safety Organizing Scale (SOS), a 9-item unidimensional
measure of self-reported behaviors, empowered safety culture and was
observed to have high core reliability and reflect theoretically derived and
empirically observed content domains.

(Vogus & Sutcliffe,
2007b)

Health Care

Survey-Based
Study

The study revealed an indication that the benefits of safety organizing on
reported errors were improved when combined with high levels of trust in the
manager or the use of care pathways.

260

(Valentine, et al., 2010)

Education-Based
Healthcare

Survey-Based
Study

The results showed that mindfulness was related to decreased role conflict and
that perceived ethical values and a shared ethics code were related to reduced
role conflict and increased mindfulness. Therefore, companies might better
manage role conflict through the development of mindfulness and
organizational ethics.

(Busby, 2006)

Railway

Case Study

Based on the study, future work in this area (i.e., organizational mindfulness in
the railway industry) could profit from further analyses of organizations whose
reliability is marginal rather than ultimately good enough or scarce. What
hinders reliability-seeking organizations is likely to be most apparent in such
settings.

(Barrett, et al., 2006)

Fire Department

Survey-Based
Study

Although analysis neither aggregates the measure nor validate it, some
employee showed some supports regarding two factors: self-efficacy and
organizational risk responsiveness.

(Hoy, et al., 2006)

Middle Education

Survey-Based
Study

The study concluded that the five elements of mindfulness support
administrators pursue to improve teaching and learning. Innovative educators
who challenge others to seek latent failures in the system will achieve higher
levels of mindfulness.

(Vogus
2003)

IPO software

Survey-Based
Study

The study indicates that three examined HR practices (the use of skilled
temporary employees, positive employee relations, and an emphasis on
training) help a subset of reliability-seeking organizations (IPO software firms)
to achieve innovation. Future research should use both HR practices and the
collective mindfulness framework to study an even wider variety of settings to
assess better the relationships between structures and processes and the scope
and boundary conditions of mindfulness.

Higher Education

Survey-Based
Study

The study examined organizational mindfulness in U.S. business schools and
provided evidence of the five dimensions of organizational mindfulness
articulated by Weick and Sutcliffe (2001). It also considers the impact of role
on how decision-makers view organizational mindfulness and discuss the
implications of our findings for both researchers and managers.

&

Welbourne,

(Ray, et al., 2011)
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(Anderson, 2010)

Information
Technology

Survey-Based
Study

The results are consistent with the assertion that it is essential to examine the
effects of collective mindfulness at its dimensions grouped as processes rather
than as an omnibus measure.

(Ogliastri & Zúñiga,
2016)

Higher Education

Case Study

The leading creator of cases among the top graduate schools of management in
Latin America shows between two and five attributes of extremely mindful
organizations. In Spite Of not being mentioned among academics in Latin
America, Weick’s concepts of mindfulness and high reliability organizations
(HROs) are pertinent in an area bound by ambiguity.

(Hales & Chakravorty,
2016)

Health Care

soft research
methods

This research found that mindfulness used with Soft Systems Methods provides
a useful framework to create HROs. In doing so, this study also discovers a
sixth aspect of HROs.

(Black & McBride, 2013)

Wildland Fire

Case Study

This research raised fundamental questions regarding how HROs key principles
are related to each other structurally and whether the relationships are constant
across the entire system or among different hierarchical or functional subsystems. Future research is essential to the linkages between these structures,
their sub-components, and their performance.

(Muhren, et al., 2007)

Financial Services

Observational
Study

The findings show that the principles that make an HRO distinct from other
organizations are, to some extent existing in the IT Incident Management
process. The study concluded that substantial opportunities remain uncaptured
to leverage the HRO qualities to a higher level.

(Jahn & Black, 2017)

Wildland
Firefighters

Survey-Based
Study

Results suggest how people can overcome the restriction of the hierarchy
constraints through leaders’ communication to nurture an operation’s
awareness and how supervisors, members, and groups might boost interactional
cultures with respectful effect.

(Borges
2010)

Electrical System

Interview-Based
Study

As empirical evidence, there is an interrelationship between micro-processes of
sensemaking, considered as ambiguity, experience, interactions, and the microprocesses of trust, considered as complexity, familiarity, and social behavior.

&

Gonçalo,
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(Berardi, 2010)

Fire Department

Survey-Based
Study

The study revealed a high tendency in the fire department to become an HRO;
however, not all the principles showed promising results, which requires
considering weaknesses and tradeoffs to make the organization fits as a whole.

(Jahn, 2016)

Wildfire Fighting

Observational
Study

The findings contribute as an explanatory model for how members adopt safety
rules into action according to workgroup norms, complementary relationships,
and practices. This extends the understanding of adaptive action and learning
in hazardous work organizations.

(Hesamamiri, et al.,
2013)

Knowledge
Management

Survey-Based
Study

The reliability evaluation instrument for KM suggested in this study was
constructed with four dimensions only, except reluctant to simplify, which did
not validate reliable factors. The related measurement items were also
identified.

(Lekka & Sugden, 2011)

Oil Refinery

Case Study

The findings illustrate a successful application of reliability-enhancing
practices in several fields, including hazard identification, emergency
preparedness, and analysis of incidents and near misses. Management
commitment to safety emerged as an essential factor behind the successful
implementation. However, fostering a reporting culture and maintaining high
management visibility levels maybe some of the challenges encountered by
organizations.

(Paranhos, et al., 2017)

Onshore Oil and Gas

Case Study

The study reveals some characteristics of HRO theory and application among
industry leaders. The studied companies have implemented various HROs
practices focused on workforce protection and total quality management to
strengthen a company’s safety culture, improve process safety, and minimize
the risk of catastrophic failures.
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Appendix B: Selected Research Publications
Table 23: Selected Studies to Conduct the Qualitative Phase of The Research
Ref.

Title

Type of
Publication
Book Chapter

Author(s)
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1

Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness

2

Managing the Unexpected: Sustained Performance in a Complex World

3

High Reliability Organizations (HROs)

4

High Reliability Organizations: A Review of The Literature

5

The Successes and Challenges of Implementing High Reliability Principles: A Case Study of
A UK Oil Refinery

Journal Article

(Lekka & Sugden, 2011)

6

Doing No Harm: Enabling, Enacting, and Elaborating a Culture of Safety in Health Care

Journal Article

(Vogus, et al., 2010)

7

Measuring High Reliability Characteristics of the Organization

8

A New Perspective on How to Understand, Assess and Manage Risk and The Unforeseen

Journal Article

(Aven & Krohn, 2014)

9

Drift, Adaptation, Resilience and Reliability: Toward an Empirical Clarification

Journal Article

(Pettersen & Schulman, 2016)

10

Re-Examining High Reliability: Actively Organizing for Safety

Journal Article

(Sutcliffe, et al., 2017)

11

The Affective Foundations of High-Reliability Organizing

Journal Article

(Vogus, et al., 2014)

12

Trust in High-Reliability Organizations

Journal Article

(Schöbel, 2009)

13

High Reliability Organizations and Mindful Leadership

14
15

Book
Journal Article
Study Report

Study Report

(Weick, et al., 1999)
(Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015)
(Sutcliffe, 2011)
(Lekka, 2011)

(Berardi, 2010)

Conference
Proceedings

(Mellor, et al., 2015)

Organizational Culture in High Reliability Organizations: An Extension

Journal Article

(Klein, et al., 1995)

High Reliability Organizations: Unlikely, Demanding and At Risk

Journal Article

(La Porte, 1996)

16

Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of HROs

Journal Article

17

Learning from What Do You Do When You Build Safety? Practitioners’ Guide to Learning
from Successful Operations

Study Report

(Rosness, et al., 2016)

18

Learning in High Reliability Organizations (HROs): Trial Without Error

Conference
Proceedings

(Aase & Tjensvoll, 2003)

19

Learning Process Promoted by Sensemaking and Trust: A Study Related to Unexpected

Journal Article

(Borges & Gonçalo, 2010)

20

The Underappreciated Role of Habit in Highly Reliable Healthcare

Journal Article

(Vogus & Hilligoss, 2016)

21

Mindfulness in Organizations: A Cross-Level Review

Journal Article

(Sutcliffe, et al., 2016)

22

Teamwork as an Essential Component of High-Reliability Organizations

Journal Article

(Baker, et al., 2006)

23

The High Reliability Organization Perspective

Book Chapter

(Dekker & Woods, 2010)

24

Huddling for High Reliability and Situation Awareness

Journal Article

(Goldenhar, et al., 2013)

25

Theoretical and Operational Challenges of "High-Reliability Organizations": Air-Traffic
Control and Aircraft Carriers

Journal Article

(La Porte & Consolini, 1998)

26

Toward High Reliability Project Organizing in Safety-Critical Projects

Journal Article

(Saunders, 2015)

27

Becoming a High Reliability Organization: Operational Advice for Hospital Leaders

28

A Model of Communicative and Hierarchical Foundations of High Reliability Organizing in
Wildland Firefighting Teams

Journal Article

(Jahn & Black, 2017)

29

Fair and Just Culture, Team Behavior, and Leadership Engagement: The Tools to Achieve
High Reliability

Journal Article

(Frankel, et al., 2006)

30

Mitigating Hazards Through Continuing Design: The Birth and Evolution of a Pediatric
Intensive Care Unit

Journal Article

(Madsen, et al., 2006)

31

Collective Mind in Organizations: Heedful Interrelating on Flight Decks

Journal Article

(Weick & Roberts, 1993)

32

Creating High Reliability Organizations Using Mindfulness

Journal Article

(Hales & Chakravorty, 2016)

Study Report

(LaPorte & Consolini, 1991)

(Hines, et al., 2008)
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33

Organizing for Transient Reliability: The Production of Dynamic Non-Events

Journal Article

(Weick, 2011)

34

High Reliability Leadership: A Conceptual Framework

Journal Article

(Martınez-Corcoles, 2017)

35

Assessing Your Organization’s Potential to Become a High Reliability Organization

Journal Article

(Youngberg, 2004)

36

Overcoming Dysfunctional Momentum: Organizational Safety as A Social Achievement

Journal Article

(Barton & Sutcliffe, 2009)

37

An empirical exploration of the presence of HRO safety principles across the health care sector
and construction industry in Norway

Journal Article

(Høyland, et al., 2018)

38

Structuring for high reliability: HR practices and mindful processes in reliability‐seeking
organizations

Journal Article

(Vogus & Welbourne, 2003)

39

Organizational Mindfulness in Business Schools

Journal Article

(Ray, et al., 2011)

40

IT is risky business: Three essays on ensuring reliability, security, and privacy in technology
mediated settings.

PhD Dissertation

(Anderson, 2010)

41

Assessing high reliability practices in wildland fire management: an exploration and
benchmarking of organizational culture

Study Report

(Black & McBride, 2013)

42

Measuring the reliability of knowledge management Instrument development and validation

Conference
Proceedings

(Hesamamiri, et al., 2013)

43

Highly Reliable Organizations in the Onshore Natural Gas Sector: An Assessment of Current
Practices, Regulatory Frameworks, and Select Case Studies

Study Report

(Paranhos, et al., 2017)

44

Role Conflict, Mindfulness, and Organizational Ethics in an Education-Based Healthcare
Institution

Journal Article

(Valentine, et al., 2010)

45

The Safety Organizing Scale: Development and Validation of a Behavioral Measure of Safety
Culture in Hospital Nursing Units

Journal Article

(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007a)

46

The Impact of Safety Organizing, Trusted Leadership, and Care Pathways on Reported
Medication Errors in Hospital Nursing Units

Journal Article

(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007b)

47

Aircraft Carrier Operations at Sea: The Challenges of High Reliability Performance

Study Report

(LaPorte, et al., 1988)

Appendix C: Labels and Definitions of Final Codes
Table 24: Final List of Codes Across Five Codes Families
Coding

Code Label

Family

Detecting

Code Definition
and

Resolving
Anomalies

PWF

Preoccupation with Failure

System Knowledge

Expectations
Domain

Cues of Evolving
Failure

It refers to the practice of continual searching for any discrepancies and suspicious cues, catching and resolving
them within a plausible time before they grew into serious problems. An anomaly is an indication of something
wrong that does not fit into a series. Something that is a departure from common order, form, or rule. It has been
described as contrasting in the quality of the successive segments of a stream of thoughts. An anomaly serves as a
motive to examine intentions and expectations.
It refers to the knowledge regarding the physical interconnections and parameters of the systems, and how it works
as a whole through knowing; (1) weaknesses in the technologies, (2) slops in the operations, (3) gaps in the
procedure, and (4) the orders by which errors in the system are triggering each other. However, the literature does
not directly connect system knowledge to detecting and resolving anomalies, but the context explains that one can
better detect anomalies when having better system knowledge.
It refers to the scope of the anticipations surrounding the system, its processes, and operations. Whenever
something comes from outside the frame (domain), it would be considered as an anomaly that requires an action.
The expectation domain is regarded as a tool for sensemaking.
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It refers to the unnoticed signals (e.g., small errors, near misses), which, when they accumulate, a failure could
evolve. It is also known as the conversion of a cue into a clue. These cues continue to develop until a failure
happens, particularly when people misjudge or misinterpret their evolution. These events are perceived as very
harmful that they may disable the entire system, radically limit its capacity to pursue the goals, and lead to its
destruction. To impede these types of events, the organization should increase failure knowledge and sensitivity to
failure.

Failure Knowledge

Failure Repositories

Failure Report
Preoccupation with Failure

PWF

Failure Update and
Analysis

Sensitivity to Failure

Normalization

It refers to the knowledge regarding how a failure evolves, causing the system or a part of the system to collapse.
Acquiring and sustaining failure knowledge is a critical competency to preclude the noticed cues and latent signals’
accumulations. For this organizational property to be maintained and increased, specific experience and other
knowledge types, particularly system knowledge, are required. Therefore, an HRO develops and sustains
repositories of failure as sources of information such as experts and experienced people and building failure
databases based on failure report and failure update and analysis.
It refers to the sources of acquiring failure knowledge through expertise. It has been widely acknowledged that
maintenance departments in each organization play a central or the source of organizational learning. The
accumulation of experience resulted from dealing with a wide range of failures.
It is denoting to communicate all types of failures by everyone involved regardless of the nature and the size of the
failure; even small and straightforward failures still count as a deviation from the norm. This practice requires a
culture that encourages and rewards, which is derived from the value of keeping the organization fully informed
and aware of any potential cues through increasing failure knowledge.
It refers to integrating and expanding the failure database through the continual update with any emergent
information and whenever new failures are reported. Updating failure is requiring a continual analysis that diagnose
the symptoms and investigate the causes. This practice increases the failure of knowledge needed to avoid the same
scenarios in the future.
It is defined as the subtlety regarding the system’s expected and unexpected failure, which increases the readiness
and responsiveness of the system. The importance of sensitivity is derived from the fact that it is mitigating fixation,
and therefore, it increases the system’s capability to reduce the accumulation of any latent cues.
It is defined as tolerating and treating the supposed to be abnormal as normal. For example, accepting or handling
a partial failure or a certain level of risk beyond the standards or the predefined risk is, in fact, normalizing them.
Normalization could happen gradually, such as the phenomenon of creeping change or reliability drift, which
requires excellent attention and adherence to both standards and risk boundaries.
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Adherence

to

Standards

Adherence to Risk
Boundaries
Preoccupation With Failure

PWF

Institutionalizing

Calibrate

Misestimating
Reliability

It is defined as the commitment to the domain and levels of the established and precisely defined risks and hazards
that can be controlled and managed. However, setting boundaries means to coherently articulate what risk and
hazard are and what is not, why the organization may accept a certain level of risk, and how it can be reduced and
mitigated. Considering that in some situations, accepting a certain level of risk requires more attention since, in
such a situation, the accepted level of risk might be gradually extended to a higher level, particularly when the
operations suffer creeping change.
It is defined as integrating a mindset of being continuously worried that failures can happen at any time. This is
very important, especially that successful organizations (in terms of safety or reliability) become less worried, or
in other words, “complacent,” which may lead to misestimating reliability in the entire or particular parts of the
organization. Therefore, lingering wariness should be adapted, and skepticism should be encouraged.

Wariness

Concern

It is defined as the commitments to the precise articulation and definition of the standardized protocols and
checklists and the criteria of the procedures, processes, responsibilities, job descriptions, rules of teamwork and
collaboration, quality of competences, qualifications, and skills, in addition to the training quality and assurance.
The precise and comprehendible articulation of the standards is essential to ensure that all the organization members
have a better understanding of how the system works as a whole and how do they operate within, which guides
them to ensure that they are following and exhibiting safe practices and behaviors.

and

It refers to a culture of raising apprehension, or in other words, fearing potential cues that require asking questions
about what is wrong or what could go wrong. This is creating an awareness of vulnerability, which helps in
developing a course of learning. While calibrating is to track, report, compare, feedback, and follow-up.
It refers to the incorrect certainty that interim success is a reflection of long-term reliability. When success is
achieved (i.e., reliability is high), organizations tend to reallocate its resources or limit them (e.g., due to financial
reason; reducing costs), thinking that there are no more needs for such resources to promote a higher level of safety,
which in other words, changes the beliefs regarding reliability. This, in fact, reduces the preoccupation with failure
and drifts to be preoccupied with other goals.
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Complacency
Preoccupation With Failure

PWF

Institutionalized
Doubt

Contradiction Spirit

RTS

Reluctance To Simplify

Simplification

Generalization

Reluctance

To Simplify

RTS

Misidentification

It results from ongoing success over time, which eventually leads the organization members, particularly managers,
to be overconfident as they relate success to themselves and demonstrate success as a high competence, ultimately
narrowing their perception towards the unexpected. Complacency is a door for unexpected events to pass through
and occur.
It is defined as integrating doubt as a mindset considering that dealing with doubts is safer than living with a naïve
certainty. HROs adopt a mindset of doubting that smooth operations do not reflect reliability because dynamic
processes could always bring surprise and unexpected outcomes. This mindset encourages a spirit of contradiction
while discourages the spirit of the accord.
It is referring to establishing freedom of posing confronted points of view so that members of the organization urge
and criticize each other when necessary. This spirit has widened the foundation of various inputs that increase the
variety in dealing with the unexpected.
It is defined as the tendency to simplify the context that people are working within to understand it or better deal
with it better. Therefore, simplification causes people to miss, neglect, or obscure unwanted, unanticipated,
unexplainable essential details, which increases the probability of producing an unreliable performance. Also,
simplification reduces people the cognitive capacity to comprehend complexity, which puts them in challenging
situations when unexpected happens.
It is defined as the inclination to interpret and treat signals, issues, information, reports, actions, rules, regulations,
etc., based on the general description. Generalization happens when people categorize their world. Thus they
interpret what they notice or perceive based on what they already know or have known. These types of
categorization smoothen over fine-grained distinctions that may predict unexpected.
It is a product of mistaken identification of an issue based on the identification factors or symptoms of other issues
that have already been identified. This happens when people compare issues superficially to seek similarities for
the sake of simplification, while they neglect the intrinsic differences. Misidentifications could lead to generating
more issues by augmenting the misidentified ones.

270

It refers to differentiating things based on the specific context that they are falling in and the details that they are
providing. Distinctions are highly significant in reducing simplifications, generalizations, and misidentification by
identifying more differences and developing a richer and more diverse image of possible outcomes, suggesting a
richer and more varied set of precautions and early warning signs.

Distinction

Organizing

for

Variety

Requisite Variety

Organizational
Complexity

Simplify RTS

Reluctance To

Complicated System

Complex System

It is defining the organizational design to increase the process base of sensing, analyzing, and responding to various
inputs. In a complex system, complexity is the only way to cope with the complex environment and sustain a
healthy condition. It has been acknowledged that diverse groups have a wide range of information than those in
homogeneous groups. Organizing for variety can be achieved and sustained through designing requisite variety
and organizational complexity.
It is also called requisite complexity. It refers to diversifying the organization members’ perspectives over the
traditional means to achieve reliability in a complex environment. For example, experiments showed that a task
managed by people from varied functional, educational, experiential backgrounds is most likely to be successful
than if people of similar backgrounds managed it.
It refers to the design and the nature of the system structure and the dynamic interactions among its elements when
it functions as a whole. Since HROs design requisite variety to ensure varied inputs, they fabricate complexity to
facilitate that by allowing disagreements and conflicts as normal interactions in HROs that widen the range of
comprehending complexity inherent in such organizations. However, conflicts must be negotiated, managed, and
controlled. These efforts take such forms as diverse checks and balances embedded in the circulation of committees
and meetings, frequent adversarial reviews, selecting new employees with non-typical prior experience, regular
job rotation, and re-training.
It refers to the system design that is featured by its constituents. A complicated system constitutes negativity since
it encourages simplification resulted from the need to develop a common operational image among individuals.
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It refers to the system design that is distinct from the interactions among the constituents. A complex system is
desired in HROs since it adapts to requisite complexity.

Compilation System

They are defined as informal latent and complex networks created and activated to encounter certain situations that
take the normal operations to where they get outside the boundaries and the anticipation’s scope. Such networks
are created as a supplement to the normal patterns of formal hierarchy and compliance with strict roles to solve the
issue and dissolved after the problem is solved.

Ad hoc Networks

Organizing for
Sense-Discrediting

Reluctance To Simplify

RTS

Actions

It refers to translating actions into more understandable information extracted from the actions of those who solve
problems and interpret that for learning.

Interpretation
Continual
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Diagnoses

It refers to embedding uncertainties regarding the existing concepts in confronting dynamic, complex
environments, which means organizing for more openness. In other words, the system is open to new information
and new experiences, by which the system is capable of coping with such environments. Systems confronted with
the dynamic complex environment need to be able to develop brilliant ideas about that environment (sense-making)
and criticize their ideas (sense-discrediting). Therefore, organizing for Sense-Discrediting enables the organization
to slow simplifications and allow for simultaneous change and stability. That is why sense-discrediting functions
as a balancing force.
It is defined as a designed form of duplications and backups in the system. It is a backup for technological,
individuals, and organizational elements. Redundancy takes a form of skepticism, which may frustrate any type of
complacency, and involves cross-checks, doubts that precautions are sufficient, and wariness about claimed levels
of competence. Redundancy can make the system more complex to get oversimplifications and misidentifications
by making the system denser and varied.

Redundancy

Reassessment

It refers to the best way to design and organize for a variety that is required to ensure requisite complexity since it
creates emergent complexity and the use of the existing one. For example, when two members interact and make
sense of the nonobvious in ways that neither of them alone could have done.

of

It refers to the frequent examination and evaluation of the credibility of the available diagnoses. This process
continues until these diagnoses make sense or keep looking for more options. This process reduces the vulnerability
of producing misjudgments.

Cultivation

of

Alternatives
Diagnoses
Sensitivity To Operations

STO

Anchoring

in

the

Present

It refers to collecting more options by expanding the boundaries to consider a broader set of alternative diagnoses,
enhancing the anticipation and ﬂexibility needed for mindful organizing.

It is defined as the continual concentration and the full mind’s use on the operations within the present moment
that the operations are ongoing. That is because operations are described being acting in real-time, where the
momentary context, complete with its content and feelings, will affect people’s behaviors (actions). Anchoring in
the present increases attentiveness and readiness for quick responses. However, deviance of the attention or
attention wavers would lead to lapses that eventually cause operators to lose control and preclude their capacity to
detect and resolve anomalies and cues of evolving failures. Anchoring in the present requires a clear mind, which
is described as the mind that takes the form of thinking while acting, thinking by acting, and thinking through
acting.

Sensitivity To Operations

STO

Ignorance

It refers to neglect and apathy, both intentionally or unintentionally, to advice or a safe direction. This could be a
result of self-complacency or personal culture.

Casualness

It refers to people’s tendency to ease and simplify situations and issues around the context they work within.
Casualness leads to superficial interpretations when it is essential to interpret the signals and actions required to
diagnose what is happening and act thoughtfully.

Distraction

It refers to whatever reduces mind concentration and takes it elsewhere than the work in the present moment.
Anchoring in the present requires full attention and be with all mind, which is described as the mind takes the form
of thinking while acting, thinking by acting, and thinking through acting.

Constructing

and

Sustaining

the

Cognitive Map

It refers to constructing and maintaining the cognitive map that allows people to integrate diverse inputs,
information sensors and remote observation, and real-time status and performance. This is called “having the
bubble” in US Navy ships. This is very important, mainly to cope with the surprise of the automated operations.
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Building

Plausible

Stories
Maintaining
time

Real-

Situational

Awareness
Assessment

and

STO

Sensitivity To Operations

Continual Updates
Procedure
Knowledge
Cognitive
Limitations

Situational
Awareness Drifts
Heedful
Interrelating

It is referring to the assembly of complex inputs, references, explanations, and definitions of the total situation. For
example, operators build stories to see “whether actions indicated in the procedure steps make sense in the context
of a particular event.” Building stories are sustaining the cognitive maps required to stay sensitive to the operations.
Situational awareness is defined as the awareness of the environment’s components within a time and space, the
understanding of their significance, and the forecast of their status shortly. Therefore, this pattern is denoting to
upholding the situational awareness during the real-time operations, which means to reduce or mitigate any laps
between perception and ongoing operations.
It refers to the constant appraisal of the operators’ cognition representation with any new emergent inputs,
references, interpretations, and definitions to assess their situational awareness.
It is referring to the logic of the series of actions conducted in a specific order or manner to execute the operations.
Operators use knowledge of the assumptions and logic that underlie preplanned procedures to deal with situations
not fully covered by the procedure.
It refers to individuals’ cognition resources to process and integrate a map and build stories of real-time awareness
and assessment. Individuals’ cognitive capacity is naturally limited and possibly reduced even more when
individuals experience stress, fatigue, distraction, and other job-related effects. When ongoing operations do not
fully occupy cognitive capacity, maintaining situational awareness in real-time becomes an issue, and laps often
occur, which dangers the reliable outcome.
It refers to the loss of situational awareness during real-time operations, which, when happens, operators fail to
notice the error and detect anomalies. At the same time, continue to be guided by inaccurate simplifications, sunken
in intentions and plans, rely on an established routine, and follow authorities blindly.
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Heed is defined as attending to how something is achieved while doing it. Heedful interrelating then refers to a
collective mind or social process through which individual action participates in a larger shared action pattern and
understands how their efforts fit into that more extensive pattern. This level of heedfulness explains how the
operations are tied together by patterns shaping the members’ participation in the organization’s total outcome,

including performance, safety, success, or failures. Furthermore, these patterns are implemented with care,
alertness, and wariness during the real-time operations
Contribution

It refers to the level of involvement in the creation of activities and functions in the long-term goal and the
organization’s success, especially regarding the organization’s effort to achieve high reliability.

Representation

It refers to how the organization members view or image their contributions to the process, operations, and general
success or failure. In other words, it refers to how individuals treat their multiple interactions with diverse team
members as if all those interactions were of the same kind of source.

STO

Sensitivity To Operations

Subordination

Self-Interest

Pressure

Sensitivity To

STO

Operations

Dysfunctional
Momentum

It refers to the condition in which members of the organization treat the system as it is their dominant context; ask
what it needs, and act in ways intended to meet those needs.
It refers to when members of the organization view their jobs based on their interests and partition the functions
based on their roles and responsibilities. This type of context is a killer to the subordination, mainly, and the heedful
interrelating generally.
It refers to any type of pressure, particularly production pressure, which often happens in industries where
production is the conclusive factor of success. Pressure leads to limit people’s cognition, cause them a distraction,
weaken their ability to judge correctly and interpret accurately. It also causes misidentification that reflects on
operators’ behaviors and leads them to fall back on first-learned, overlearned reactions. It is eventually leading to
severe consequences.
It is defined as continuing in the course of action without reassessing the entire situation, particularly when the
operations suffer lapses and unnoticed cues. It results from the routinely recurring events of the processes, and
when they are failing, they continue to fail until a disaster happens or intentional interruptions and adjustments are
decided. Dysfunctional Momentum is a clear indication that people are not sensitive to the operations, and the
organization is preoccupied with efficiency than reliability.
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It refers to the patterns of the actions required to get over the dysfunctional momentum, particularly in the failing
operations. The suggestion is to slow down or stop (i.e., make interruptions if they trigger sensemaking as it is a
form of sensitivity to functions), while overcoming inertia requires to start or increase. Interruptions need
rethinking and adjustments.

Interruptions

Commitment to Resilience

CTR

Adjustments

It refers to the opportunities to preclude mistakes and errors from lining up so that they grow into more significant
issues. This includes deploying resources whenever and wherever needed.

System Flexibility

It refers to the system’s capabilities to be elastic and recoverable at the same time, without causing any damage.
This term, in regard to HRO means both individuals and the organization should be flexible to cope with the
unexpected and bounce back.

Elasticity

It refers to the capacity of stretching without breaking. In other words, it means that individuals and the organization
are capable of expanding enough when it is required to contain any threats.

Recovery

It refers to the capability to bounce back after an emergent expansion to some shape slowly or quickly, which
means that the organization can presume its activities whenever copped with unexpected events.

Resistance
Change

Commitment to

Resilience

CTR

Improvisation

to

In the context of collective mindfulness, resistance to change is defined as the capacity of maintaining the same
outputs or effects (reliable performance) even when the conditions are varying. It might be understood as a harmful
cultural outcome. However, it is considered an achievement regarding the practice of commitment to resilience. In
other words, it is reflecting the organization’s adaptability to maintain reliable outcomes.
It refers to the ability to act upon emergent threats, particularly when those involved encounter scarcity or lack of
resources. Improvisation comprises; “on-the-spot surfacing, criticizing, restructuring, and testing of intuitive
understanding of experienced phenomena, while the ongoing action can still make a difference.” Improvisation
should see the threatening details even within the most complex environment and requires a mix of skills,
knowledge, and intuitive recombination based on a simple structure that allows such actions to be taken.
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Simple Structure

It refers to the preexisting or minimal structure that provides experienced people with a frame to act (improvise)
within. This simple structure could be the set of the core values, regulations, rules of engagement, or the mission
statement, within which people can direct themselves and engage with sensemaking.

General

Refers to knowing concepts, principles, rules, regulations, standards, and boundaries regarding the system,
procedure, expectations, and failures throughout all the available resources.

Knowledge
Interpersonal Skills

It refers to exceptional personal capabilities to apply the information and knowledge and the received training in
the job’s specific context.

Confidence

The feel of doing so. It is a product of knowing the self and the personal capabilities and the encouragement,
motivation, and trust by upper management.
It refers to the process of social construction that creates a workable level of certainty and imposes order on
perceptions, experiences, and expectations. Sensemaking is about thinking while acting, and it is involving the
ongoing reflective development of plausible images that validate what people are doing and experiencing.
Sensemaking highlights that people try to make things reasonably accountable to themselves and others; therefore,
to make sense of things during a trying condition, people need to reconstitute the evolving present through
continuous assessments and calibrations.

Sensemaking

CTR

Commitment to Resilience

Reconstituting

the

Evolving Present

Communication and
Collaboration

It is the process of recalibrating the expectations in real-time. When an unexpected event happens, individuals and
organizations face an evolving present that might never be experienced before (i.e., no previous similar situations
to learn from, and not enough or a total lack of resources to depend on. Therefore, such situations require the
development of solutions in parallel with the evolving problems, or in other words, those involved use different
modes, find new dynamics and develop new logic.
It refers to the required, frequent and intensive cooperated exchanges and share of the information, warning signs,
news, wisdom, expertise, advice, etc., to developmental representations and mutual knowledge among all
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organization members. Communication and collaboration lead to developing a social force and engagement, which
strengthens heedfulness and accountability.
Responses (Actions)
Repertoire

Learning

from

Failure

Negative Feedback
Commitment to Resilience

CTR

Training

Deferen

ce to

Expertis

Migrating Decision
Making

It is an extensive and rich reference for developing capabilities for commitment to resilience built through training
and simulation, varied job experiences, learning from negative feedback, and ad hoc networks that allow for rapid
pooling of expertise to handle unanticipated events. Responses or action repertoire include different levels of
information richness, collaborative practice, and pro-active focus. Organizational knowledge within HROs should
be considered by a comprehensive action repertoire to redefine investigation and learning by trial-and-error and a
high degree of hands-on focus to get ready for unexpected incidents.
It is considered a key factor to operate resiliently. It refers to expanding the information already generated from
previous errors (failure) and implementing that learning through fast and negative feedback. This component is
recently labeled “Learning from incident LFI” and was giving very close attention from academia and practitioners.
This type of learning enlarges the response repertoire and highly and positively increase the capability of
commitment to resilience.
It is fast-real-time learning that allows people to cope with an unfolding surprise in ways that are not speciﬁed in
advance. It is a base of the learning process from failure, whereby operators tend to end or reduce the fluctuations
in the output failures or errors. It is sometimes called double-loop learning.
Mindful training or training for resilience can be defined as a set of practices focused on teamwork with equal
concentration on cognitive processing and interpersonal skills. It should be designed to create team members who
consistently use sensory judgments, make quality decisions, and access all required resources under stressful
conditions in a time-constrained environment. It is suggested that training may cover the following aspects:
situational awareness, group dynamics, effective communications, risk management, decision-making workload
management, stress awareness and management, mission planning, physiology, and human performance.
It is the process of pushing down the decision-making authority to the people (individuals or teams) in the lower
and lowest levels of the organization, particularly to those who have specific knowledge around certain events
when required to make faster and effective decisions. It is often happening when people in lower levels notice
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potential failures that need to take immediate actions and decisions at their ends to mitigate any consequences or
reduce their harmful effects.

Structure Flexibility

Respectful Yielding

It is denoting the property of loosening or untying the hierarchical structure’s rigidity to allow for the decisionmaking process to migrate to lower levels, particularly to those in frontlines during situations of emergencies and
serious threats. In a mindful system, the structure is a variable, but the activity of structuring is constant. This
property requires collective cultural beliefs that the required competence lies somewhere in the system and that
migrating problems will ﬁnd them. These beliefs are associated with a more mindful recruitment of expertise.
It is denoting to the nature of the interactions or subordination among the members of the organization, which is
described to happen relative to the performance criteria applied in a particular context, or other words, it happens
to interpret an action, answer a question, solve a problem, provide advice and so on. Respectful yielding as a
property of deference to expertise reflects its nature as relational rather than an individual. It is considered as the
foundation of the shared understanding and communication of interpretations.

Deference to Expertise DTE

Self-Awareness

It refers to knowing and acknowledging the knowledge and experiences of the self and the limits and gaps in them.
Therefore, a real expert is not hesitant to inquire about others’ knowledge when he/she needed.

Available Expertise

Expertise is a co-production of modified, varied, and sometimes conflicted opinions, sources of supplying data,
mixed experiences, and additional inputs to discussions and conversations. Experts can make sense because they
pay close attention to context and are known to solve problems or answer questions relating to a specific problemsolving domain or area of expertise. In HROs, those experts are termed as reliability professional “RPs,” who are
generally part of teams, have special perspectives on reliability, both cognitively and normatively. They have been
termed “reliability professionals,” although they need not be holders of particular positions, have professional
degrees, or even higher degrees. They can be found at all levels of HROs – some are top-level executives. Still,
they can be found among department heads, program managers, shift supervisors, and on down to control operators,
pilots, nurses and maintenance engineers, and technicians. To grasp the right and relative expertise, one needs to
avoid self-importance, equate expertise to experience, and authority.

Self-Importance
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It refers to a false rank that some people claim as they pursue central positions or conduct sensitive works due to
the level of the risk inherent in their jobs, which might be deceptively confirmed when others tell them that they

are essential. However, such responsibilities do not mean that these experts are all-knowing. The problem lies when
others mistakenly hide important information assuming that these so-called experts already know it, while they
may not. Therefore, in solving problems, people respectfully defer to the wrong experts.
Equating Expertise
to Experience

Equating Expertise
to Authority
Deference to Expertise DTE

Domain-Specific
Knowledge

Experience

Compressed
Experience

It is denoting the mistaken beliefs that expertise can be found in those with more years of experience. People falsely
believe that the more years others spent in a specific job, the more experienced they are. Reliant expertise is
minimized in such situations since people with less experience would defer to the wrong experts.
It is denoting the mistaken beliefs that a higher rank or a higher authority is a reflection of expertise, and therefore,
people yield to the so-called wrong experts based on their rank. In fact, this view narrows the significance of
deference to expertise and minimizes true expertise in the organization.
It is defined as a firsthand and simulated experience. This knowledge is relevant to a specific domain that is an
environment or situation or problems’ category. Domain-specific knowledge is what constitutes an expert. Much
problem solving involves domain-specific knowledge. This property reflects that there is “little transfer from highlevel proficiency in one domain to proficiency in other domains-even when the domains seem, intuitively, very
similar.”
It is defined as; “we know with what we have known.” This simple definition implies that what we have known
comprises some understanding of the nature and functioning of the expertise we know to whom we defer. In
addition, it includes experience with specific unexpected events. Firsthand experience in a speciﬁc domain is more
or less meaningful, depending on the frequency and depth of that experience.
It is the product of experience-based knowledge and what clarifies expertise and defines the core of the expert’s
role. In other words, an expert who spent a certain period and made efforts in a specific domain knows better than
those whom their experiences are in a different domain. However, knowledge in this context is attainable when
people are willing to spend more time and effort to gain the necessary experience.
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DTE

Deference to Expertise

Experience Depth

It is the product of experience in a specific domain that is built by handling contextual risks and stresses. Sufficient
expertise is built up as people learn the lessons of closure or learn that even bad events come to an end, which
people could learn from.

Experience

It refers to the experience of recurrence and density in a specific domain (i.e., experience depth). For example,
experiencing a domain or specific emergency once or twice is not enough to understand or cope with a specific
environment. Claiming experience with less frequency may result in risking the situation even more.

Frequency

Reliance on
Experts

It refers to some individuals’ tendency to over-rely on experts, which, in other words, abandon or weaken their
responsibilities for monitoring and contributing to the situation’s safety. This, in fact, weakens the process of
deference to expertise and breeds malfunction in the process of organizational reliability.
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Appendix D: Codes to Themes Development Schemes
Table 25: Grouping and Converting Codes into Themes (PWF)
Codes

Basic Theme

Organizing Themes

Global Theme

Detecting and Resolving Anomalies
System Knowledge
Expectations Domain

Logical Reasoning

Failure Knowledge
Failure Repositories
Failure Report

Failure Knowledge and Attentiveness

Anticipating and Controlling
Latent Singles

Failure Update and Analysis
Sensitivity to Failure
Cues of Evolving Failure
Normalization
Adherence to Standards
Adherence to Risk Boundaries

Adherence to Standards and Risk

Normalization

Boundaries

Institutionalized Wariness
Concern and Calibrate
Contradiction Spirit

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs

Precaution as a Mind-Set

Institutionalized Doubt
Misestimating Reliability
Complacency

Complacency

Misestimating Reliability

Preoccupation with
Failure (PWF)
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Table 26: Grouping and Converting Codes into Themes (RTS)
Codes

Basic Theme

Organizing Themes

Global
Theme

Simplification
Generalization

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

Misidentification
Distinctions

Distinctions

Organizing for Variety
Requisite Variety
Organizational Complexity
Complicated System
Complex System

Requisite Variety and Complexity

Organizing for Variety

Relectance
To Smplify
(RTS)

Compilation System
Ad hoc Networks
Organizing for Sense-Discrediting
Redundancy

Redundancy

Organizing for Sense-Discrediting

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry
Actions Interpretation
Continual Reassessment of
Diagnoses
Cultivation of Alternatives
Diagnoses

Action Interpretation and Recursive
Interaction

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry
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Table 27: Grouping and Converting Codes into Themes (STO)
Codes

Basic Theme

Organizing Themes

Global Theme

Anchoring in the Present
Ignorance
Casualness

Deviance of Attention

Anchoring in the Present

Distraction
Sustaining the Cognitive Map
Building Plausible Stories
Maintaining Real-time Awareness
Assessment and Continual Updates

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

Procedure Knowledge
Cognitive Limitations
Situational Awareness Drifts

Operation as an Integrated
Map
Sensitivity To
Operations (STO)

Loss of Situational Awareness

Pressure

Pressure

Heedful Interrelating
Contribution
Representation

Level of Employee Participation

Heedful Interrelating

Subordination
Self-Interest

Self-Interest

Dysfunctional Momentum
Interruptions
Adjustments

Interruptions and Adjustments

Dysfunctional Momentum

284

Table 28: Grouping and Converting Codes into Themes (CTR)
Codes

Basic Theme

Organizing Themes

Elasticity and Recovery

System Flexibility and
Adaptability

Global Theme

System Flexibility
Elasticity
Recovery
Resistance to Change
Improvisation
Simple Structure
General Knowledge
Interpersonal Skills

Simple Structure
Personal Competence and Confidence

Improvisation

Confidence
Sensemaking
Reconstituting the Evolving Present

Sensemaking
Recalibrating the Ongoing Present

Responses (Actions) Repertoire
Learning from Failure/Incidents
Negative Feedback

Learning from Failure

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

Commitment To
Resilience (CTR)
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Table 29: Grouping and Converting Codes into Themes (DTE)
Codes

Basic Theme

Organizing Themes

Structure Flexibility

Structure Flexibility

Respectful Yielding

Respectful Yielding

Self-Awareness

Self-Awareness

Global Theme

Relative Expertise
Self-Importance
Equating Expertise to Experience

Ignoring Expertise

Available Expertise
Deference to
Expertise (DTE)

Equating Expertise to Authority
Domain-Specific Knowledge
Experience
Experience Depth
Experience Frequency
Reliance on Experts

Domain-Specific Experience
Compressed Experience
Reliance on Experts
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Appendix E: Thematic Structures and Networks
Table 30: Thematic Structure of RTS
Reluctance to Simplify (RTS) – Global Theme (General Target)
Distinctions (+)

Requisite Variety and Complexity (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Distinctions refer to differentiating things based on their specific
context and the details that they are providing. Distinctions are
significant in reducing simplifications, generalizations, and
misidentification through identifying more differences and to create
a richer and more varied picture of possible outcomes. This can then
recommend a deeper and more diverse set of precautions and early
warning indications.

→

→

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant Information (-)
This is a product of actions-based tendencies to simplify, generalize,
and often misidentify significant information. People tend to simplify
the context that they work within to better understand it. However,
simplification and generalization cause people to miss, neglect, or
obscure unwanted, unanticipated, unexplainable important details,
increasing the probability of producing an unreliable outcome. Also,
simplification reduces people the cognitive capacity to comprehend
complexity, which puts them in tough situations when the unexpected
occurs. Furthermore, obscuring and neglecting significant information
happens when interpreting and treating information based on a general
description. Generalization occurs when people categorize their world.
Thus, they interpret what they notice or perceive based on what they
already know or have known. These types of categorizations glide over
fine-grained distinctions that may predict the unexpected. As a result,
people misidentify an issue based on the identification factors or
symptoms of other problems that have already been identified.
Organizational Variety (+)
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Redundancy (+)

→

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Redundancy is defined as a designed form of duplications and
backups in the system. It is a backup for technical, individuals, and
organizational elements. Redundancy takes a form of skepticism,
which involves cross-checks, doubts that precautions are sufficient,
and wariness about claimed levels of competence. Redundancy can
make the system more complex, resulting in eliminating
oversimplifications and misidentifications by making the system
denser and varied. However, redundancy may encourage
complacency since the system’s frontline elements can overly be
relayed on the second line elements in fixing errors and assuring that
everything is processed smoothly.

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Requisite variety or requisite complexity refers to diversifying the
perspectives among the organization members over the traditional
means to achieve reliability in a complex environment. For example,
experiments showed that a task managed by people from varied
functional, educational, experiential backgrounds is most likely to be
successful than if people of similar backgrounds managed it. Since
HROs design requisite variety to ensure various inputs, they
fabricate complexity in order to allow disagreements and conflicts as
normal interactions. This widens the range of comprehending
complexity inherent in such organizations. However, conflicts must
be negotiated, managed, and controlled. These efforts take such
forms as diverse checks and balances embedded in the circulation of
committees and meetings, frequent adversarial reviews, selecting
new employees with non-typical prior experience, regular job
rotation, and re-training. Designing requisite variety is an attribute in
the HROs to leverage and sustain the organization’s goal in
organizing for variety.

Organizational variety is the organizational design that increases the
process base of sensing, analyzing, and responding to various inputs.
In a complex system, complexity is the only way to cope with the
complex environment and sustain healthy conditions. It has been
acknowledged that diverse groups have a more comprehensive range
of information than those in homogeneous groups. Organizing for
variety can be achieved and sustained through designing requisite
variety and organizational complexity. However, organizations should
be careful when they design the system structure., For instance,
complicated systems are considered undesirable since they seek
simplifications resulting from developing a common operational
image among individuals. Therefore, it has been suggested that two
types of systems design can achieve the desired complexity; a complex
system that is adapted for requisite variety and to create distinctions by
the interactions among the constituents; and compilation systems,
which develop emergent complexity in addition to the use of the
existing one, such as the ad-hoc networks.
Organizing for Sense-Discrediting (+)
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This refers to embedding uncertainties into existing concepts that
confront dynamic, complex environments, thereby organizing for
more openness. In other words, the system is open to new information
and new experiences and, therefore, can cope with such environments.
Systems confronted with the dynamic complex environment need to
be able to develop intelligent ideas about that environment (sensemaking), but at the same time, need to be able to criticize their ideas
(sense-discrediting). Therefore, organizing for sense-discrediting
enables the organization to slow simplifications and allow for
simultaneous change and stability. Thus, sense-discrediting functions
act as a balancing force. To achieve this, HROs design redundancies
as a backup and double-checks for system elements.

Action Interpretation and Recursive Interaction (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

This pattern works as a source for action based-inquiry where action
interpretation provides more comprehensible information extracted
from the actions of those who solve problems and interpret actions
for learning purposes. Problem solvers continue to reassess the
diagnoses by conducting frequent examinations and evaluations of
the available diagnoses’ credibility. This process continues until
these diagnoses make sense. If the diagnoses do not make sense, they
keep looking for more options to reduces the vulnerability of
producing misjudgments. As they continue with the process, they
collect more possibilities by expanding the boundaries to consider a
broader set of alternatives, enhancing the anticipation and ﬂexibility
needed for mindful organizing.

→

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry (+)
This refers to establishing a pattern for generating more information
from actions, particularly when people confront the unexpected, which
means that the information cues become available only when actions
are taken, or in other words, action informs systems. This pattern
precludes the tendencies to simplify the already simplified information
further. This encourages the search for more details, creating questions
for broader explanations, and allows for more distinctions. To achieve
this pattern, a sequence of interpreted actions is required, followed by
a continual reassessment of the available diagnosis, and the cultivation
of alternatives should be ongoing involving what is described as
“recursive interactions between interpreting and updating.”
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Figure 48: Thematic Network of RTS: Developed with Atlas.ti
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Table 31: Thematic Structure of STO
Sensitivity to Operations (STO) – Global Theme (General Target)
Loss of Attention (-)

→

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Loss of attention is a product of three states of mind that adversely
deviate the attention and mental concentration on operations:
ignorance, casualness, and distractions. Ignorance refers to the
intentional or unintentional neglect of safe work procedures. This
could be a result of self-complacency or personal culture.
Casualness is a product of people’s tendency to simplify situations
and issues around the context they are working within. Casualness
provides superficial interpretations when it is essential to interpret
issues (e.g., signals and alarms) on a deeper level to diagnose what
is happening and take appropriate action. However, distraction
refers to whatever reduces concentration and focus from work in the
present moment. Loss of attention could result from the work itself,
such as fatigue.
Sustaining Dynamic Situational Awareness (+)

→

Staying Focused (+)
Focus is defined as continual concentration and attention on the task at
hand. Staying focused on the present increases attentiveness and
readiness for quick responses. However, loss of or wavering attention
could lead to lapses that eventually cause operators to lose control and
preclude their capacity to detect and resolve anomalies and cues of
evolving failures. Staying focused in the present requires a clear mind,
acting while thinking, thinking by acting, and thinking through acting.

Operations as an Integrated Map (+)
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Basic Theme

Sustaining dynamic situational awareness means to construct and
continuously maintain the cognitive map. Operators need to build
stories to process complex inputs, references, explanations, and
definitions of the total situation. For example, operators examine the
described actions in the procedure steps to see if they make sense in
the context of a particular event. However, to build such stories,
operators are required to maintain real-time situational awareness,
by which they remain mindful and knowledgeable of the elements
of their work environment. Sustaining dynamic situational
awareness during real-time operations can be achieved by reducing
or mitigating any laps between the perceptions and the ongoing
operations. It requires both assessment and continual updates. This
refers to the constant examination of any new emergent inputs, their
interpretations, and definitions, by which operators continue
assessing their situational awareness.

This refers to the construction and maintenance of the cognitive map,
allowing operators to integrate diverse inputs, information sensors and
remote observations, and the real-time status and performance. This is
called “having the bubble” in US Navy ships. This “bubble” is
considered necessary, particularly in coping with any work surprises
that might arise in automated operations. However, to conceptualize the
operations as an integrated map, operators and involved personnel need
to sustain a dynamic situational awareness through building stories,
maintaining real-time situational awareness, conducting assessments,
and continually generating updates. For operators to do so, they need to
have a working understanding of the operations and procedure
knowledge, which is defined as the logic of the series of actions
conducted in a certain order or manner to execute operations. Operators
use knowledge of the assumptions and reasoning that underlie
preplanned procedures to deal with situations not covered by procedure.

→

Situational awareness is lost due to cognitive limitations and drifts.
Individual cognition is the mental resources to process and integrate
the cognitive map through building stories and maintaining realtime awareness and assessment. However, an individual’s cognitive
capacity is naturally limited and is possibly reduced even more when
they experience stress, fatigue, distraction, and other job-related
effects. When ongoing operations do not fully occupy cognitive
capacity, maintaining situational awareness in real-time becomes an
issue, and laps occur, which endangers a reliable outcome.
Moreover, when situational awareness drifts, operators fail to notice
the error and to detect anomalies. This failure can lead to inaccurate
simplifications, misinterpreted intentions and plans, reliance on an
established routine, and following authorities blindly.

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Loss of Situational Awareness (-)

Operations as an Integrated Map (+)
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Pressure (-)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme
Level of Employee Participation (+)

→

Pressure refers to any work burdens, particularly production pressure,
which often happens in organizations where production is the
conclusive success factor. Pressure reduces a worker’s focus on the task
at hand, causes them to be distracted, weakens their ability to judge and
interpret correctly, and accurately. It also causes them to simplify,
generalize, and misidentify the received and processed information,
which causes them to fall back on first-learned reactions. This
eventually leads to severe consequences, whereby operators lose their
sensitivity to operations.

→

Heedful Interrelating (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

This is a pattern of three practices: contribution, representation, and
subordination that develop a social process by which one can
perceive the relationships among the organization’s members.
Contribution points to the involvement of the organization’s
members in creating activities and functions that serve the long-term
goal. Representation refers to how the organization members view
or imagine their contributions to the process, operations, and general
success or failure of the goal. Subordination refers to the condition
where the organization members are subordinate to the
organization’s dominant culture and system by asking what it needs
and acting in ways intended to meet those needs.
Self-Interest (-)

→

Self-interest is when members of the organization view their jobs
based on their interests and divide the functions based on their roles
and responsibilities. This type of context works against
subordination particularly, and the heedful interrelating generally.

Heedful interrelating refers to a collective mind or social process where
individual actions are part of a larger shared action pattern. They
understand how their efforts fit into that more extensive pattern. This
level of heedfulness explains how operations are tied together by the
patterns shaping the level of the members’ participation in the
organization’s total outcome, including performance, safety, success,
or failures. Furthermore, these patterns are implemented with care,
alertness, and wariness during real-time operations.

Heedful Interrelating (+)
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Interruptions and Adjustments (+)
It is the pattern of actions where dysfunctional momentum can be
managed, and its consequences can be mitigated, particularly in
situations and contexts where the operations are failing.
Interruptions mean to slow down or stop the operations if they
trigger sensemaking as it is a form of sensitivity to operations.
Interruptions require rethinking and adjustments, which refer to the
opportunities to preclude mistakes and errors from lining up so that
they grow into more significant issues. This includes deploying
resources whenever and wherever needed.

→

Dysfunctional Momentum (-)
Dysfunctional momentum is keeping to the course of action without
reassessing the total situation, particularly when the operations suffer
lapses and unnoticed cues. It is a result of routinely recurring events
during operations that when they fail, they continue to fail until a
disaster happens or intentional disruptions and adjustments are decided.
Dysfunctional momentum is a clear indication that people are not
sensitive to the operations and that the organization is preoccupied with
efficiency over reliability.
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Figure 49: Thematic Network of STO: Developed with Atlas.ti
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Table 32: Thematic Structure of CTR
Commitment to Resilience (CTR) – Global Theme (General Target)
Elasticity and Recovery (+)

Simple Structure (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Elasticity and recovery refer to the organizational ability to expand
and bounce back, hence being both elastic and recoverable. Elasticity
refers to the capacity of stretching without breaking, or in other
words, expanding enough when it is required to contain any threats.
Recovery means to return, either slowly or quickly, into some form,
so that the organization, whenever faced with unexpected events, can
presume its activities.

→

→

Simple structure refers to the preexisting or minimal structure that
provides experienced people with a framework to act (improvise)
within. This simple structure could be a set of core values,
regulations, rules of engagement, or the mission statement, within
which people can direct themselves and engage with sensemaking.

System Flexibility and Adaptability (+)
For a system to be elastic and recoverable, or in other words, to expand
and bounce back, the system should be flexible enough without causing
any damage. This term concerning HROs means that both individuals
and the organization should be flexible enough to cope with the
unexpected and resume normal operations. System adaptability refers
to maintaining the same outputs or effects even when the conditions of
the operations are varying.
Improvisation (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Improvisation refers to the ability to act upon emergent threats,
particularly when those involved encounter lack of resources, such as
no information regarding the experienced situation. Improvisation
involves rearranging and examining the intuitive understanding of the
experienced phenomena, while the ongoing action can still make a
difference. Improvisation should be able to see the details of the threat
even within the most complex environment. It requires a mix of skills,
knowledge, and intuitive recombination based on a simple structure that
allows for such actions.
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Personal Competence and Confidence (+)

Reconstituting the Evolving Present (+)

→

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

It is the process of recalibrating the expectations in real-time. When
an unexpected event happens, individuals and organizations face an
evolving present that might never have been experienced before (i.e.,
no previous similar situations to learn from, and not enough or a total
lack of resources to depend on). Therefore, such situations require
the development of solutions in parallel with the evolving problems.
In other words, those involved use different modes, find new
dynamics and develop new logic.

Improvisation (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Personal competence and confidence refer to the essential
qualifications and unique traits required to improvise when needed.
These qualifications consist of but are not limited to, general
knowledge, which is defined in this context as knowing concepts,
principles, rules, regulations, standards, and boundaries regarding
the system, procedure, expectations, and failures throughout all of
the available resources. Confidence is a product of knowing one’s
self and personal capabilities, as well as having upper management’s
encouragement, motivation, and trust. from

→

Sensemaking (+)
Sensemaking refers to the process of social construction that creates a
practical level of certainty and imposes order on perceptions,
experiences, and expectations. It is about thinking while acting, and it
involves the ongoing reflective development of plausible images that
justify what people are doing and experiencing. Sensemaking highlights
the fact that people try to be reasonably accountable to themselves and
others and make sense of things during a trying situation. People need
to consider the evolving present through continuous assessments and
calibrations.
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Learning from Failure/Incident (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Learning from failure or incidents is a key factor to operate
resiliently. This theme refers to expanding the repertoire of the
information already generated from previous errors (failures) and
implementing that learning through fast and negative feedback. This
practice was recently labeled “Learning from incident LFI.” It was
given a lot of attention from academia and practitioners since this
type of learning enlarges the response repertoire and positively
increases the capability of commitment to resilience. Learning from
failure requires negative feedback, which is fast-real-time learning
that allows people to cope with an unfolding surprise in ways that
are not speciﬁed in advance. It is at the base of the learning process
from failure, whereby operators tend to end or reduce the
fluctuations in the output failures or errors. It is sometimes called
double-loop learning.

→

Responses (Actions) Repertoire (+)
It is an extensive and rich reference for developing capabilities for
commitment to resilience. This is built through training and simulation,
varied job experiences, learning from negative feedback, and ad hoc
networks that allow for rapid pooling of expertise to handle
unanticipated events. Responses or action repertoire include different
levels of information richness, collaborative practice, and pro-active
focus. Organizational knowledge within HROs should be described by
a wide-ranging action repertoire to redefine investigation and learning
by trial-and-error and a high degree of pro-active focus to prepare for
unexpected events.
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Figure 50: Thematic Network of CTR: Developed with Atlas.ti
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Table 33: Thematic Structure of DTE
Deference to Expertise (DTE) – Global Theme (General Target)

Structural flexibility loosens or unties the hierarchical structure’s
rigidity to allow for the decision-making process to migrate to lower
levels, particularly to those on frontlines during situations of
emergencies and serious threats. In a reliable or mindful system, the
structure is a variable, but structuring is constant. This property requires
collective cultural beliefs so that the necessary competence lies
somewhere in the system and that migrating problems will ﬁnd them.
These beliefs are associated with a more mindful recruitment of
expertise.

→

Respectful Yielding (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Self-awareness refers to knowing and acknowledging the
knowledge and experiences of the self, as well as the limits and gaps
in them. Therefore, a true expert does not hesitate to inquire about
others’ knowledge when he/she needs it. Besides, this personal
attribute guides the individuals to yield respectfully to other
individuals with a more profound level of expertise and experience.

Structure Flexibility (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme
Self-Awareness (+)

→

Respectful yielding is the interactions or subordination among the
members of the organization. It happens relative to the performance
criteria applied in a particular context. In other words, it interprets an
action, answers a question, solves a problem, provides advice, and so
on. Respectful yielding as a property of deference to expertise reflects
its nature as relational rather than an individual. It is considered the
foundation of shared understanding and communication.
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Expertise is a co-production of modified, varied, and sometimes
conflicted opinions, supplying data sources, and mixed experiences and
additional inputs to discussions and conversations. Experts can make
sense regarding a subject or an issue because they pay close attention
to context. Expertise is known to solve problems or answer questions
relating to a specific problem-solving domain or area of expertise. In
HROs, those experts who are termed as reliability professional “RPs,”
are generally part of teams, have special perspectives on reliability, both
cognitively and normatively. They have been termed “reliability
professionals,” although they need not be holders of particular
positions, have professional degrees, or even any higher degrees at all.
They can be found at all levels of HROs – some are top-level
executives. Still, they can also be found among department heads,
program managers, shift supervisors, and on down to control operators,
engineers, and technicians.

→

Domain-Specific Experience (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

Compressed experience clarifies expertise and defines the core of
the expert’s role. In other words, an expert who spent a certain
period and made efforts in a specific domain knows better than those
whose experiences are in a different domain. However, knowledge
in this context is attainable when people are willing to spend more
time and effort to gain the necessary experience. Compressed
experience is, therefore, an experience-based knowledge that results
from both depth and frequency, or in other words, frequent
encounters and handling with risks and stresses, as well as lessons
learned from closures of bad events.

Available Expertise (+)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme
Compressed Experience (+)

→

Domain-specific experience is the product of domain-specific
knowledge and generalized experience. Domain-specific knowledge is
defined as the personal, simulated, or virtual experience. This
knowledge is relevant to a specific domain that is a class of problems.
Much problem solving involves domain-specific knowledge. On the
other hand, generalized experience implies that what we have known
comprises some understanding of the nature and functioning of the
expertise we know to whom we defer. Besides, it is comprised of
experience with specific unexpected events. Firsthand experience in a
speciﬁc domain is more or less meaningful, depending on the frequency
and depth of that experience; or in other words, it requires compressed
experience.

Ignoring Expertise (-)

Organizing Theme

Basic Theme

→

Expertise is minimized when it is neglected or ignored, such as when
organizations acquire other organizations. Thus, the newly parent
organizations do not give the transferred expertise the required attention
and importance. People consider expertise as products of years of
experience or a reflection of the higher rank and authorities. Therefore,
they equate them to their experience or authorities, which either
minimizes the true expertise or defers to the wrong ones. Another factor
that leads to minimizing expertise is self-importance, which refers to
falsely ranking the self-based on pursuing central positions or
conducting sensitive work due to the level of the risk inherent in the
job, which might be deceptively confirmed when people tell those with
self-importance that they are essential. However, such responsibilities
do not mean that these experts are all-knowing. The problem lies when
others mistakenly hide essential information, assuming that these socalled experts already know it, while they may not. Therefore, in
solving problems, people respectfully defer to the wrong experts.

→

Overreliance on Experts (-)

Organizing Theme

Overreliance on Experts refers to the tendency of some individuals to
overly depend on experts, which in other words abandon or weaken
their responsibilities for monitoring and contributing to the situation’s
safety. This weakens the process of deference to expertise and breeds
malfunction in the process of organizational reliability.
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Figure 51: Thematic Network of DTE: Developed with Atlas.ti
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Appendix F: FCM’s Edges Weights Comparison Based on Three Measures
Table 34: Edges Weights Comparison Based on Three Measures

C- Coefficient

Strength - 3 Intervals

t-Coefficient

Strength - 3 Intervals

Cosine Similarity Index

Strength - 3 Intervals

Compatibility - (c-t)

Compatibility - (c-c)

Compatibility - (t-c)

C- Coefficient -Range

t-Coefficient -Range

Cosine Index -Range

1

Action Interpretation and Recursive
Interaction

+

Organizing Action Based Inquiry

0.195

Moderate

0.473

Moderate

0.525

Moderate

1

1

1

0.66

0.66

0.66

2

Action Interpretation and Recursive
Interaction

+

Distinctions

0.036

Weak

0.393

Weak

0.536

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

3

Adherence to Standards and Risk
Boundaries

-

Normalization

0.104

Weak

0.508

Moderate

0.677

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66

4

Adherence to Standards and Risk
Boundaries

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.041

Weak

0.428

Weak

0.535

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

Relationship (+/-)

Target
Number of Connection

Source

304

Weak

0.310

Weak

0.388

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

Weak

0.920

Strong

0.990

Strong

0

0

1

0.33

0.99

0.99

Strong

0.506

Moderate

0.464

Moderate

0

0

1

0.99

0.66

0.66

Strong

0.596

Moderate

0.640

Moderate

0

0

1

0.99

0.66

0.66

+

Normalization

Weak

0.333

Weak

0.461

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

-

Adherence to Standards and Risk
Boundaries

Weak

0.438

Moderate

0.558

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66

-

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs

0.040

Weak

0.395

Weak

0.495

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

11

Complacency

Misestimating Reliability

0.045

10

Complacency

+

0.056

9

Complacency

PREOCCUPATION WITH FAILURE

0.241

8

Complacency

+

0.238

7

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

SENSITIVITY TO OPERATIONS

0.109

6

Anchoring in the Present

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.012

5

Adherence to Standards and Risk
Boundaries

-

305

12

Complacency

-

Precaution as a Mind-Set

0.040

Weak

0.385

Weak

0.461

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

13

Complacency

-

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.037

Weak

0.421

Weak

0.594

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

14

Compressed Experience

+

Domain Specific Experience

0.267

Strong

0.570

Moderate

0.740

Strong

0

1

0

0.99

0.66

0.99

15

Deviance of Attention

-

Anchoring in the Present

0.114

Moderate

0.331

Weak

0.129

Weak

0

0

1

0.66

0.33

0.33

16

Deviance of Attention

-

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.014

Weak

0.356

Weak

0.405

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

17

Distinctions

-

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.095

Weak

0.347

Weak

0.455

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

18

Domain Specific Experience

+

DEFERENCE TO EXPERTISE

0.135

Moderate

0.426

Weak

0.330

Weak

0

0

1

0.66

0.33

0.33
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19

Domain Specific Experience

+

Relative Expertise

0.069

Weak

0.436

Moderate

0.618

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66

20

Domain Specific Experience

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

0.068

Weak

0.364

Weak

0.521

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

21

Domain Specific Experience

+

Improvisation

0.044

Weak

0.361

Weak

0.437

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

22

Domain Specific Experience

+

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

0.043

Weak

0.316

Weak

0.415

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

23

Domain Specific Experience

+

Sensemaking

0.042

Weak

0.332

Weak

0.418

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

24

Domain Specific Experience

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.040

Weak

0.400

Weak

0.478

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

25

Domain Specific Experience

+

Logical Reasoning

0.038

Weak

0.315

Weak

0.441

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66
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26

Domain Specific Experience

+

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

0.024

Weak

0.383

Weak

0.310

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

27

Domain Specific Experience

-

Pressure

0.017

Weak

0.228

Weak

0.246

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

28

Domain Specific Experience

+

Learning from Failure

0.012

Weak

0.315

Weak

0.408

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

29

Dysfunctional Momentum

-

SENSITIVITY TO OPERATIONS

0.031

Weak

0.344

Weak

0.141

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

30

Elasticity and Recovery

+

System Flexibility and Adaptability

0.186

Moderate

0.433

Moderate

0.549

Moderate

1

1

1

0.66

0.66

0.66

31

Failure Knowledge and Attentiveness

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.143

Moderate

0.562

Moderate

0.785

Strong

1

0

0

0.66

0.66

0.99

32

Failure Knowledge and Attentiveness

+

Logical Reasoning

0.077

Weak

0.435

Moderate

0.579

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66
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33

Headful Interrelating

+

SENSITIVITY TO OPERATIONS

0.070

Weak

0.327

Weak

0.274

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

34

Heedful Interrelating

+

Interruptions and Adjustments

0.029

Weak

0.334

Weak

0.327

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

35

Heedful Interrelating

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.023

Weak

0.364

Weak

0.413

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

36

Improvisation

+

COMMITMENT TO RESILIENCE

0.177

Moderate

0.394

Weak

0.336

Weak

0

0

1

0.66

0.33

0.33

37

Improvisation

+

Action Interpretation and Recursive
Interaction

0.015

Weak

0.322

Weak

0.383

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

38

Interruptions and Adjustments

-

Dysfunctional Momentum

0.244

Strong

0.483

Moderate

0.669

Moderate

0

0

1

0.99

0.66

0.66

39

Interruptions and Adjustments

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.059

Weak

0.425

Weak

0.488

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66
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40

Learning from Failure

+

COMMITMENT TO RESILIENCE

0.174

Moderate

0.421

Weak

0.306

Weak

0

0

1

0.66

0.33

0.33

41

Learning from Failure

+

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

0.161

Moderate

0.429

Weak

0.542

Moderate

0

1

0

0.66

0.33

0.66

42

Learning from Failure

+

Improvisation

0.109

Weak

0.383

Weak

0.457

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

43

Learning from Failure

+

Failure Knowledge and Attentiveness

0.069

Weak

0.456

Moderate

0.646

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66

44

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs

+

Precaution as a Mind-Set

0.080

Weak

0.471

Moderate

0.616

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66

45

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs

+

Failure Knowledge and Attentiveness

0.072

Weak

0.502

Moderate

0.677

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66

46

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.063

Weak

0.486

Moderate

0.645

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66

310

47

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs

-

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.038

Weak

0.364

Weak

0.520

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

48

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs

-

Normalization

0.020

Weak

0.305

Weak

0.423

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

49

Logical Reasoning

+

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

0.109

Weak

0.413

Weak

0.243

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

50

Logical Reasoning

+

Operations as an Integrated Map

0.055

Weak

0.262

Weak

0.352

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

51

Logical Reasoning

+

Sensemaking

0.044

Weak

0.305

Weak

0.405

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

52

Logical Reasoning

+

Distinctions

0.037

Weak

0.279

Weak

0.350

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

53

Logical Reasoning

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.031

Weak

0.443

Moderate

0.624

Moderate

0

0

1

0.33

0.66

0.66
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54

Logical Reasoning

-

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.010

Weak

0.305

Weak

0.447

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

55

Loss of Situational Awareness

-

Operations as an Integrated Map

0.070

Weak

0.294

Weak

0.188

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

56

Loss of Situational Awareness

+

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.028

Weak

0.293

Weak

0.181

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

57

Members’ Level of Participation

+

Heedful Interrelating

0.292

Strong

0.448

Moderate

0.708

Moderate

0

0

1

0.99

0.66

0.66

58

Minimizing Expertise

-

Relative Expertise

0.211

Moderate

0.554

Moderate

0.469

Moderate

1

1

1

0.66

0.66

0.66

59

Misestimating Reliability

-

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.015

Weak

0.372

Weak

0.448

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

60

Misestimating Reliability

-

PREOCCUPATION WITH FAILURE

0.009

Weak

0.364

Weak

0.187

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33
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61

Normalization

+

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.034

Weak

0.283

Weak

0.381

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

62

Normalization

-

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.028

Weak

0.356

Weak

0.484

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

63

Normalization

-

PREOCCUPATION WITH FAILURE

0.015

Weak

0.322

Weak

0.260

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

64

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

-

RELUCTANCE TO SIMPLIFY

0.225

Strong

0.396

Weak

0.273

Weak

0

0

1

0.99

0.33

0.33

65

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

-

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.036

Weak

0.411

Weak

0.554

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

66

Operations as an Integrated Map

+

SENSITIVITY TO OPERATIONS

0.138

Moderate

0.426

Weak

0.273

Weak

0

0

1

0.66

0.33

0.33

67

Organizing Action Based Inquiry

+

RELUCTANCE TO SIMPLIFY

0.045

Weak

0.385

Weak

0.250

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

313

68

Organizing Action Based Inquiry

-

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.043

Weak

0.307

Weak

0.381

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

69

Organizing for Sense-Discrediting

+

Precaution as a Mind-Set

0.207

Moderate

0.439

Moderate

0.567

Moderate

1

1

1

0.66

0.66

0.66

70

Organizing for Sense-Discrediting

-

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.024

Weak

0.279

Weak

0.279

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

71

Organizing for Sense-Discrediting

-

Normalization

0.021

Weak

0.197

Weak

0.235

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

72

Organizing for Sense-Discrediting

+

Sensemaking

0.019

Weak

0.231

Weak

0.263

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

73

Organizing for Sense-Discrediting

+

RELUCTANCE TO SIMPLIFY

0.012

Weak

0.344

Weak

0.193

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

74

Organizing for Variety

+

RELUCTANCE TO SIMPLIFY

0.056

Weak

0.382

Weak

0.182

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

314

75

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

Improvisation

0.103

Weak

0.382

Weak

0.391

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

76

Precaution as a Mind-Set

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.043

Weak

0.428

Weak

0.568

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

77

Precaution as a Mind-Set

+

PREOCCUPATION WITH FAILURE

0.041

Weak

0.397

Weak

0.317

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

78

Precaution as a Mind-Set

-

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.037

Weak

0.347

Weak

0.492

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

79

Precaution as a Mind-Set

-

Normalization

0.027

Weak

0.314

Weak

0.431

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

80

Precaution as a Mind-Set

+

Sensemaking

0.025

Weak

0.311

Weak

0.383

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

81

Precaution as a Mind-Set

-

Misestimating Reliability

0.018

Weak

0.349

Weak

0.287

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

315

82

Pressure

+

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.052

Weak

0.263

Weak

0.262

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

83

Pressure

-

SENSITIVITY TO OPERATIONS

0.043

Weak

0.361

Weak

0.151

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

84

Pressure

-

Distinctions

0.030

Weak

0.173

Weak

0.195

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

85

Pressure

-

Operations as an Integrated Map

0.029

Weak

0.226

Weak

0.276

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

86

Pressure

-

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.010

Weak

0.328

Weak

0.271

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

87

Reconstituting the Evolving Present

+

Sensemaking

0.086

Weak

0.354

Weak

0.375

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

88

Reconstituting the Evolving Present

+

Elasticity and Recovery

0.038

Weak

0.248

Weak

0.292

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

316

89

Redundancy

+

Complacency

0.100

Weak

0.320

Weak

0.425

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

90

Redundancy

+

Organizing for Sense-Discrediting

0.055

Weak

0.334

Weak

0.419

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

91

Redundancy

+

Reliance on Experts

0.051

Weak

0.304

Weak

0.342

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

92

Redundancy

+

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

0.031

Weak

0.242

Weak

0.237

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

93

Redundancy

-

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.020

Weak

0.300

Weak

0.396

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

94

Redundancy

-

Normalization

0.016

Weak

0.251

Weak

0.286

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

95

Relative Expertise

+

DEFERENCE TO EXPERTISE

0.071

Weak

0.365

Weak

0.216

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

317

96

Relative Expertise

+

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

0.043

Weak

0.267

Weak

0.321

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

97

Relative Expertise

+

Redundancy

0.018

Weak

0.247

Weak

0.298

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

98

Reliance on Experts

-

Members’ Level of Participation

0.061

Weak

0.298

Weak

0.277

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

99

Reliance on Experts

-

DEFERENCE TO EXPERTISE

0.023

Weak

0.328

Weak

0.162

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

100

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Organizing for Variety

0.317

Strong

0.620

Moderate

0.823

Strong

0

1

0

0.99

0.66

0.99

101

Requisite Variety and Complexity

-

Obscuring and Neglecting Significant
Information

0.103

Weak

0.395

Weak

0.562

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

102

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Listening to Various Voices and Inputs

0.055

Weak

0.411

Weak

0.543

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66
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103

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Distinctions

0.051

Weak

0.310

Weak

0.342

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

104

Requisite Variety and Complexity

-

Normalization

0.045

Weak

0.280

Weak

0.323

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

105

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

0.044

Weak

0.292

Weak

0.336

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

106

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Redundancy

0.041

Weak

0.317

Weak

0.354

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

107

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Precaution as a Mind-Set

0.036

Weak

0.353

Weak

0.503

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

108

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Action Interpretation and Recursive
Interaction

0.029

Weak

0.335

Weak

0.488

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

109

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Organizing for Sense-Discrediting

0.024

Weak

0.299

Weak

0.324

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33
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110

Requisite Variety and Complexity

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.020

Weak

0.403

Weak

0.499

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

111

Respectful Yielding

+

DEFERENCE TO EXPERTISE

0.080

Weak

0.413

Weak

0.190

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

112

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

+

COMMITMENT TO RESILIENCE

0.093

Weak

0.392

Weak

0.273

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

113

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

+

Improvisation

0.056

Weak

0.332

Weak

0.345

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

114

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.023

Weak

0.372

Weak

0.380

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

115

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

+

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

0.018

Weak

0.356

Weak

0.238

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

116

Responses (Actions) Repertoire

+

Sensemaking

0.017

Weak

0.268

Weak

0.335

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33
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117

Self-Awareness

+

Respectful Yielding

0.111

Weak

0.291

Weak

0.291

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

118

Self-Awareness

+

Relative Expertise

0.083

Weak

0.385

Weak

0.488

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

119

Self-Interest

-

Relative Expertise

0.091

Weak

0.262

Weak

0.262

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

120

Self-Interest

-

Respectful Yielding

0.059

Weak

0.279

Weak

0.308

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

121

Self-Interest

-

Heedful Interrelating

0.029

Weak

0.260

Weak

0.168

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

122

Sensemaking

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.051

Weak

0.421

Weak

0.452

Moderate

1

0

0

0.33

0.33

0.66

123

Sensemaking

+

COMMITMENT TO RESILIENCE

0.043

Weak

0.379

Weak

0.278

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33
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124

Sensemaking

+

Action Interpretation and Recursive
Interaction

0.028

Weak

0.281

Weak

0.388

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

125

Sensemaking

+

Elasticity and Recovery

0.019

Weak

0.276

Weak

0.332

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

126

Simple Structure

+

Improvisation

0.067

Weak

0.340

Weak

0.165

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

127

Structure Flexibility

+

DEFERENCE TO EXPERTISE

0.290

Strong

0.945

Strong

0.997

Strong

1

1

1

0.99

0.99

0.99

128

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

+

Operations as an Integrated Map

0.244

Strong

0.455

Moderate

0.271

Weak

0

0

0

0.99

0.66

0.33

129

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

+

SENSITIVITY TO OPERATIONS

0.200

Moderate

0.916

Strong

0.992

Strong

0

0

1

0.66

0.99

0.99

130

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

+

Sensemaking

0.095

Weak

0.403

Weak

0.279

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

322

131

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

+

Interruptions and Adjustments

0.060

Weak

0.353

Weak

0.227

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

132

Sustaining Dynamic Situational
Awareness

+

Anticipating and Controlling Latent
Singles

0.034

Weak

0.389

Weak

0.331

Weak

1

1

1

0.33

0.33

0.33

133

System Flexibility and Adaptability

+

COMMITMENT TO RESILIENCE

0.218

Strong

0.424

Weak

0.317

Weak

0

0

1

0.99

0.33

0.33

323

Appendix G: Materials of the Contextualization Procedure
Table 35: Scenario Based Managerial Interventions
Intervention (Source)

Stop-Work-Authority

Reporting Near Misses and Safety-Critical
Events

Fostering Social Ties and Mutual Respect

→

HRO-Relevant Concepts (Target)

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

-

Dysfunctional Momentum

-

Pressure

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

Simple Structure

+

Structural Flexibility

+

System Flexibility and Adaptability

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

-

Dysfunctional Momentum

+

Learning from Failure/Incidents

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry

-

Ignoring True Expertise

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

Organizational Variety

+

Redundancy

+

Self-Awareness

-

Self-Interest

+

Level of Employee Participation

-

Overreliance on Experts
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Institutionalizing Prosocial Motivation

+

Self-Awareness

-

Self-Interest

Foster a Sense of Personal Accountability for

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

Safety on All Levels

-

Complacency

-

Ignoring True Expertise

+

Level of Employee Participation

-

Self-Interest

+

Self-Awareness

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

+

Learning from Failure/Incidents

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

Organizational Variety

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

+

Domain-Specific Experience

+

Learning from Failure/Incidents

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

+

Level of Employee Participation

-

Overreliance on Experts

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

-

Self-Interest

+

Self-Awareness

Implementing Safety Huddles

Practicing Tabletop Exercises
Practicing Post-Event Debriefings
Practicing Emergency Drills

Institutionalizing Emotional Ambivalence
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Managing Reliability Drift

Practicing Individual Mindfulness

Implementing Just-In-Time Learning

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

+

Staying Focused

-

Dysfunctional Momentum

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

-

Pressure

+

System Flexibility and Adaptability

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

+

Staying Focused

-

Loss of Situational Awareness

-

Loss of Task Attention

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

+

Staying Focused

-

Loss of Situational Awareness

+

Level of Employee Participation

+

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

Understanding the Situation in Real-Time

+

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry

+

Learning from Failure/Incidents
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Appendix H: Material and Outcomes of the Pilot Study
Team 1 Handout and Inputs
Encouraging Stop-Work Authority
Definition: Employees and contractors are trained to stop work on an activity if, in their
opinion, a continuation of the work poses a threat to human health, property, or the
environment. This extends to stop-work cases that are not covered by government or
company regulations. People are celebrated for stopping work, even if service is disrupted.
Encouragement of stop-work authority is particularly emphasized when rank (line workers,
contractors) or conditions (layoffs and economic worries, high production pressure) make
it likely that people fail to stop work.
How does implementing this intervention impact the following concepts?
Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries (+)
Everybody is committed to precisely articulated standards for procedures and acceptable
risk levels, despite the tendency of such commitments to erode over time. Procedural
standards are protocols, checklists, responsibilities, job descriptions, required
qualifications, rules of teamwork, etc. Risk boundaries define what is considered a risk and
what is not, and which strategies are to be used to reduce or mitigate risks. They are the
result of systematic risk assessments.
Dysfunctional Momentum (-)
Continuing in the course of action without stopping and reassessing the situation in total,
particularly when the operations suffer lapses and unnoticed cues.
Members Level of Participation (+)
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Levels of participation are determined by three factors: the level of involvement of
employees in defining goals and ways to achieve them (contribution), the degree to which
employees feel that their contributions are valued and used (representation), and the degree
to which they focus on what the organization needs, even if this complicates their job.
Pressure (-)
Forces that can limit cognition, cause distraction, impede judgment, such as work and
production pressure, time pressure.
Personal Competence and Confidence (+)
Employees have the qualifications to improvise when needed successfully. This requires
two things:


General knowledge of:
•

the system (concepts, boundaries, behavior) to predict its state

•

possible actions to manage the system (knowledge of rules, regulations, standards,
resources).



Personal skills and confidence, based on knowing oneself, and having received
encouragement, motivation and trust by upper management.

Simple Structure (+)
Minimal but clear structure that provides experienced people a framework for making
sense of a situation and directing themselves as to what to do. Consists of core values, a
mission statement, and a few core regulations and rules of engagement. Enables
improvisation.
Structural Flexibility (+)
Reducing hierarchical structure’s rigidity to migrate decision-making to lower levels,
particularly to those in frontlines during emergencies and serious threats. Decision-making
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can thus be structured ad-hoc based on the needs of the situation. Structural flexibility
requires that members of the organization trust that, somewhere in the system, there is
sufficient competence to handle any problem and that it will be located when it is needed.
System Flexibility and Adaptability (+)
Ability to absorb shocks/disruptions without breaking (i.e. maintaining the same output)
and to quickly recover if severe disruptions occur.
Table 36: Workshop: Team 1 Data Inputs
Expected

Participants

Impact

Impact

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

+

+

0.63

Dysfunctional Momentum

-

-

0.33

Member’s level of participation

+

+

0.63

Pressure

-

-

0.33

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

-

0.33

System Flexibility and Adaptability

+

+

0.63

Simple Structure

+

+

0.63

Structure Flexibility

+

+

0.63

Safety-Related Practices

Scale

Based on your experience, do you think this intervention has additional impacts on safety
in offshore oil and gas? Please list them.
What are the problems that you experience or anticipate with this intervention?
Team 2 Handout and Inputs
Encouraging the Reporting of Near Misses and Safety-Critical Events
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Definition: Management actively encourages the reporting of near misses and safetycritical events and reduces barriers to reporting. Possible approaches: (1) clear definitions
of what constitutes a reportable incident, (2) supervisor example (i.e., supervisors report
themselves), (2) reporting as an expectation in performance evaluation, (3) immediate
positive feedback for the reporting employee, pointing out the problem that may have been
avoided as a result of him/her taking action, (4) no blame or fear of punishment for the
reporting employee, (5) if the level of reporting is generally low: honorable mention or
other visible (but not financially important) rewards for units which are top reporters, (6)
After corrective action is taken, inform the reporting employee about it, (7) where
appropriate, publicize the report and the corrective action beyond the immediately affected
organizational unit.
How does implementing this intervention impact the following concepts?
Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries (+)
Everybody is committed to precisely articulated standards for procedures and acceptable
risk levels, despite the tendency of such commitments to erode over time. Procedural
standards are protocols, checklists, responsibilities, job descriptions, required
qualifications, teamwork rules, etc. Risk boundaries define what is considered a risk and
what is not, and which strategies are to be used to reduce or mitigate risks. They are the
result of systematic risk assessments.
Dysfunctional Momentum (-)
Continuing in the course of action without stopping and reassessing the situation in total,
particularly when the operations suffer lapses and unnoticed cues.
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Learning from Failure/Incidents (+)
A systematic process through which employees and the organization seek to understand
any adverse safety events that have taken place to prevent similar future events. Decisionmakers involved in the incident receive feedback for their own decisions. People not
involved in the incidents receive lessons learned to spread the knowledge gained.
Members Level of Participation (+)
Levels of participation are determined by three factors: the level of involvement of
employees in defining goals and ways to achieve them (contribution), the degree to which
employees feel that their contributions are valued and used (representation), and the degree
to which they focus on what the organization needs, even if this complicates their job.
Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry (+)
Rather than processing readily available information only, systems are set up so that
employees can take action to seek out additional information actively. This can lead
employees to re-interpret already existing information, possibly triggering further
inquiries. Actions can include asking an expert, collecting other data, running an
experiment, using data analytics, etc.).
Table 37: Workshop: Team 2 Data Inputs
Concept

Expected Impact

Participant Impact

Scale

Adherence to Standards and Risk Boundaries

+

+

0.33

Dysfunctional Momentum

-

-

0.33

Learning from Failure/Incidents

+

+

0.63

Members’ Level of Participation

+

+

0.33

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry

+

+

0.33
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Based on your experience, do you think this intervention has additional impacts on safety
in offshore oil and gas? Please list them.
What are the problems that you experience or anticipate with this intervention?
Team 3 Handout and Inputs
Fostering Social Ties and Mutual Respect
Definition: Creating a work environment that fosters social ties that build on mutual
respect. Actions can include onboarding new team members (e.g., buddy or mentor
system), creating opportunities for social interactions, and setting clear expectations for
respectful behavior. This addresses the reliability challenges that occur when people do not
know each other well enough. They do not interact frequently or intensively. They have
modest mutual knowledge and move from one area or role to another while not
collaborating over extended periods.
How does implementing this intervention impact the following concepts?
Ignoring True Expertise (-)
Failing to identify and leverage the knowledge of true experts. Reasons can be relying on
rank, tenure, or perceived competence or “not invented here” (particularly after mergers).
Members Level of Participation (+)
Levels of participation are determined by three factors: the level of involvement of
employees in defining goals and ways to achieve them (contribution), the degree to which
employees feel that their contributions are valued and used (representation), and the degree
to which they focus on what the organization needs, even if this complicates their job.
Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry (+)
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Rather than processing readily available information only, systems are set up so that
employees can take action to seek out additional information actively. This can lead
employees to re-interpret already existing information, possibly triggering additional
inquiries. Actions can include asking an expert, collecting additional data, running an
experiment, using data analytics, etc.).
Personal Competence and Confidence (+)
Employees have the qualifications to improvise successfully, when needed. This requires
two things:


general knowledge of:
•

the system (concepts, boundaries, behavior, …) to predict its state

•

possible actions to manage the system (knowledge of rules, regulations,
standards, resources).



Personal skills and confidence, based on knowing oneself, and having received
encouragement, motivation, and trust by upper management.

Redundancy (+)
Designed duplications in the system for technological, individual, and organizational
elements. This can include backup equipment and personnel (e.g., backup energy supplies,
backup operator if the main operator becomes overwhelmed) and backup decision-making
and control (e.g., having multiple people independently do the same control task).
Requisite Variety and Complexity (+) (achieving the necessary organizational diversity)
Decisions are made based on the inputs of people from varied functional, educational, and
experiential backgrounds. This avoids simplistic interpretation and group-think.
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Disagreement and conflict are permitted and successfully negotiated, managed, and
controlled. Variety can be designed through hiring practices, frequent and adversarial
reviews, and by mixing up teams (e.g., job rotation and re-training and re-assignments).
Self-Awareness (+)
It is referring to knowing and acknowledging the knowledge and the experiences of one’s
self, as well as the limits and gaps in them. (Self-awareness reduces resistance to asking
for knowledge from others when needed).
Self-Interest (-) It refers to when members of the organization view their jobs based on
their interests and define their work content solely on their roles and responsibilities
officially given to them.
Table 38: Workshop: Team 3 Data Inputs
Concept

Expected Impact

Participant
Impact

Scale

Ignoring True Expertise

-

-

0.33

Members’ Level of Participation

+

+

0.33

Organizing for Action-Based Inquiry

+

-

0.33

Personal Competence and Confidence

+

+

0.63

+

No Impact

0.00

Redundancy

+

+

0.33

Self-Awareness

+

+

0.33

Self-Interest

-

-

0.33

Requisite Variety and Complexity / (achieving
the necessary organizational diversity)

334

Figure 52: Model Simulation Results Based on Team 1 Inputs
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Figure 53: Model Simulation Results Based on Team 2 Inputs
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Figure 54: Model Simulation Results Based on Team 3 Inputs
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Figure 55: Model Simulation Results Based on Combining Team 2&3 Inputs
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Sigmoid Function: Lambda 2

Sigmoid Function: Lambda 5

Hyperbolic Tangent Function: Lambda 2

Hyperbolic Tangent Function: Lambda 5

Figure 56: Different Inference Function and Two Values of Lambda (2, 5)
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Appendix I: Online Survey Final Results
Table 39 - Online Survey Final Results Calculated Based on the Median
Intervention

Stop-Work Authority

Reporting of Near Misses and
Safety-Critical Events

Fostering Social Ties and Mutual
Respect

Foster a Sense of Personal
Accountability for Safety on All
Levels

HRO-Relevant Concepts

Edge Sign and
Weight Based on
the Median

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.67

System flexibility and adaptability

-0.67

Simple structure

-0.33

Personal competence and confidence

0.33

Structure flexibility

-0.33

Pressure

0.33

Level of employee participation

0.33

Dysfunctional momentum

-0.67

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

1.00

Level of employee participation

0.67

Learning from Failure/Incidents

0.67

Organizing for action-based inquiry

0.33

Dysfunctional momentum

0.67

Organizing for action-based inquiry

0.67

Organizational variety

0.67

Redundancy

-0.33

Personal competence and confidence

0.33

Self-awareness

0.67

Ignoring expertise

0.67

Level of employee participation

0.67

Self-interest

-0.33

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.67

Complacency

-0.67

Learning from Failure/Incidents

0.00

Self-awareness

0.67

Ignoring expertise

0.00

Level of employee participation

0.67

Self-interest

0.67
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Implementing Safety Huddles

Tabletop Exercises

Post-Event Debriefings

Practicing Emergency Drills

Prosocial Motivation

Emotional Ambivalence

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.67

Organizing for action-based inquiry

0.33

Organizational variety

0.00

Personal competence and confidence

0.67

Learning from Failure/Incidents

0.67

Level of employee participation

0.67

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.33

Organizing for action-based inquiry

0.50

Personal competence and confidence

0.67

Learning from Failure/Incidents

0.50

Domain Specific Experience

0.50

Level of employee participation

0.17

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

1.00

Organizing for action-based inquiry

1.00

Personal competence and confidence

1.00

Learning from Failure/Incidents

1.00

Domain Specific Experience

1.00

Level of employee participation

1.00

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.67

Organizing for action-based inquiry

0.67

Personal competence and confidence

0.67

Learning from Failure/Incidents

0.67

Domain Specific Experience

0.67

Level of employee participation

0.33

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.00

Self-awareness

0.67

Overreliance on experts

0.67

Level of employee participation

0.67

Self-interest

0.00

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.50

Personal competence and confidence

0.67

Self-awareness

0.67

Overreliance on experts

-0.67

Level of employee participation

0.67
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Managing Reliability Drift

Practicing Individual Mindfulness

Just-In-Time Learning

Self-interest

-0.33

Staying focused

0.00

Level of employee participation

0.00

Personal competence and confidence

0.00

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.00

System flexibility and adaptability

0.00

Pressure

-0.33

Dysfunctional momentum

-0.33

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

0.33

Personal competence and confidence

0.67

Loss of task attention

-0.50

Staying focused

0,67

Pressure

-0.17

Loss of situational awareness

-0.50

Level of employee participation

0.33

Adherence to Standard and Risk Boundaries

-0.67

Organizing for action-based Inquiry

0.00

Personal competence and confidence

-0.33

Understanding the situation in Realtime

-0.33

Learning from Failure/Incidents

-0.67

Loss of task attention

0.33

Staying focused

-0.67

Loss of situational awareness

0.33

Level of employee participation

0.33
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